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 1 
Introduction 
This dissertation is a critical discourse analysis of sovereignty in Western canonical political 
theory. The Oxford English Dictionary defines sovereignty as “supremacy in respect of 
excellence or efficacy; preeminence, as political supremacy...[or] supremacy in respect of power 
or rank; supreme authority.” As early modern French legal scholar Jean Bodin (1530-1596) notes 
in his Method for the Easy Comprehension of History (1566), sovereignty is involved in five 
functions:  
I see the sovereignty of the state involved in five functions. One, and it is the principal 
one, is creating the most important magistrates and defining the office of each one; the 
second, proclaiming and annulling laws; the third, declaring war and peace; the fourth, 
receiving final appeal from all magistrates; the last, the power of life and death when the 
law itself leaves no room for extenuation or grace.
1
  
Although sovereignty is not necessarily a theological signifier, Christian moral philosopher H. 
Richard Niebuhr (1894-1962) draws out its religious significance by signaling sovereignty as a 
deity. A deity is, for Niebuhr, an entity, whether person or idea, that has the power to evoke 
absolute loyalty and devotion as their ultimate cause and center of value.
2
 In his Radical 
Monotheism and Western Culture (1943,1970), Niebuhr depicts Western culture as constituted 
by three deities: “the many,” which are the objects of desire (polytheism), “the one among the 
many” (henotheism), and “the One beyond all the many” (radical monotheism).3 These deities 
are in perpetual competition for human faith, that is, human “dependence on a value center or 
loyalty to a cause.”4 The concept of sovereignty plays itself out in our human contestations over 
faith on earth and the battle of the gods.       
                                                        
1
 Bodin, Method for the Easy Comprehension of History trans. by Beatrice Reynolds (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1945), 172-3 
2
 Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (Louisville: John Knox Press), 24 
3
 Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism, 24 
4
 Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism, 24 
 2 
Nothwithstanding the polyvalence of Sovereignty, this dissertation tracks the concept as a 
political symbol throughout modern Western political theory. The dissertation begins with the 
early modern writings of Jean Bodin and English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), both 
of whom had monarchial views of sovereignty. It then tracks the four-fold transmigration of the 
discourse on political sovereignty, which rests first with the monarch and then “the people” in 
the thought of John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). With 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and GWF Hegel (1770-1831), sovereignty comes to nest in the 
authority of “reason”. Finally, sovereignty comes to rest on “the dictator” for German jurist Carl 
Schmitt (1888-1985) and “ideology” for German political theorist Hannah Arendt (1906-1975).  
This dissertation finds that sovereignty is justified by three doctrines in Western canonical 
discourse: the state of nature, the body and the political body. The state of nature is a figure of 
speech, a primordial myth that has been taken literally, and the political body is nature’s 
mimetically derived political symbol. Thinking on the state of nature thus conditions thinking on 
the political body. Thus the state of nature becomes the central theme among the three for how 
one thinks about sovereignty. This dissertation finds that Hobbes’ doctrine of the state of nature 
has become hegemonic in the discourse on sovereignty, and that his doctrines of the state of 
nature and the body politic have problematic enduring cultural-historical effects, especially for 
African Americans and the world’s poor.    
How I Came to the Topic of Study 
I proceed in a rather autobiographical manner to situate the significance of this 
dissertation to my overall concerns with African American political theology. I did not originally 
plan to write a dissertation on sovereignty. I only came to a decision on this topic after a long 
course of development from the time I arrived at Vanderbilt through coursework, qualifying 
 3 
examinations, and a dissertation proposal. In coming to Vanderbilt University in 2006, when 
asked by professors and graduate students what I wanted to work on, I was very uncertain about 
my research trajectory. As a student at Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary, in Austin, 
Texas, Reformed theology was paint on the hallow halls, and the spirits of John Calvin and Karl 
Barth enjoyed great privilege. Many of their theological commitments resonated with my own 
background as a non-denominational black Evangelical. I was sure that I would be a Reformed 
theologian, thinking and writing under the lights of Calvin, Schleiermacher, and Barth. Though I 
continue to appreciate their influence on my thinking, the reader will note, perhaps with a 
measure of concern, that these figures appear nowhere as topics of interest governing this 
dissertation. I hope to ease this concern momentarily.  
Moreover, during my final year at Austin, in passing conversations, I was introduced to 
something called “public theology” and found the idea critical for my application to study at 
Vanderbilt. However, my knowledge of public theology was much too shallow to ground my 
graduate research trajectory. Although reformed theology and public theology captured my 
academic interest, my heart belonged to the “least, lost, and left out” of the world, those whom 
psychiatrist and philosopher Frantz Fanon dubbed the “wretched of the earth.” This ambivalence 
was in part a result of my experiences growing up in poverty and in part an outgrowth of my 
Christian faith. Thus at Austin Seminary, throughout my theological education in a mainline, 
predominantly white, progressive Presbyterian seminary I immersed myself in a variety of 
“publics” connected to America’s underclass. I served as a youth minster at St. James Missionary 
Baptist Church (2001-2006), as staff intern for the Honorable Representative Dawnna Dukes 
during Texas’ 79th Session, and as a special project director at the Austin Area Urban League 
(2005-2006).   
 4 
In my intellectual development, I found a measure of coherence between my academic 
interests and my social action by reading works by Christian philosopher and cultural critic 
Cornel West. Three works were particularly motivating: Prophesy Deliverance: An Afro-
American Revolutionary Christianity (1982, 2002), Race Matters (1993, 2001), and Democracy 
Matters: Winning the Fight against Imperialism (2004). Race Matters evoked in me the acute 
sensibility of existential nihilism that was threatening over young black men and women 
throughout the U.S. Senses of meaninglessness, hopelessness, and lovelessness marked my self-
understanding at the time. Yet, West foregrounded the immanent force of love that sustained me 
against the absurd. Prophesy Deliverance was both shocking and exciting. West presented the 
very real possibility of socio-political transformation driven by African American faith and 
Marxist social theory. Such a transformation through the power of black revolutionary 
Christianity would bring the perennial domination of blacks in America to an end. Even if 
West’s vision remained unfulfilled, I became fixated on the problems he raised in that book.  
However, it was West’s Democracy Matters that brought together the wider scope of my 
concerns for the world’s poor and socio-political transformation. West highlights three 
‘antidemocratic dogmas’ that dominate the American cultural landscape. They are “free market 
fundamentalism” (an unfettered, deregulated market, even at the expense of public interest), 
“aggressive militarism” (might makes right), and “escalating authoritarianism” (the staggering 
growth in the areas of US government surveillance and policing and the centralization of key 
aspects of law such as criminal justice).
5
 These dogmas frame the cultural conditions of African 
American oppression in the early twenty-first century.  
                                                        
5
 The definitions of these dogmas are modifications of West’s original definitions that have been modified in light of 
my own research, especially ‘escalating authoritarianism’. For West’s own definitions see Democracy Matters (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2004), 4-7 
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Although West shaped much of my thinking before Vanderbilt, it was the writings of French 
social theorist Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Italian Political theorist Giorgio Agamben 
(1942-) that convinced me to write on sovereignty.  I came to critical political consciousness by 
reading West, But also found West’s sole focus on culture left unattended larger social forces, 
especially political and economic ones. Arriving to Vanderbilt, then, I was theoretically 
confused: Where to turn? Theology? Culture Studies? Social Policy Studies? I read as widely as 
I could during the first two years of my graduate study. I was introduced to Foucault in my 
Theories of Practice Seminar, specifically his Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
(1986).
6
 Here, Foucault argues that sovereign power now works primarily through various subtle 
forms of social discipline (exams, normalizing judgments, hierarchical observations, 
classifications, confinement) rather than through its older, more spectacular methods of 
punishment (town scaffold). The operations of sovereign power are mobilized to protect the 
sovereign social body.  
While Foucault’s text put sovereignty on my radar, Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998), compelled me to take sovereignty seriously. I was 
introduced to Agamben in my Biopolitics and Biopower course. Agamben discusses how the 
logic of sovereignty still circulates throughout modern societies (in the form of the ban), an event 
where one is abandoned by both human and divine law.
7
 Caught in this double exclusion, the 
abandoned is rendered “bare life”, “life that is able to be killed but not sacrificed”8 and life that is 
always already under the shadow of sovereign power. Between Foucault’s and Agamben’s 
                                                        
6
 West rejected Foucault’s analysis in The Evasion of American Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (1989), 
223-226. West’s humanist conception of human agency would not allow him to acknowledge Foucault’s description 
of modern power, i.e. biopolitics. See “The Political Philosophy and Humanism of Cornel West” by Howard 
McGary, Jr. in Cornel West: A Critical Reader 
7
 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 28 
8
 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 99 
 6 
writings, I began to see how the concept of sovereignty was linked to my concern for the “least 
of these.”  
Before beginning my dissertation research, I took qualifying examinations. These gave me 
my first opportunity to study the topic of sovereignty beyond Foucault and Agamben. I read not 
only in philosophy, which is the primary focus of the dissertation, but especially in theology. The 
twentieth century Western political theological discourse on sovereignty has been defined 
primarily by two figures, Anglican “radical orthodox” theologian John Milbank and the late 
political theorist Jean Bethke Elsthain.  Milbank’s views on sovereignty are expressed most 
definitively in Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (1990), where he argues that 
the fundamental problem of Western culture is the sovereignty of secular reason, which 
nihilistically posits that power, violence and self-interest lie at the root of all human relations.
9
 
For Milbank, secular culture is one where self-assertion, domination and aggression are virtues, 
and ultimately a culture that deconstructs into “violent, agonistic difference.”10 Milbank argues 
that sovereign secular reason also blinds culture to the fact that its claims about human nature are 
theological claims. Secular reason itself stands on the heretical notion of “the dominium of an 
arbitrary, voluntarist God.”11 Thus for Milbank, to engage sovereignty is to engage issues of 
ontology, to answer questions about the nature of existence and being.
12
 Engaging sovereignty is 
also to engage issues of metaphysics, discussing a) what is ultimately real and b) the nature of 
                                                        
9
 See Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 1990, 2006). Also see his 
The Future of Love and Theology (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2009) and Theology and The Political: The New 
Debate (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005) 
10
 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 380 
11
 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory 326 
12
 Edward Craig, “Ontology”, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/ontology Accessed 8/6/2015 
 7 
reality.
13
 Milbank argues that any account of human existence that fails to acknowledge the 
reality of the sovereign Christian triune God of reason and love denies reality itself. Such 
accounts also necessarily subscribe to a heterodox understanding of God as an all-powerful, 
irresistible will-centered being. The reality of the triune God implies an ontology of peace as 
well as unity and harmony for the world’s difference. Milbank says, “as the reality which 
includes and encompasses in [God’s] comprehensio every difference, God is also the God who 
differentiates.”14 Recognition of the reality of God also reorients our desires, displacing self-
interest and lust (cupiditas) with true love of God and other (caritas).
15
    
Like Milbank, Elshtain takes up sovereignty in terms of metaphysics, although she casts the 
discussion around a realist/nominalist polemic as opposed to Milbank’s orthodoxy/heresy one.16 
In Sovereignty: God, State, and Self (2008) Elshtain argues that there are essentially two views 
on sovereignty.
17
 On one hand, realists such as St. Augustine (354-430), St. Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274), and Elshtain herself agree that all volition and action, including sovereignty, should 
be checked by limits.
18
 For example, political will should be checked by the right to life. Such 
checks on political action reflect the (metaphysical) structure of the cosmos, where (God’s) 
power is limited by the laws of nature (or divine covenant). On the other hand, nominalists such 
as Richard Hooker (1554-1600) and Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) prioritize will and power over 
limits and thus advocate unlimited sovereignty. Politically, they might emphasize dictatorial or 
national will over established laws. Like realists, nominalists have a view of the world. 
                                                        
13
 Edward Craig, “Metaphysics” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/metaphysics, Accessed 8/6/2015  
14
 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 429-30, brackets mine 
15
 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, ch. 12 
16
 See Elshtain’s Sovereignty, God, State, and Self: The Gifford Lectures (New York: Basic Books, 2008) and 
Augustine and the Limits of Politics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).  
17
 See also Elshtain’s Augustine and the Limits of Politics (1995) and Democracy on Trial (New York: Basic Books, 
1995). 
18
 Elshtain, Sovereignty, God State, and Self, ch. 1 
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Nominalists believe that (God’s) power is so absolute that even the world’s existence is 
contingent. Elshtain notes nominalism’s troubling view of culture as well. Nominalism posits a 
“sovereign self”, a “monistic self” whose willing and action takes place “in a vacuum”19 without 
acknowledging contexts, relationships and other limits to which the self is responsible.
20
 For 
Elshtain, the sovereign self is the self of unlimited desire, and as such, unfit for democratic life 
and oriented toward socially destructive action. Such a self feeds a culture of “multiple, 
individualized entities, each willing and each calling upon the state- a state defined as entirely 
self-determining under the classical definition of sovereignty – to satisfy that willing and to serve 
as a model of strong self-determination.”21 Elshtain advocates a realist metaphysics and a limited 
sovereignty, and also cautions against the sovereignty of self or identity politics in our 
postmodern political climate.  
I also studied the discourses of black and womanist theologies of liberation on sovereignty, 
discourses which, although insightful, contributed little on the topic. Like West, black and 
womanist theological discourses of liberation conduct analyses primarily at the level of culture. 
Key texts in my theological ethics exam were Dwight N. Hopkins’ Religions/Globalizations: 
Theories and Cases (2001), Being Human: Race, Culture, Religion (2005) and Black Faith and 
Public Talk: Critical Essays on James H. Cone’s Black Theology and Black Power (1999). I also 
studied much of James H. Cone’s work, including Black Theology and Black Power (1969), A 
Black Theology of Liberation (1970), and God of the Oppressed (1975) as well as key womanist 
thinkers such as Katie Cannon’s Black Womanist Ethics (1988) and Emilie Townes’ Breaking 
the Fine Rain of Death (1998) and Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of Evil (2006). 
                                                        
19
 Elshtain, Sovereignty, God State, and Self, 166 
20
 Elshtain, Sovereignty, God State, and Self, 160, 229 “[W]ith the emergence of sovereign selves,” says Elshtain, 
“the sovereign God stands as a provocation: man must himself become a God against the Creator God in order to 
strip himself of any indebtedness, whether to Creator or other persons.” 160 
21
 Elshtain, Sovereignty, God State, and Self, 160-1 
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If there yet remains an unarticulated consensus on the topic of sovereignty in black theological 
discourse, it is a critical orientation toward the sovereignty of white supremacist ideology. In 
black liberationist discourse, white supremacy aspires to be that ultimate principle of authority 
beyond all laws and magistrates. The relevance of black liberationist discourses for this 
dissertation lies in the fact that they reflect and give voice to a culture located on the underside of 
sovereignty, one more exposed to the sovereign powers of death than those of life. Black 
liberationist discourses emerge from such a state of affairs. As my qualifying exams came to a 
close, then, I was forced to acknowledge the limits of theological discourse with respect to 
gaining clarity on the concept of sovereignty or in understanding how their perspectives on 
sovereignty connected to the concrete, everyday struggles of the least of these.   
Having completed qualifying examinations, I then moved into the dissertation stage of my 
research. My qualifying examinations had not only increased my knowledge on sovereignty, but 
also suggested strong links between this concept and both “race” and “American empire”. It 
seemed necessary, then, to study these three concepts as a cluster or constellation. Linking my 
research back to Cornel West’s work, I entitled my dissertation proposal, “The Niggerization of 
the Other: Sovereignty, Race and the American Empire.” If the latter two terms emerged as 
correlates to sovereignty during the course of my qualifying examinations, the term 
“niggerization” was taken from Cornel West’s Democracy Matters, where he used the term to 
capture a growing sense of fear and insecurity among Americans. West says: 
Americans of all classes, colors, regions, religions, genders, and sexual orientations [feel] 
unsafe, unprotected, subject to random violence, and hated. Yet to have been designated and 
treated as a nigger in America for over 350 years has been to feel unsafe, unprotected, subject 
to random violence, and hated.” 22  
                                                        
22
 West, Democracy Matters, 20 
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My original research goal was thus to critique this process of “niggerization” by analyzing the 
three categories of sovereignty, race, and American empire. I wanted to take seriously the 
structurally expansive forms of sovereignty and racism that are determinate in the 
“niggerization” not only of African American ‘Others’, but also other ethnies, so called third-
world populations, and global economies influenced by U.S. foreign policy.  
 I found West’s three doctrines, namely free-market fundamentalism, escalating 
authoritarianism and aggressive militarism, to be an adequate account of what sovereignty looks 
like in our contemporary global situation, and why sovereignty continues to be a bad idea. 
Moreover, I wanted to investigate the operations and effects of sovereignty in particular cases 
such as the war on drugs culminating in the phenomenon of mass incarceration, the rule of 
necro-politics over the global south, or the globalization of multinational corporations’ 
productive capital, which has rendered the world’s poor poorer, destroyed continuities of many 
traditional societies and indigenous peoples, and contributes to the making of world subalterns. I 
also planned to search for a substantive theological interpretation of West’s conception of radical 
democracy that was faithful to the resources of black Christianity. This interpretation would be 
instrumental in the renewal of democratic practices beyond the logics of sovereignty, race, and 
American imperialism. To be sure, my goals were ambitious, and I have come to provisionally 
set aside these goals to gain clarity on “sovereignty” itself. Sovereignty has too long of a history 
(emerging in the 1500s) and is entangled in too many discourses to do it justice except on its own 
terms, at least initially. This dissertation is thus a ground clearing project on the concept. Only 
after getting clearer on it could I move forward with my original plan for a project in African 
American political theology. 
 
 11 
Method: Critical Discourse Analysis 
There were lots of interpretive issues to overcome in my research. In pursuing this 
project, I first began reading in social theory and political theology, but have since read in a wide 
range of disciplines, including law, economics, history, psychology, political science, science, 
and even a bit of math, which I had actively avoided for my entire educational career. I began 
looking at texts in modern political theory to understand the categories that fill in theoretical 
points in political and social thinking on sovereignty. As I read more recent political 
philosophers such as Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990), Sheldon Wolin (1922-), Judith Shklar 
(1928-1992) Leo Strauss (1899-1973), Wendy Brown (1955-) and J.B. Schneewind (1930-), I 
discovered that there was an established rubric of figures that continued to circulate around 
certain periods. So through secondary literature I was led to isolate canonical figures on 
sovereignty in liberal civic republicanism. These figures are Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes (ch. 
1), John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (ch. 2), Immanuel Kant (ch. 3) GWF Hegel (ch. 4), 
Carl Schmitt (ch. 5) and Hannah Arendt (ch.6). Much of the secondary literature on liberal 
political theory refers back to the canonical figures covered in this dissertation, and Western 
politics is largely interpreted and evaluated in light of these figures. Thus, I selected figures that 
are inescapable as representative theorists of civic republicanism.  
This dissertation is a discourse analysis of primary texts of these representative figures on 
sovereignty. Discourse analyst Titus Hjelm defines discourse analysis as the “study of how to do 
things with words”, especially how words construct social reality.23 Discourse is a “way of 
speaking that does not simply reflect or represent things ‘out there’, but ‘constructs’ or 
                                                        
23
 Titus Hjelm, “Discourse Analysis” in The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion ed. 
by Michael Strausberg and Steven Engler, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 134  
 12 
‘constitutes’ them.”24 According to Hjelm, discourse analysis begins with the premise that all 
descriptions of the world - written or spoken texts - are by definition partial, and that the 
variability of discourse itself is an indicator of the constructed nature of social life. Discourse 
analysis highlights this constitutive feature of texts. Discourse is not only constitutive, but also 
functional.  
Discourse analyst Norman Fairclough thus defines discourse as “the use of language seen 
as a form of sociocultural practice.”25 Here, discourse analysis is analysis of how texts work 
within and as sociocultural practice. Analysis in this more critical model requires attention to 
textual form, structure and organization at all levels, the phonological, grammatical and lexical, 
for the ways that discourse contributes both to the reproduction of society and to social change.
26
 
This may include vocabulary and metaphors, grammar, politeness conventions, speech-
exchange, style, or other aspects of discourse.
27
 One must thus live with the texts to get a sense 
of them. Critical discourse analysts ask how the discursive constructions of common knowledge 
perpetuate particular ways of thinking and practice by suppressing alternative discourse. They 
focus not only on the way that discourse constructs reality, but more specifically on how 
discourse constructs reality such that relationships of domination/oppression are maintained. 
Critical discourse analysis thus asks about relations of power and ideology in discourse as well 
as a reality outside of discourse that is reproduced and exchanged discursively.  
According to Hjelm, critical discourse analysts must be aware that the range of a text’s 
properties is potentially ideological. Following Hjelm, I understand ideology not simply as a 
                                                        
24
 Hjelm, “Discourse Analysis” 135 
25
 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language, (New York: Longman Group Limited, 
1995), 7 
26
 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, 4 
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(philosophical) grand narrative of cultural transformation (e.g. Marx’s class struggle and a 
subsequent communist society), but also as “meaning in service of power…which contributes to 
the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination.”28 Discourse analysts 
ask about the ideological nature of discourse, which not only includes ideological conceptions of 
self and world, but also the kinds of relations these ideologies support and the actions they 
legitimate. Following Fairclough’s conception of power, a discourse may thus be defined as 
ideological to the extent that it maintains either asymmetries between participants in discourse 
events or the unequal capacity to control how texts are produced, distributed, consumed.
29
 The 
peak of ideology is hegemonic discourse. An ideological discourse becomes hegemonic when all 
alternative constructions are suppressed in favor of one dominating view.  
The framework of critical discourse analysis should enable one to analyze language in 
ways that address its involvement in contemporary capitalist society, thus serving as a resource 
for people who are struggling against domination and oppression in its linguistic forms.
30
 This 
includes a multifunctional view of text. Texts always simultaneously function a) ideationally in 
the representation of experience and the world, b) interpersonally in constituting social 
interaction between participants in discourse and c) textually in tying texts to situational 
contexts.
31
 My framework also notes that in critical discourse analysis, one seeks to move 
beyond studying the actual “content of a text” to studying the “content of its texture.” It asks 
about a text’s form of organization, its links to other texts and text types, and its implicit 
meaning. In the final analysis, this method is more interpretive than an exact science. As 
Fairclough notes, it is the process of wandering to and fro in and between texts until one finally 
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comes upon “the halfway house between presence and absence.”32 Yet Hjelm reminds us that 
analysis still makes use of three different models, and is thus not arbitrary. A discourse analyst 
may ask 1) about the cognitive reception and processing of texts (cognitive model), 2) about the 
thematic structures in discourse itself (interactive model), or 3) about the dynamics of power, 
knowledge and ideology that surround discursive processes (critical model). This dissertation 
adapts and combines these models as needed. Hjelm reminds the analyst, however, that the 
primary focus of discourse analysis is the thematic macrostructure of a text and its application in 
practical analysis. In analysis, “the theme of discourse is processed and condensed from the 
words and sentences of a particular text.”33  
Reading primary texts allowed me to analyze actual discourse on sovereignty rather than 
secondary discourses about the discourse on sovereignty. I was also able to map out from the 
texts themselves the nuances between these figures to gain a better sense of their own structures 
beyond generalizable themes and to get a sense of their own difficulties and complexities beyond 
generalizable judgments. Again, not only did I read primary texts, but also theological readings 
and secondary literature as well as literature dealing with the development of modern liberal 
thought, some of which were very hard to get. The historical contextual work was background 
for reading primary texts. Then after reading primary sources, I mined them for their 
hermeneutical value to the questions that this dissertation asks, namely in what ways does 
discourse on sovereignty contribute to the oppression of the world’s poor and socially marginal? 
My analysis suggests that theorists of sovereignty in the Western tradition such as Thomas 
Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, etc. are comparable rather than redundant, and certainly 
not reducible to their agreement on the notion of a “social contract”. Their differences are 
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especially exhibited by way of three thematic centers that frame discourses on sovereignty in 
liberal civic republicanism. This same thematic structure also operates as the organizing rubric 
for my chapters. As with the figures studied, then, the chapter thematizations allow for 
comparisons between theorists disparate in time. The thematic centers are a) “the state of 
nature,” a social theory of what life was like before the political organization of social life, b) 
“the body,” their philosophical anthropology, their view of the nature of human beings, and c) 
“the political body,” the visions by which social communities are rendered politically coherent.  
Discourse analysis on sovereignty reveals a story. It is the story of sovereignty and the 
loss of “the political”, or civil society, in modern political thought, culminating in the perpetual 
state of exception. This dissertation describes the dynamics inherent in modernist theories of 
sovereignty, which over time and through a series of rational moves, have progressively eroded 
the centrality of the political. In early modern theories of sovereignty (Bodin, Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau), the political was embedded logically in the body politic. With Hume’s radical 
empiricism leading to Kant’s rational empiricism and the abandonment of traditional 
metaphysics for transcendental thinking, theories of sovereignty traveled from their metaphysical 
basis in early modern thinkers to the reason of state. Thus, in comparison with early modern 
thinkers, Kant and Hegel give little attention to a philosophy of nature and do not envision a 
political body based on an imaginary social contract. With Hegel in particular, the reason of state 
becomes totalized. With this epistemological shift, the political force of early modern theory, 
along with its notion of the political body, recedes into background as bureaucracy, management 
and statecraft become the primary locus of the political. In an early 20
th
 century crisis, the reason 
of state abandoned itself to the state of exception, marked by the voluntary creation of a 
permanent state of emergency and the suspension of habeas corpus for certain populations. The 
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outline of the chapters reflects and gives rise to this narrative. The dissertation frames this 
discussion in six chapters, which are divided for heuristic purposes into two parts, Part I: 
Sovereignty and the Metaphysics of Nature, which includes chapters 1-2, Bodin, Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau on sovereignty, and part II: Sovereignty and the Rationality of State, consisting of 
chapters 3-6, Kant, Hegel, Schmitt, Arendt and culminating in Agamben’s state of exception.  
The gravest difficulty in discourse analysis is translatability. To meet this challenge, the 
dissertation gives attention to historical context and the significance of their contexts for the 
theory. It also analyzes theorists’ answers to the problems posed by the political order of their 
day. It shows their considerable agreement with philosophical and scientific thinking, which 
grounds their views of nature and anthropology. It then pays close attention to the analyticity of 
distinctions embedded within the complexity of political theories of sovereignty. Finally, I try to 
show how the analytic particulars contribute to a coherent picture of a unified political order in 
their theory. I thus try to give an image of their understanding of the political body and consider 
its promise as a contribution to the development of civic republicanism and its concept of 
sovereignty. It is from this final step that my thesis emerges, namely the four-fold transmigration 
of sovereignty from the monarch to the people to reason to ideology.  
To be exact, this dissertation reflects interest in one area of political theology. It critically 
analyzes the discourse on sovereignty to get at its structural logic insofar as this understanding 
enters into our structure of civil society. The dissertation asks what sovereignty bestows upon 
actors in civil society, whether the monarch, the people or representatives. Sovereignty itself is a 
free-floating signifier; what was ascribed to the monarch in Bodin floats to the people and its 
representatives in Locke, and in the thinking of Kant, to the military. It consists ultimately of the 
power and authority over life and death.  
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To conclude, political theologians bear a great responsibility for the history of effects and 
consequences of sovereignty as the ideology of totality and power in the twenty-first century. 
Sovereignty endures even today in the state of exception, which frames our current global 
political context. The challenge this dissertation presents for future constructive work is how to 
construe the political when the state of exception seems perpetual in the 21
st
 century. In this 
sense, the dissertation is a prolegomena to an African American political theology in the state of 
exception, where the henotheism of market forces reigns supreme: free-market fundamentalism, 
escalating authoritarianism, and aggressive militarism. In concluding the dissertation, I ask the 
following questions: 1) How might one think about African American Political Theology where 
we seem caught between the rock of Carl Schmitt’s henotheistic faith in the national community 
as sovereign and the hard place of Hannah Arendt’s polytheistic faith in plurality and difference? 
This dissertation finds through the critical theory of philosopher Giorgio Agamben that the 
beginning of an answer to this question lies in understanding the state of nature doctrine not as 
an ontological game of the reconciliation of “identity and difference”, but as a paradigm for the 
art of governance. Viewing the state of nature doctrine as a paradigm enables us to see that 
certain state of nature doctrines are constituted with the paradigm of sovereignty, and that this 
paradigm must be forcefully countered with alternative paradigms. I explore these paradigms in 
detail in chapter 7 and the conclusion. CB   
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Chapter 1 
Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes: Monarchial Sovereignty 
 
This chapter takes up the writings of French legal theorist Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and 
English political theorist Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who overlapped with Baruch de Spinoza 
and John Locke, as canonical representatives of early modern (15
th 
-16
th 
century) discourses on 
sovereignty. Both Bodin and Hobbes articulated their political theory during the decline of late 
medieval feudalism, the Catholic religio-political establishment, and the rise of mercantilist and 
capitalist regimes. They take up and reconfigure sovereignty in an attempt to establish an 
appropriate arrangement of authority and power in early modern European states. Analysis of the 
discourse on sovereignty discloses its progressive democratization since the sixteenth century, 
and although neither thinker in this chapter is a democrat, there is a slight movement in the locus 
of sovereignty from the monarch in Bodin to the monarch as state in Hobbes. Both thinkers are 
absolute monarchialists, where the king’s will transcends public law, and the king has ultimate 
authority over the power of life and death. However, they differ in that Bodin locates the origins 
of sovereignty with heads of households while Hobbes, on the other hand, attributes sovereignty 
to everyone in the state of nature, before the state is constituted. Bodin and Hobbes also differ in 
their understandings of the nature of the political body. For Bodin, the political body is a natural 
outgrowth of (and is modeled on) the family. For Hobbes, the political body is a voluntary 
construct authorized by social contract. The political body creates unity out of self-interest in an 
otherwise precarious and atomistic world.  
Hobbes is slightly less absolutist that Bodin in terms of the offices of government. 
However, this dissertation finds that Hobbes’s state of nature doctrine has had had far more 
deleterious effects with respect to African American freedom than Bodin’s doctrine of nature. 
Hobbes’s state of nature doctrine, theorized largely based on traveler’s reports of experiences 
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during the colonization of the New World, Africa and India, has had a long and lingering 
negative history of effects on African Americans. This doctrine, which reflects the darkest 
dimensions of frightened white Western fantasy, has been read onto black and colored bodies in 
an effort to order them “appropriately” in relation to ‘the civilized’ and civilization, i.e. the 
political body. In the end, it is this doctrine of nature rather than any absolutist theory of 
government, that continues to vitiate African American struggles for freedom by providing the 
state with a paradigm, which justifies the exercise of sovereignty. This chapter introduces the 
doctrine to the reader within Hobbes’s own context. Before Hobbes, however, we begin with 
Bodin. 
A. Jean Bodin 
Context 
French legal scholar Jean Bodin (1530-1596) was among many of his time to offer a theory 
of absolute monarchial sovereignty. This was done within the context of an early modern 
Europe, whose structures of feudal society were upset as the Renaissance and Reformation 
movements permeated Northwestern Europe (France, Germany, Italy) and England. Empowered 
by a burgeoning mercantilist economy, sixteenth century France began to assert its international 
independence against the jurisdictional authority of both the papacy and Holy Roman 
Imperium.
34
 Christendom was falling away, and a new imperium was coming into formation. 
According to legal historian Harold J. Berman, the French Catholic establishment also took 
action to quell the growing number of Calvinist-formed Huguenots, who became more bold 
about the open practice of their Protestant faith in a Catholic Country. Berman explains that the 
Huguenots posed a unique threat because they “advocated the bible-based right and duty not of 
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every person…to kill a tyrant, but of the responsible leaders of the Christian community, the 
elders or magistrates, to overthrow a monarch who persecutes adherents of the truth faith.”35 The 
Huguenots’ social movement for the freedom to practice their faith destabilized the French-
Catholic establishment, which in turn heightened efforts to persecute the nascent Protestant 
faction. The Catholic backlash became especially vicious on August 24, 1572, when Queen 
Mother Catherine of Medici oversaw the murder of Huguenot political and military leaders in the 
St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of 1572.  
Although the exercise of sovereignty began as a royal prerogative, the Queen Mother 
could not control its unintended social consequences. The political violence enacted on August 
24 spilled over into French society as several thousand Huguenots were killed in the following 
weeks, continuing well after Charles I had issued a royal order for the killings to cease on August 
25th. Over the course of his intellectual career, Bodin remains steadfast on the conviction that 
the political body is rooted in the monarch. This suggests that Bodin would have legitimated both 
the murderous acts of August 24
th
 and the order to cease and desist on the following day. As a 
royalist, Bodin would have argued that any evil committed by the crown’s sovereign acts was 
ultimately offset by the fundamental good of the preservation of the state. But he failed to 
consider the unintended social consequences of his theory, wherein an act of political 
sovereignty incited a wave of cultural violence that dethroned the very authority he wanted to 
establish in France. 
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The “Theater” of Nature and the Body 
According American historian Ann M. Blair, Bodin’s doctrine of nature was derived 
from a Renaissance humanist method called the “commonplace book.” Blair explains that with 
this method one uses a notebook to organize “interesting turns of phrase, opinions, or facts of all 
kinds encountered in reading, travel, and daily life, for later retrieval and use.”36 Blair notes that 
the commonplace book was “taught in Renaissance schools and advocated by Bodin himself in 
his first major work, the Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem (Method for the Easy 
Comprehension of History – 1566)”37. It provided a way for students to manage the “explosion 
of knowledge in late Renaissance without cognitive dissonance”.38 The method also appears in 
his Universae naturae theatrum (theater of all of nature, 1596), where he uses it to argue that one 
must study nature in a particular order. According to Blair, Bodin’s view of a correct 
understanding of nature begins with the things most “clear to us”, i.e. ash, the elements, the earth 
and sky, plants, fossils and animals. Only after considering these may we proceed to those “most 
difficult” things, i.e. humans, the heavenly bodies.39 “Finally, [we consider] God, incorporeal, 
eternal and infinite,…[at]a tenth hypostases ‘outside the order of nature’”.40 Blair argues that this 
approach to the study of nature is frequently characterized as a “chain of being”, where as 
Bodin’s view may also be understood as a “complex web of interconnections.”41 Bodin himself 
speaks of a ‘chain of being’ at times, but also of “the indissoluble coherence of nature, its 
interrelations and agreements.”42 Bodin says, 
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For there is nothing we have searched for more diligently than the succession of all things 
and the indissoluble coherence of nature, its interrelations and agreements [contagionem 
et consensum], and [to see] how the first things correspond to the last, the middle ones to 
both extremities, and everything to everything else [omnia omnibus].
43
 
Blair notes that Bodin’s “task is not to follow a strict progression from less to more perfect, but 
to search for the interconnections between each and every being.”44 It is to theorize the general 
relations between various classes and types of natural beings. In his Universae “a hierarchized 
structure gives way to an abundance of particulars treated with little apparent structure: the chain 
of being becomes a web in which intermediate creatures link many different levels of beings.”45 
Bodin’s depiction of these relations as a web allows him to balance his concern for order with 
variety.  On the one hand, the web brings order to nature’s large field of particulars, while, on the 
other, it maintains the “exuberant diversity of nature…[that might] overwhelm any pedagogical 
framework.”46 By theorizing nature as such, Bodin brings coherence to those particulars 
observed in the commonplace book by highlighting their interconnections with the elements, 
humankind and heavenly bodies.  
 Although Bodin’s philosophy of nature prioritizes the material world, he acknowledges 
God as nature’s first cause. Blair explains, “science and religion were inextricably intertwined in 
the early modern period…religious themes permeated traditional and encyclopedic natural 
philosophy in the northern, sixteenth century Renaissance.”47 Thus the “table [tabula] of the 
whole world” – elements, plants, animals, souls and angels – find their source and summit in 
God.
48
 Blair argues that Bodin’s “natural theology” is unique, first, in that it “invokes divine 
providence and omnipotence but as the best explanations of natural phenomena rather than the 
                                                        
43
 Bodin, Universae, 6 quoted by Blair 
44
 Blair, Theater, 32-3 
45
 Blair, Theater 33 
46
 Blair, Theater 30 
47
 Blair, Theater, 18 
48
 Bodin, Universae, 129-30 quoted by Blair  
 24 
primary subject of his work”.49 In other words, while Bodin discusses God, he does not offer an 
exhaustive account of God’s nature and attributes. Blair notes a second unique feature of Bodin’s 
natural theology, namely that his “own religious position remains unusually broadly defined: his 
atheomachia [apology] is not a defense of Christianity like other contemporary works. Bodin’s 
exaltation of a single Creator-God could be acceptable not only to Catholics and Protestants, but 
also to Jews and Muslims, who were regularly included among infidels attacked in defenses of 
Christianity.”50 Although Bodin’s natural theology is broad enough to include other faith 
confessions (i.e. Judaism, Islam), Blair notes that his thinking shows traces of the nominalist 
Catholic theologian Duns Scotus (1266-1308).
51
 For Scotus, nature exists as the result of 
almighty God’s voluntary, completely free act. Divine government (i.e. the natural law) 
orchestrates nature’s operations, but God may suspend these to directly intervene in nature, and 
all rests fundamentally on divine decree emerging from God’s sovereign will.  
Bodin conceived of nature as a “theater” wherein the human as spectator contemplates 
nature’s wonders. According to Blair, the metaphor of the theater signifies that “nature is a 
theater or a spectacle laid out by God for human contemplation, which is both beautifully varied 
and perfectly ordered by its Creator.”52 Bodin exclaimed that after God’s act of creation, 
“nothing that he did was greater or better than to distinguish the parts of matter that were 
mingled and confused in the beginning and to place them, once garbed with form and figure, 
each in the appropriate location”.53 God, in freedom and power, acts to establish and order the 
world and all the wonders therein. For Bodin, humans occupy a primarily passive position in the 
grand scheme of the cosmos, as they are more spectators than actors in the theater of nature. 
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Blair notes that the theater metaphor suggests a “nonverbal form of contemplation” within the 
vast public structure that is nature, rather than human activity.
54
 Humanity looks “out at the 
world as to a stage where God displays [God’s] skills and providence as author and producer.”55 
In beholding the wonders of nature, the atheist is compelled to acknowledge the one true God, 
and all are compelled to worship God. Blair notes Bodin’s “double-use of the metaphor of the 
‘theater’, which not only signified nature, but Bodin’s book itself (Universae naturae theatrum). 
The term Theatrum , she says, signifies “the ambition of treating a large subject systematically, 
as if in a tabular fashion.”56 The metaphor of the theater of nature especially conveyed the 
encyclopedic ideal of bringing a vast topic under a single, all-encompassing gaze. Bodin’s text 
thus not only sought to place nature’s “table” of beings against the backdrop of a divinely 
governed world, but to represent this world with the metaphor of the theater in the body of the 
text itself.   
According to Blair, one of the most original aspects of Bodin’s natural theology is his 
application of the argument of the interconnectedness of the world through “intermediate 
beings.” While nature’s field of particulars (i.e. nature table) finds its first cause and principle of 
coherence in almighty God, Bodin believed that “intermediaries” established relations between 
different substances and species in nature.
57
 Blair notes that Bodin’s concept of intermediaries is 
unclear, but she characterizes them as “innumerable links,” which create nature’s web of 
relations. For example, Bodin uses the concept of intermediaries when describing how spirits 
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(angels and demons) are able to associate with humankind, “directing them and communicating 
with them.”58 Bodin says: 
There can be no association that holds between angels and demons [for God has placed 
an irreconcilable antipathy between them]; but there are men who are neither good nor 
bad and can adapt to either type, so that one can say that the intellective soul of man is 
intermediate between angels and demons. For we can see that this great God of nature has 
bound all things through intermediates, which are in accord with the extremes and 
compose the harmony of the intelligible, celestial, and elementary worlds through 
intermediate and indissoluble links.
59
  
 
In this example, humans are intermediaries between good and evil spirits, i.e. they stand as 
figures of “harmony which subsume[s] discord.”60 Blair notes that although he does not refer to 
the concept of ‘intermediaries’ in his Six Books of the Commonwealth, he acknowledges that 
“middling people” in the areas of “social status, wealth, or moral qualities [as] crucial to the 
harmony and stability of government.”61 These (social) intermediaries are important because 
they mitigate extremes of wealth and poverty; they are “middling people [mediocres] who link 
people to one another”, making the state less prone to revolutions.62  
In Theatrum, Bodin compares intermediaries in the state to the angels in heaven; both the 
state and the heavens require intermediaries – middling persons in the state, angels in the 
heavens - to keep them “in harmony, by diffusing and executing fairly and effectively the orders 
from above. If in the state there are three essential ranks of magistrates (superior, middling and 
inferior magistrates), there is also in nature a web of command descending from almighty God to 
superior angels, then to inferior ones, humans, and finally animals.
63
 Blair says, “In both nature 
and the state, intermediate beings uphold hierarchy and create harmony: magistrates and angels, 
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as the essential links of a hierarchy of command; and intermediates of all ranks and types 
(between rich and poor, wise and foolish, between rocks and metals, or snakes and insects) as the 
bonds between opposites that create stability and harmony. This is one of Bodin’s most often and 
proudly repeated insights.”64    
Bodin’s conception of “intermediaries” is also critical for his view of human nature. It 
enables him to conceive of human beings as constituted by bodies and immortal corporeal souls. 
Blair notes that Bodin’s view of the body consciously embraces the natural body (the body of 
physics) as opposed to the mathematical body (abstracted by reason alone), the artificial body 
(subject of mechanics) or the incorporeal body (the subject of metaphysics).
65
 Thus Bodin’s 
section on the human body, “De corporis humani fabrica”, is suggestive of a 1543 anatomical 
study by Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564), the physician to Holy Roman Emperor Charles V 
(1500-1558). Vesalius’ book, De humani corporis fabrica libri septem, revolutionized 
anatomical and physiological studies by using the latest technologies of visual representation to 
display the inner workings of the human body.
66
 As Blair notes, Bodin’s illustrative account 
pales in comparison to Vesalius’.  His list of the parts of the human body, “’bones…marrow, 
ligaments,…muscles, veins, arteries, kidneys,’ and so on”, is more of a “jumble” than a 
classification .
67
 However, Bodin’s allusion to Vesalius’ book and his attempt to account for the 
most recent anatomical studies is consistent with his “commonplace” scientific method, which 
begins with nature’s field of particulars before taking account of their coherence in the grand 
theater of God. Bodin’s theory of the soul takes up this second task. That is, if Bodin’s 
anatomical approach takes up the body as particular, Bodin’s theory of the soul accounts for 
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humanity’s place among the variety of natural beings. As with the body, Bodin placed his 
treatment of the soul under physics. Bodin explains:  
The subject of physics is the mobile body. Since therefore we have demonstrated that angels, 
souls surviving the dead bodies [to which they were attached], and demons are mobile 
bodies, it is the task of the physicus to treat their nature.
68
  
 
Blair explains that Bodin’s “noteworthy” conception of an immortal corporal soul begins from 
“analogy with angels and demons.”69  Bodin reasons that “[i]f angels and demons are corporeal, 
then disembodied souls must be too, for given their past association with material bodies, they 
are inferior to angels in dignity.”70 Bodin’s idea that angels and demons are corporeal, rather 
than immaterial beings, was derived not from the commonplace method, but from a rich 
scholarly tradition which includes “Aristotle, Iamblichus, Plotinus,…Tertullian, Augustine.”71 
All of these thinkers, according to Bodin, affirm that the human soul is corporeal. Bodin also 
establishes this claim on rational grounds. He says: 
Every substance that is contained in the embrace of the greatest orb is finite: human souls 
[mentes], angels, and demons are contained in the embrace of the greatest orb, therefore 
they are finite, because noting infinite can be contained in a finite space…But nothing 
incorporeal is enclosed in any limits or place; therefore human souls, angels and demons 
are not incorporeal…therefore they must have a corporeal nature.”72 
 
For Bodin, the notion that human beings consist of both bodies and corporeal souls is established 
not only by tradition, but by rational deduction given the nature of all finite beings. If human 
souls, angels and demons exist within a larger orb then they must be finite, but since nothing 
incorporeal can be limited by time or place, they must be corporeal. Bodin also pointed to cases 
of out of body experiences or “ecstatic religious” experiences where they ‘heard’ or ‘saw’ things 
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without the faculties of a body.
73
 These were evidence for him that human souls consisted of the 
same corporeal nature of angels and demons, but also of the soul’s immortality. Bodin is not 
saying that the human soul is an intermediate between corporeal and noncorporeal things, nor 
that the human body is connected to an incorporeal soul. Rather, Blair explains that for Bodin 
human nature mediates between these two extremes, between “form separated from matter 
(disembodied souls and angels) and form fully embedded in matter (as in all natural bodies).”74 
Bodin attempts to describe the nature of the corporeal soul: “[H]uman souls [mentes], angels, and 
demons consist of some corporeal nature, but not of bone, or flesh; rather from an invisible 
essence, like air or fire or both, or of a celestial essence…thus even if we grant that it is a 
spiritual body, it is a body nonetheless.”75  Thus, Bodin theorized something of a polyvalent 
body, one that exists as an entity subject to the forces of the material world also stands as 
intermediary between angels and demons.      
The Political Body 
As early as 1896 political theorist W.A. Dunning clarified the structure of Bodin’s 
politics, noting its roots in Greek thought.
76
 Dunning finds traces of Aristotle (384-322 BC) in 
Bodin, specifically Aristotle’s Politics (350 BC). Like Aristotle, Bodin discusses “the social 
basis and philosophical end of state; the analysis of the family and the distinction between the 
family and the state; the characteristics of paternal authority and the institution of slavery.”77 For 
Bodin, a state is born when families and other collectivities (e.g. guilds, fraternities) come 
together under a common authority.
78
 A state cannot be founded by one person or one family. It 
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requires that “more than one should come together under the same roof” and that they have an 
obligation to a single (ultimate) authority. Bodin elaborates his understanding of the state in 
Method:   
So I hold that the family or fraternity is the true image of the state, and since the family 
cannot come into existence in the solitude of one man, so the state cannot develop in one 
family or one guild…Then three or more families, or five or more fraternities forms a 
state, if they are joined together at a given moment by the legitimate power of authority. 
If, on the other hand, families or colleges are separated from each other and cannot be 
controlled by any common rule, the group should be called anarchy, not a state….From 
this it comes about that the state is nothing else than a group of families or fraternities 
subjected to one and the same rule.
79
  
 
Bodin explains that his conception of the state may apply to villages, towns, cities, however 
scattered, again provided that they are controlled by the same authority. Those under this single 
authority become citizens, and all not under this authority become foreigners. Citizenship is thus 
defined by subjection to an authority rather than inalienable rights.  
The fact of legal personality distinguishes (male) citizens from women, children and 
aliens. Legal personality grants citizens certain rights, liberties or power to dispose of property.
80
 
For Bodin, it is this legal personality, rather than rights, that makes one politically free. A citizen 
is thus “a free subject who is dependent on the sovereignty of another.”81 Bodin upholds a 
public/private divide in the commonwealth. The public comes into being when heads of 
households gather as equal citizens away from their private homes. However, as Bodin 
transitions from public life to private concerns, the notion of ‘equality’ recedes into the 
background and the notion of ‘sovereign power’ emerges as a controlling theme. Although equal 
in public, citizens remain lord and master of their households. Bodin is clear that this means that 
sovereign power, i.e. the power of life and death, is ascribed to the head. Bodin says, “The 
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power, authority and command that a husband has over his wife is allowed by both divine and 
positive law to be honourable and right”.  The natural right of sovereign power is also extended 
to parents over their children: “In any rightly ordered commonwealth, that power of life and 
death over their children which belongs to them under the law of God and of nature, should be 
restored to parents.”82 
According to M.J. Tooley, Bodin’s view of the family served as a model for state 
government. “The artificial society of the commonwealth,” Tooley asserts, “should be modeled 
on the natural society of the family, and no father is appointed by his children to rule over 
them.”83 For Bodin, nature serves as a model for statecraft. Bodin’s ideal state, then, is one 
where a single authority rules with absolute power, just as a father rules his household. In the 
political realm, this authority is called ‘the sovereign’ and his power, ‘sovereignty.’ 
“Sovereignty”, says Bodin in Six Books the Commonwealth (1576), is the “absolute and 
perpetual power of a commonwealth.”84 The term ‘perpetual’ signifies that “the true sovereign 
remains always seized of his power”, even for life.85 Bodin says:   
However much he gives there always remains a reserve of right in his own person, 
whereby he may command, or intervene by way of prevention, confirmation, evocation, 
or any other way he thinks fit, in all matters delegated to a subject, whether in virtue of an 
office or a commission. Any authority exercised in virtue of an office or a commission 
can be revoked, or made tenable for as long or short a period as the sovereign wills.
86
 
 
For Bodin, the sovereign can never be deprived of absolute and perpetual power, i.e. of 
sovereignty. It inheres in the physical body of the sovereign. Thus, for Bodin, to embrace 
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absolutism is also to embrace hereditary monarchialism. The birth of an heir to the throne is also 
the promise of a rightly ordered state, and the art of government becomes an explication of the 
features and contours of sovereignty.  
On Sovereignty 
 
Bodin’s discourses on sovereignty is worked out in both his Method (1566) and his Six 
Books (1576). Over the course of this unstable decade, Bodin emphasizes absolute rather than 
limited monarchial sovereignty. In Method, Bodin argues that sovereignty is the foundational 
principle of the state. Sovereignty rests at the top of a political hierarchy. It is distinct from the 
actual governance of the state, that is, decision-making and the issuing and execution of orders. 
Sovereignty is neither the bare statutory process of lawmaking nor the execution of the law, or 
what Foucault calls “juridical power”. For these servile functions of government, magistrates are 
given only a portion of political authority.
87
 Sovereignty (summum imperium/summa rerum) is 
that final, ultimate authority beyond magistrates, which has an independent principle of 
legitimacy to endow or recant magistrates or sanction their decisions regarding governance. 
“[T]he right of sovereignty,” Bodin maintains, “is chiefly displayed in these specific attributes. 
Therefore, in every state one ought to investigate who can give authority to magistrates, who can 
take it away, who can make or repeal laws – whether one citizen or a small part of the citizens or 
a greater part. When this has been ascertained, the type of government is easily understood.”88 
Sovereignty is, for Bodin, the highest, most decisive, and necessary aspect of political authority 
and of the state.  
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A sovereign, says Bodin, possesses his own right of authority, has jurisdiction over 
everything or anything, and is a permanent and unitary force.
89
 Bodin lists five functions in 
which sovereignty is involved: creating magistrates, proclaiming/annulling laws, declaring 
war/peace, receiving final appeal, and the power of life and death when the law itself leaves no 
room for extenuation or grace.
90
 Notwithstanding these powers of monarchial sovereignty, Bodin 
advocates a limited monarchial sovereignty as opposed to absolutism. Still, even in Method, his 
theory abounds with tensions, ambiguities, and even confusion. This is owing to his locating 
both sovereignty and powers thereof in the same person, while leaving intact the substantive 
checks to monarchial sovereignty by divine law, natural law and the property rights of subjects. 
Absolute monarchial sovereignty is not autonomous. Rather, Bodin insists that it is above 
positive law, i.e. the laws of certain states. If necessary, however, the sovereign “may repeal 
[positive law], take from it, invalidate it, or add to it, or even if circumstances demand, allow it 
to become obsolete. These things cannot be done if the man who makes legislation is held by 
it.”91  
In Method, Bodin, thus, highlights two views of monarchial sovereignty. The first is 
unlimited, and the second stresses limits on the monarch’s power. On the first view, monarchial 
sovereignty is unlimited, i.e. “restrained by no law at all” according to Bodin.   
Of the first kind are the kings who once upon a time without any laws governed empires 
most justly by prerogative. Such the kings of the ancient Greeks are said to have been 
before Lycurgus and Draco, that is, before any laws had been made binding. Such, also, 
the ancients remember the rule of the kings in Italy. At that time no laws were 
promulgated by kings or private citizens, but the whole state and the rights of citizens 
depended upon the will of the prince.
92
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Bodin explains that while it may be appropriate to bind magistrates with law, “it is…an entirely 
different matter to hold the king, since the latter has authority from himself, the [magistrate] 
from the prince of the people.”93 For Bodin, the sovereign’s authority is self-caused. “For those 
who decree the law ought to be above it, that they may repeal it, take from it, invalidate it, or add 
to it, or even if circumstances demand, allow it to become obsolete. These things cannot be done 
if the man who makes legislation is held by it”.94 This unlimited sovereignty renders the 
sovereign “master of all things and of laws in the state.” The metaphor of the family drives home 
Bodin’s point. These kings, “like fathers of families, protect the state as if it were their own 
property.”95 Yet even in this unlimited model, Bodin notes at least one obligation the sovereign 
must keep in addition to the divine and natural law. “Only he must duly defend the empire with 
his arms and his child with his blood…”96 
With the second view of sovereignty, the sovereign’s power is limited, i.e. bound by laws. 
As with the first, the sovereign’s authority is self-caused, and thus the sovereign cannot be bound 
by any authority other than his own.  However, this second view differs in that the sovereign 
binds himself to the law. Bodin explains that these princes    
…bind themselves to govern the state in accordance with the laws of the country and the 
public good…[B]efore the priests the prince swears by immortal God that he will give 
rightful law and justice to all classes as so far as in him lies will judge with integrity and 
religious scruple. Having sworn, he cannot easily violate his faith; or if he could, yet he 
would be unwilling to do so for the same justice exists for him as for any private citizen, 
and he is held by the same laws.
97
  
In the case of limited sovereignty, the sovereign takes an oath before a state’s dignitaries and 
religious leaders. This oath, dressed in a religious ceremony, signifies that the prince will 
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sacrifice his own will to preserve laws and customs of the state. (Bodin notes the curious 
coincidence that many of these second types of monarchs were Christians). This then, is the 
second kind of sovereignty. Already in Method, Bodin showed privilege toward the unlimited 
model, repeatedly stressing that this model was the obvious choice for so many ancient rulers. 
With respect to the limited model, Bodin writes, “[f]ew princes consider that this law was passed 
for them-not the kings of the Turks, or the Persians, or the Scythians, or the Britons, or the 
Abyssinians…they never tied their own hands.”98      
Published eleven years after his Method, Six Books is explicitly absolutist. Here, Bodin 
defines sovereignty as the “absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth” 99 (majestas). Its 
distinctive mark is the ability to “impose laws generally on all subjects regardless of their 
consent.”100 Being absolute, sovereignty cannot be burdened with obligations.101 “Just as…the 
Pope can never tie his own hands, so the sovereign prince cannot bind himself, even if he 
wishes”, says Bodin.102 Still, the divine and natural law, and promises and covenants, are its only 
checks. For instance, the queen cannot break promises once made to subjects or estates. But as to 
law, the monarch wields absolute sovereignty. “The first attribute of the sovereign prince, …is 
the power to make law binding on all his subjects in general and on each in particular…[H]e 
does so without the consent of any superior, equal, or inferior being necessary.”103 The second 
mark of sovereignty is perpetuity; it lasts for the lifetime of the sovereign. Third, subjects cannot 
resist or disobey the monarch, even under the “pretext that honour and justice require it…”104  
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In summary, we can see how Bodin’s conception of sovereignty in the state of nature had 
immediate implications for his conception of the political body and sovereignty. In Bodin’s state 
of nature, men have the natural liberty, i.e. the “right under God to be subject to no man living 
and amenable only to those commands which are self-imposed.”105 In private matters, this 
natural right takes form as the power over life and death. For Bodin, a rightly ordered political 
body and the appropriate exercise of sovereignty therein is only possible when modeled on the 
order of nature. Just as a household consists of several individuals under a single absolute 
authority, so a state consists of several principalities under an absolute sovereign.  
B. Thomas Hobbes  
 
Context 
 
By the middle of the seventeenth century, France was home to another theory of sovereignty, 
one far more influential and contested from its roots in the early modern period until today. After 
fleeing his native England to Paris for fear of his life in 1640, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) 
wrote Leviathan (1651), his most important political work on the theory of state sovereignty. 
Few European countries experienced more radical effects of Renaissance and Reformation 
movements than seventeenth century England, where even as unprecedented wealth poured into 
the country from the recently colonized East Indies, Africa, and Americas, England was a 
cauldron of internal conflicts that jeopardized political stability. Unlike Bodin’s France, where 
the Huguenots were the sole challenge to Catholic political and ecclesial prerogative, England 
was far more thoroughly fragmented along religious and political lines. Where the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648) ended the lengthy war between Spain and the Dutch Republic and brought a 
relative peace to the continent, England remained plagued by civil war. Now a vengeful Spanish 
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Catholic Church wrestled with Anglicans and Puritans for control of both the Church of England 
and political authority in English affairs.
106
  
These tensions came to a head at mid-century, when nominalist Anglicans such as John 
Bramhall (1594-1663) and Richard Hooker (1554-1600), those identified by Hobbes as leaning 
too much toward authority, faced off with Puritan natural law theorists associated with the likes 
of John Selden (1584-1654) and Richard Cumberland (1631-1718), which Hobbes saw as 
desiring too much liberty. Nominalists argued that the king’s divine right was above the law, 
which supported James I and Charles I respective visions for shaping England. Natural lawyers, 
by contrast, holding that universal and necessary laws govern all things, argued for 
constitutionalism and for parliamentary right of resistance to the crown. Although Hobbes was a 
monarchialist in the final analysis, he rejected both of these perspectives as legitimate 
justifications and searched instead for a mediating position. Hobbes did this because he believed 
that the traditional intellectual and social structures of Christendom had collapsed, or at least 
have lost their ability to establish widespread consensus for the legitimacy of political authority. 
The State of Nature and the Body 
In political theory, Hobbes’s most known work, Leviathan (1651) reigns, but he did not 
divorce his political thinking from his interest science. Texts such as De Cive (1642), De 
Corpore (1655) and De Homine (1658) remind us that like Bodin, Hobbes’s theory of 
sovereignty is grounded in certain views of nature and the human body. However, Hobbes 
operated with a different understanding of science than Bodin, namely mechanism, which 
emerged during the sixteenth to eighteenth century scientific revolution. Mechanism challenged 
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Bodin’s view of science, which philosopher Douglas Jesseph calls the “Scholastic-Aristotelian” 
view of science, by operating with a different causal explanation. Jesseph explains:  
Aristotle and his Scholastic followers conceived of substances as composites of form and 
matter, and their methodology distinguished between formal, material, efficient and final 
causes. Thus a causal explanation in the scholastic tradition might include reference to a 
substance’s form (the formal cause), its matter (the material cause), the process that 
produced it (the efficient cause), and the end or purpose for which it was produced (the 
final cause). The Scholastic way of thinking about nature was rejected by the leading 
scientific figures of the seventeenth century who championed a mechanistic conception 
of the world and insisted that natural phenomena be explained exclusively as the result of 
the motion and impact of material particles. 
Hobbes was a devotee of the new “mechanical philosophy” and he combined his 
insistence on the causal nature of scientific knowledge with the mechanistic maxim that 
“Nature does all things by the conflict of bodies pressing each other mutually with their 
motions.” His methodology dictates therefore that the scope of natural science be 
restricted to the investigation of the mechanical causes of natural phenomena, and it 
entails the rejection of a Scholastic-Aristotelian natural philosophy grounded in the 
consideration of such nonmechanical principles as substantial forms or final causes.
107
  
According to Jesseph, the fundamental distinction between Scholastic-Aristotelian natural 
philosophers and those who subscribed to mechanism is their view of science, Scholastic-
Aristotelian thinkers like Bodin operate with a conception of science that takes account of four 
causes: formal, material, efficient and final. By contrast, mechanistic philosophers take account 
of two: material and efficient, since these are the only causes that present themselves to empirical 
analysis.  
In taking account of only material and efficient causes, mechanistic thinkers such as 
Hobbes are also materialists. Materialists, according to philosopher George J. Stack,   
hold that all entities and processes are composed of – or are reducible to – matter, 
material forces or physical processes. All events and facts are explainable, actually or in 
principle, in terms of body, material objects or dynamic material changes or movements. 
In general, the metaphysical theory of materialism entails the denial of the reality of 
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spiritual beings, consciousness and mental or psychic states or processes, as ontologically 
distinct from, or independent of, material changes or processes.
108
 
Materialism, then, reflects a particular conception of science, one that understands the nature of a 
thing through material and efficient causes to the exclusion of formal and final ones. Mechanism 
is one way of construing the totality of relations between these material bodies. These were not 
only Hobbes, but also of other sixteenth and seventeenth century scientific figures who were 
representative of the “The New Science” such as Copernicus (1473-1543), Galileo Galilei (1564-
1642) and Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727). For them, matter and physical force are the only 
existents and agents of change in nature. Nature itself operates mechanistically, i.e. as if it were a 
grand machine whose separate parts impact one another through the motion of bodies. 
Philosopher Mark Wilson explains that in the mechanistic view, objects “obey the three laws of 
motion articulated by Isaac Newton in 1686 in a deterministic manner: once a mechanical system 
is assembled, its future behaviour is rigidly fixed.”109  
Hobbes’s work in mechanism clearly preceded Newton’s articulation of the laws of 
motion in his 1687 Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica. However, the themes of 
mechanical laws, determinism, and a mechanically-predictable future state of affairs pervade 
Hobbes’s thinking.  Hobbes’s view of nature as mechanism was a radical departure from Bodin’s 
‘Scholastic-Aristotelian’ conception of nature as created order and cosmic theater. For Bodin, 
God, a spiritual being, is the first cause of nature, and nature consists of a “web of 
interconnections” ordered by natural law. Hobbes also speaks of God as the first cause of nature, 
but as Hobbes scholar Luc Foisneau notes, Hobbes’ language of God refers to the general 
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principle of necessity rather than to a formal cause beyond the natural world.
110
  In other words, 
Hobbes conceives of God as the totality of nature’s deterministic forces. Finally, Bodin 
conceived of nature as a web of interconnections, while Hobbes’ mechanism renders nature an 
aggregate of atomized particles rather than a unified whole.  
Hobbes’s mechanical philosophy also had implications for his view of the human body. 
With Bodin, the human being consists of a material body and an immortal corporeal soul. 
Hobbes, on the other hand, does not believe that Bodin’s Scholatistic-Aristotelian natural 
philosophy is science
111
 and instead embraces a mechanistic science that limits the scope of its 
investigations to material bodies. Hobbes thus rejects the notion of an immaterial soul, and on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Hobbes says it “is for the most part so far from the possibility of being 
understood, and so repugnant to naturall Reason, that whosoever thinketh there is any thing to 
bee understood by it, must needs think it supernaturall.”112 Hobbes’s negative views on 
Aristotle’s writings also extended to his Politics and Ethics as well, which were grounded in his 
Metaphysics. Hobbes asserts:  
And I believe that scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall Philosophy, than 
that which now is called Aristotles Metaphysiques; nor more repugnant to Government, 
than much of that hee hath said in his Politiques; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of 
his Ethiques.
113
    
For Hobbes, Scholastic-Aristotelian notions of “abstract essences” and “substantial forms”, i.e. 
essences separated from bodies, was nothing more than “jargon.”114 While for Bodin, Aristotle 
was the scientific authority, for Hobbes, Aristotle’s Metaphysics no longer has scientific 
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standing, i.e. renders no helpful knowledge for physics.
115
 For Hobbes, a truly scientific account 
of (human) bodies and their operations considers material and efficient causes only, i.e. their 
matter and motions. Hobbes’s mechanistic view of the body can be seen in the early part of 
Leviathan. Hobbes scholar Cees Leijenhorst notes that Leviathan, a text in politics, curiously 
begins “with the genesis and function of sense perception”116 rather than a discussion of political 
laws, abstract essences, or substantial forms. In Hobbes view, external bodies present themselves 
to human sense organs, and this feeds the human imagination and intellect. In turn, the 
imagination and intellect create mental representations of external objects and gives rise to 
various appetites and aversions, i.e. desires and dislikes. In this way Hobbes takes up human 
psychology within his mechanistic science. Human beings engage the world through a mental 
artifice or image of the world rather than the world itself, and human thinking can never 
demonstrate the reality of supernatural existence. All human thinking thus contains both a 
perspectival and subjective aspect, as opposed to having an intrinsic universal quality. It is 
necessarily limited, fallible, and incomplete.  
Hobbes’ mechanism also has implications for his view on the question of the freedom of 
the will. As philosopher H. Van den Enden notes, while Hobbes believes in the possibility of free 
human action, he does not believe in the doctrine of the freedom of the will. Hobbes understands 
free human action (a.k.a. natural liberty) as action without impediments beyond those intrinsic to 
the agent.
117
 “On the other hand” says Van den Enden,  
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the will itself cannot be legitimately called free in the sense of it being indetermined and 
incapable of autonomous self-determination. The so called “will” can only be understood 
and explained if it is apprehended as a volitional process which is determined by its 
antecedent causes.
118
      
Van den Enden explains that in Hobbes view, humans are free to act according to their will, but 
not to determine their will.
119
 The will is determined by “antecedent factors”, especially mental 
representations. Representations cause something to appear as desirable or not, and thus motivate 
an agent to act either for a certain good or to avoid an evil. In this way, human action according 
to the will is only possible if and only if the will is necessitated by antecedent causes. “The act of 
willing” says Van den Enden, “is dependent on appetites for specific objects which arise in man's 
mind beyond his control. It is not in his power to choose or to determine his appetites and the 
objects that appear in his imagination.”120 Human actions are not predicated on free will. Instead, 
voluntary action is already determined by mental representations. For Bodin, the variety of 
nature was ordered by the universal web of interconnections. For Hobbes, however, although the 
atomistic universe is ordered according to nature’s mechanistic laws, no such similar mechanism 
exists to coordinate the variety and conflict inherent in desire-driven human action. People act in 
response to perceived threats, promises, joys, grief, pleasures and pains. In this way, the moral 
life, for Hobbes, is also fundamentally constituted by the passions. These, rather than reason, 
frame the conditions of social interaction.        
Hobbes’ discusses his actual doctrine of the “state of nature” for only five of Leviathan’s 
four hundred and ninety – page text.121 Yet this doctrine has created a history of effects that 
remains with us today on a global scale (chapter four). As we have seen, Hobbes’s philosophy of 
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nature varies significantly from Bodin’s. If for Bodin, nature’s law gives order and indissoluble 
coherence to its variety, for Hobbes there is only variety. Hobbes thus conceives of natural 
human relations as a formless “multitude” rather than a social whole. For Bodin, the varieties of 
human relations are embedded within nature’s order, opening toward a natural coherence and 
balance in society. In stark contrast to Bodin’s harmony and balance, Hobbes’s state of nature is 
marked by war. Hobbes does not begin his doctrine with war, but with observation that “Nature 
hath made [people] so equall…”122 For Hobbes, natural equality, rather than inequality, is a key 
factor in conditions of war, for such conditions can only arise if “[f]rom this equality of ability, 
ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the 
same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies;”123 In Hobbes’s 
state of nature, humans do not occupy an intermediary space between angels and demons. Nor 
are they naturally called to family life, or to lives of virtue and contemplation of God, as it was 
for Bodin.
124
 Hobbes’ natural human is at liberty to pursue desired ends, and for Hobbes, this 
liberty has destructive effects on human social life. He argues that without a common power (i.e. 
government) to check human action, relations will be overtaken by the lust for power and the 
pull of the passions (competition, diffidence, glory).
125
 Hobbes claims that social relations 
decline, first from relations of competition to diffidence, and then from diffidence to conditions 
of war. Industry (agriculture, knowledge, arts) withers, society decays, and life is poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short.
126
  Such is Hobbes’s infamous state of nature.  
Hobbes notes that the state of nature has never been a historical reality. Mid-late twentieth 
century scholarship posits that the state of nature is a myth or a rhetorical device. Hobbes had a 
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background in seventeenth century British renaissance humanism. This suggests that Leviathan 
can be read as a work of political rhetoric rather than empirical description, whose goal is to get 
the audience to participate in the act of contract. For example, in his Hobbes and the Epic 
Tradition of Political Theory (1970) Sheldon Wolin argues that Hobbes hoped to achieve a great 
and remarkable deed, namely to make the world reflect his theory.
127
 He characterizes Hobbes’s 
deed as “epical;” it is a “thought-act” that attempts to redeem a situation by way of a compelling 
piece of drama-as-literature. Michael Oakeshott’s Hobbes on Civil Association (1975) notes the 
mythical aspect of Leviathan; in a context of civil war, political upheaval, and epistemological 
collapse, Hobbes attempts to create a new myth (story of a people’s history, fall, and redemption) 
around which early modern English society could envision a collective dream, and in turn, a 
civilization.
128
 
The Political Body 
 
According to Hobbes, the multitude decides to transition from the state of nature to political 
society, i.e. to a state of affairs designed for the safety and contentment of all. Thus for Hobbes, 
the birth of civil society is not natural, as Bodin and Aristotle argued, but artificial. Also, civil 
society is birthed by a multitude of individuals as opposed to the family. Hobbes understands 
human beings as naturally social, rather than political, animals. For him, political society is 
established out of self-interest, while Bodin and Aristotle see humans as zoon politikon. Just as 
God makes and governs the world through the art of nature, so, too does the Hobbesian multitude 
gather to construct a political body to harmonize their diverse interests.
129
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If for Bodin each head of household exercises natural liberty over the family, for Hobbes, 
each individual exercises natural right in the state of nature. As Hobbes’s multitude gathers, each 
individual’s interest is represented by the postulate of natural right. Hobbes explains that natural 
right is:  
the liberty each [human] hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation 
of his own nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which 
in his own judgement, and reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. 
By liberty, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of 
externall Impediments: which impediments, may oft take away part of [one’s] power to do 
what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his 
judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.
130
  
For Hobbes, natural right is the ability to use one’s own judgment and reason, and to calculate 
and act in their own interest however they see fit. It is self-sovereignty. Bodin also spoke of 
“natural liberty each [one] has to live as [one] chooses,”131 but Bodin’s natural liberty was 
confined to the household, and only after the head had subjected his own appetites to reason and 
the will of God. For Hobbes, natural liberty is the liberty to use one’s own judgment and capacity 
as they see fit to preserve themselves. Sovereignty operates in both understandings of liberty. For 
Bodin, the head of household exercises limited self-sovereignty. Thus, Bodin argues that one 
should be the head of a household only after their will has been disciplined by reason and faith. 
The head exercises unlimited sovereignty over the family, i.e. the power of life and death.  
It is highly likely that life was precarious for the women, children and slaves who were under the 
authority of Bodin’s head of household. Nevertheless, in comparison to Hobbes, Bodin’s state of 
nature is a far more stable society. For example, heads of households come together as citizens 
and interact as equals. They conduct public affairs in an organized manner. With Hobbes, there is 
only self-sovereignty, which renders any public/private distinction precarious in the state of 
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nature and totalizes the threat of war. This precariousness motivates Hobbes’s multitude to form 
a state. For Hobbes, natural right is distributed to all, to the multitude at large, as opposed to 
heads of households only, and thus all agree to form the state. After discussions, negotiations and 
voting, all agree to raise “a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to 
the Common Benefit.”132 The multitude then binds themselves with a social contract: 
I Authorise and give up my Right of governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly 
of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his 
Actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a 
Common-Wealth, in latine, Civitas. This is the Generation of that great Leviathan, or 
rather of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortal God, our peace and 
defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-
Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him [for] Peace at 
home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad.
133
   
 
Having found the state of nature to be an existence plagued by fear and war, people form a 
covenant or social pact with one another. With this, they transfer their natural right to an 
authority whose task it is to maintain a state of peace and security. The artifice that emerged 
from the collective imaginations – Leviathan – has supreme right. State sovereignty in Hobbes’s 
theory is not predicated on natural attributes of rulership, divine right, or an eternal natural law. 
It is instead the prerogative of an artifice spurred by rational necessity, shaped from below 
through deliberative processes, and established by the consent of the multitude. The multitude 
establishes the authority of rulership through social contract and retains dominion (control) and 
the right of Leviathan’s actions.134  
The inauguration of the contract implies certain duties for subjects and rights for the 
sovereign. Hobbes leaves subjects only one right: The right to preserve one’s body, but this right 
is not constitutionally protected. His comments concerning subjects are otherwise couched in 
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negative terms. Subjects are not bound to harm themselves, nor can they be forced to wage war 
(but can volunteer for it). Subjects are relatively powerless in relation to the sovereign – they are 
not allowed to make any type of separate covenant among themselves that has not been approved 
by the sovereign.  They are never allowed, under any conditions, to cast off sovereign authority 
or to transfer it. If either occurs, Hobbes notes that a subject is actually breaking the social 
contract with all others, thus committing a grave and punishable injustice. Indeed, one cannot 
complain regarding the sovereign’s actions of decisions, since they formed the covenant that 
authorized the sovereign to act. Those who would protest should remember that being subject to 
the lusts and unlimited power of the sovereign is better than returning to the state of nature.
135
  
On Sovereignty 
 
Conversely, the sovereign retains all power in the commonwealth.  He possesses 
undivided power in legislative, judicial, and executive matters. He decides the rules of propriety 
for all peoples (what is lawful and unlawful), property rights, and possesses the power to appoint 
officers to judge controversy and enforce the law. The sovereign has the power to make war 
and/or act in any way he deems fit to maintain the peace and security of the commonwealth. He 
can choose who is granted titles of honor and respect in the commonwealth (e.g. model citizens) 
and can also designate the particular signs of respect to be given them.
136
 These rights, Hobbes 
claims Hobbes, compose the very “Essence of Soveraignty.”137 The greatest of sovereign 
powers, however are the powers of life and death.  
The maintenance of civil society, depending on justice; and justice on the power of life 
and death, and other lesse Rewards and Punishments, residing in them that have the 
Sovereignty of the Commonwealth; It is impossible a Common-wealth should stand, 
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where any other than the Sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than Life; and 
of inflicting greater punishments, than death.
138
  
As the state’s supreme magistrate, the sovereign’s will is the source of civil justice. The 
exercise of justice, however, rests on the power of life and death, i.e. on sovereign power, and 
Hobbes’s sovereign also has power over these most precious rewards and punishments. Thus, a 
state constitution is left to the sovereign’s discretion. In an effort to preserve the state, the 
sovereign may ignore established laws and even compel subjects’ wills.139 Disobedience cannot 
be tolerated, not even on urge of divine command. Moreover, while the sovereign should show 
restraint, no authorized exercise of sovereign power can be considered a breach of contract. The 
sovereign possesses absolute right over the offices and functions of the commonwealth. Hobbes 
justifies such unlimited power with three claims: 1) The social contract is between people, not 
between the people and the sovereign. The sovereign can thus do nothing to violate the covenant. 
2) The sovereign is only accountable to God, and thus only obliged by the law of nature – to seek 
peace 3) Even if the sovereign does bind himself to the people, this covenant is “but words,” 
having “no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect…”140 Said another way, since there is 
no one to hold the sovereign accountable by force, promises by the sovereign are tenuous at best. 
Hobbes held that representational power was the essence of all political organizations, 
and thus a critical prerogative of sovereignty.
141
 His notion of “representation” was derived from 
the Latin persona, a theatrical term for “actor.” As with the persona in late antique dramas or 
British Renaissance plays, those involved in the creation of Hobbes’s political artifice have 
(representational) roles to fulfill if the overall performance is to be judged favorably, i.e. if the 
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political body is to endure. According to Hobbes scholar Paul Dumouchel, Hobbes understands 
representation as a two-pronged political phenomenon, comprised of authorization and theatrical 
manifestation.
 142
 Dumouchel explains that ‘representation as authorization’ deals with the 
(procedural) forms of political agency (e.g. representative institutions vs. the people’s self/direct 
representation) and also deals with the legitimacy thereof. Hobbes’s view on this matter was that 
even the worst forms of government were “held through the accord, agreement, or authorization 
of those governed.”143 Contra Bodin, Hobbes sees the multitude as authors of state, so that even 
an aberrant state, i.e. one whose representational procedures no longer function appropriately, is 
a legitimate state. Dumouchel explains that there is also a second aspect to representation, i.e. 
‘representation as theatrical dramatization.’ where the governing body displays its power (e.g. 
police, ‘historians,’ journalists) to enhance the stability of that power. If the first type of 
representation is procedural, this second type is performative. For Hobbes, the sovereign 
exercises authority over these aspects of representational power.  
In Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty, the multitude’s consent constitutes Leviathan as 
representative of his subjects, and the rational interests generated by the multitude define 
Leviathan’s actions. Hobbes stands firmly within the absolutist tradition, primarily because of his 
failure to deem any citizens’ rights inalienable (although some rights are always natural) and his 
view that the issue of a (legal) constitution is best left to the sovereign’s discretion. As a result, 
the sovereign’s will is the source of civil justice, and in an effort to preserve the state, he may 
ignore established laws and even compel subjects’ wills. Since the multitude freely contracts 
with one another, authorizes the state, and appoints the sovereign, they are unconditionally 
obligated to the state. Paradoxically, the multitude freely authorizes Leviathan to exercise 
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supreme right over them. Disobedience, even if for God’s sake, cannot be tolerated by the 
sovereign.
144
 While the sovereign should follow Gods’ example and restrain herself, in the end 
the show must go on, and no authorized exercise of sovereign power can be considered a breach 
of contract. 
Conclusion 
 
In Bodin’s and Hobbes’s theories of sovereignty, there is agreement on the form of 
government but divergence on the locus of sovereignty. Both advocate monarchial absolutism, 
but Bodin locates sovereignty in the monarch while Hobbes locates it in the monarch as state. 
Neither thinker is democratic, but a slight “democratization” of sovereignty occurs from Bodin’s 
theory of monarchial sovereignty to Hobbes’s theory of state sovereignty, where the monarch is 
now a representative of the state as opposed to a divinity. Bodin and Hobbes also diverge in 
other key aspects of their thinking, most importantly their views on the natural world, the 
political body and the relationship between the two. For Bodin, the political body emerges from 
and is modeled on the natural order, i.e. the family, which is itself part of the universal web of 
interconnected beings. For Hobbes, the political body is a voluntary artifice grounded in the 
multitude’s self-interest and authorized by social contract. The Hobbesian political body emerges 
out of the context of the threat of war and creates unity in an otherwise precarious and atomistic 
world. It provides peace and contentment for all its citizens, but can only do so through 
continued exercise of absolute sovereignty at home and beyond its borders.  Here, we also find 
an unsettling association between liberty and sovereignty, one that makes sovereignty a far more 
grotesque symbol that originally anticipated. For both Hobbes and Bodin, the exercise of 
sovereignty, i.e. the power of life and death, is necessary to preserve liberty. This is the case for 
                                                        
144
 For Hobbes’s articulation of the legal and institutional powers of the sovereign see Leviathan, Chapters XVIII-
XX.    
 51 
Bodin’s head of the household and monarch, and Hobbes’s natural individual and sovereign. For 
Bodin, the exercise of this power is limited by God’s natural law, while it is unlimited for 
Hobbes. What, if any, are the criteria for the evaluation of exercise of sovereignty, whether by 
individuals, associations, heads of families, political figures, and even states?   
Bodin and Hobbes saw the world beyond the state differently. Bodin’s sovereign was 
absolute in the commonwealth, but limited beyond the state by a universal web of 
interconnections. For Bodin, God sits at the summit of nature as supreme governor, and Bodin is 
clear that there cannot be an analogical relation, or any other kind, between the eternal God of 
heaven and a civil monarch on earth.
145
 In Hobbes’s mechanistic world, the sovereign must 
necessarily continue to exercise the right of nature in what is now an international or foreign 
context. Bodin’s and Hobbes’s sovereigns operate in similar fashion at home, but differently 
abroad. Hobbes’s sovereign looks out onto a different natural world, one constituted more by 
variety and chaos than harmony and order. This state of nature forces Hobbes’s sovereign to take 
drastically different measures to preserve the commonwealth, i.e. sovereign measures. This 
concludes our reflection on theories of sovereignty in the state of nature in early modern political 
theory, with Bodin and Hobbes serving as representative figures. In the next chapter we turn to 
theories of sovereignty in the state of nature during the emergence of the early modern capitalist 
order. In England, we look to the theory of John Locke, and in France we turn to Jean Jacques 
Rousseau.           
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Chapter 2 
John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau: On Popular Sovereignty 
 
In the last chapter, we saw how sovereignty, as both a political phenomenon and theoretical 
concept was gradually “democratized,” or at least made slightly less absolutist. While French 
theorist Jean Bodin argued for monarchial sovereignty, Hobbes argued for the sovereignty of the 
monarchial state. Hobbes’ monarch was still sovereign, but was demoted to a state 
representative. The monarchy was now an office as opposed to a hereditary birthright. Chapter 
one also showed that discourse on sovereignty is not exclusively concerned with the form of 
government, nor can it be restrict to political science. It is intimately linked to particular 
understandings of nature, the body and the political body. Thus, the early modern 
democratization of sovereignty was linked to shifts in thinking in the philosophy of nature and its 
mimetic offspring, the political body. This chapter continues the discourse analysis on 
sovereignty by way of our thematic centers: the state of nature, the body and the political body. 
This time we turn to the discourses of seventeenth century English philosopher John Locke 
(1632-1704) and eighteenth century French thinker Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).  
Analysis of these discourses finds that the early modern trend of the democratization of 
sovereignty continues into well into the eighteenth century, and that the trend of democratization 
is accelerated in the novel context of constitutional regimes and proto-capitalist orders. In 
Locke’s thinking, sovereignty becomes popular, i.e. a prerogative of the people in representation, 
and for Rousseau it moves to the general will of the people. The increased democratization of 
sovereignty is not without modification to the doctrines of the state of nature, the body and the 
body politic. Locke and Rousseau have different conceptions of the body and the political body, 
but both thinkers have a rather optimistic view of (human) nature than Bodin and Hobbes in the 
previous chapter. For Locke the state of nature is such that those who order their actions 
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according to the natural law (i.e. work ethic) form a peaceful society, even in the state of nature. 
As such, the political body does not take priority in Locke’s thinking, but is displaced by the 
(constitutional) rights of citizens, who are not nearly as desperate as Hobbes’ subjects to come 
out of the state of nature. Rousseau holds a more optimistic view of nature than even Locke. He 
understands the state of nature as that space of original goodness and natural justice, a space 
even more pure than the so-called morals of contemporary society. With Rousseau, the body 
politic returns with a vengeance, exerting sovereignty over the lives of citizens not only in the 
form of the general will, where individuals are totally alienated from their natural right, but also 
in the form of “polite society”, whose superficial morals and vain jealousies force us to mask 
what is most true about ourselves, i.e. our animality and connectedness to nature. Even as 
Rousseau’s conception of the body politic allows for more participatory forms of government 
than Bodin, Hobbes, and in some ways, Locke, sovereignty still prevails in the end.  
In the thinking of Rousseau, then, sovereignty returns in the general, i.e. national form. 
Rousseau is the first representative of national sovereignty in this dissertation (Hegel and 
Schmitt would follow). Rousseau’s theory foreshadows what would take place in late eighteenth 
century France, namely the lasting downfall of the French monarchy, itself representative of the 
shift to a new democratic era in the West. Yet the fall of the monarchy was not the end of 
sovereignty in France, as was the case in the U.S., and the French rulers of terror on the heels of 
the revolution testify to this tragic fact. After the guillotine was held over the monarchial head, 
executionary violence was released on the political body. Locke’s theory of sovereignty is not 
without problems, the most glaring of which was its legitimation of North American colonial 
slaveocracy. However, Locke’s thinking represents the democratization of sovereignty and the 
rise of the rule of law and inalienable constitutional rights. Rousseau’s thinking, on the other 
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hand, represents the discourse of tragic national sovereignty. In Rousseau’s estimation, the 
nation must trump individual rights, even if regrettably so. Such is the price we must pay to in a 
social order founded fundamentally on the ownership of private property. I begin with the 
thinking of John Locke.  
A. John Locke 
Context 
 
Even after the English civil war came to a close at mid-century, English society 
continued to battle an oppressive monarchy and antagonistic religious and political differences. 
Many thought that absolutist rule had come to an end with the rise of the Commonwealth of 
England in 1649. Hobbes returned to England and adjusted to life under parliamentary rule in the 
early 1650s. The Commonwealth and Hobbes dreams for state sovereignty ended definitively 
with Cromwell’s demise in 1658 and Charles II’s restoration of the Crown in 1660. Absolutism 
received its most publicly recognized legitimation from Robert Filmer’s biblical-theologically 
grounded Patriarcha (1680). Apparently the text had made such an impact on early modern 
English society that Locke found it appropriate to confront Filmer’s thinking in his Two 
Treatises of Government (1689). Here, Locke reminds us of Filmer’s argument for absolute 
monarchial sovereignty. According to Locke, Filmer argues that sovereignty is a hereditary 
divine right, first bequeathed to Adam in the Garden of Eden, and now, after a long line of 
succession throughout the ages, to Charles II in England. In essence, this  
Divine unalterable Right of Sovereignty” supported “Absolute, Arbitrary Unlimited, and 
Unlimitable Power, over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of his Children and Subjects; so 
that he may take or alienate their Estates, sell, castrate, or use Persons as he pleases, they 
being all his Slaves, and he Lord or Proprietor of every Thing, and his unbounded Will 
their Law.
146
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In ways akin to the classical Roman notion of dominium, Filmer also argued that the king 
of England rightly possessed the “fatherly authority” to exercise absolute power and control over 
English subjects and lands. Locke’s thinking on sovereignty in the Two Treatises, then, was 
published as a response to Filmer’s absolutism. Symbolically, Locke published his work even as 
William III of England (1689-1702), the champion of parliament against absolutism, was being 
crowned.
147
 Locke’s thinking aimed to assist this transition from absolutism to a democratic 
republic and to thus “establish the Throne of…King William; to make good his Title, in the 
Consent of the People…And to justifie to the World, the People of England, whose love of their 
Just and Natural Rights.”148   
The State of Nature and the Body 
 
Locke’s vision of the state of nature draws on a mechanistic philosophy of nature similar to 
that observed in Thomas Hobbes’ thought. Like Hobbes, then, Locke’s view of nature was 
informed by the New Science’s mechanistic thinking, specifically thinkers like Pierre Gassendi 
(1592-1655) and Robert Boyle (1627-1691).
149
 This means that Locke understood nature to 
perform its operations through the conflict of bodies in motion. Locke’s state of nature is an 
abstracted pre-political narrative of the human species as equipped with natural powers; i.e. 
natural right and the rational capacity for inductive reasoning. Locke’s natural human is 
equipped with these powers by the deistic God of nature, whose primary activity is not to 
miraculously intervene in the affairs of humankind, but to create and establish the natural 
(mechanistic) order. Also spurred by the thinking of Gassendi and Boyle, Locke embraced a 
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specifically corpuscularian conception of the body.
150 
This view sees the matter of all bodies as 
extended solid substance. It also holds that all bodies are either a) individual atoms or b) 
collections or aggregates of atoms, and that all bodies are subject to change in texture as the 
result of impact or contact of one body upon another.  
Although Locke’s view of nature shares several features with Hobbes’s, one key moment of 
distinction occurs with Locke’s dualistic conception of the relationship between the body and the 
mind.
151
 For Hobbes, the mind is essentially an aspect of body, thus mental activity can never be 
completely severed from nature’s mechanistic laws. With Locke, however, the mind and body 
deal with categorically different properties, even as mind and body are united in the same 
substance. Properties of the body pertain to materiality as mechanistic laws of nature while and 
those of the mind pertain to mentality as operations of the mind apart from mechanics. Locke 
understands that the mind and body are able to affect one another; the raw material of the mind is 
given by sense experience, and the mind thinks so as to set the body into motion. Nonetheless, 
mind and body are fundamentally distinct. In addition to thinking, the great action of the mind is 
volition, which is provoked not by drives and desires as in Hobbes, but by an uneasiness or 
desire in mind or the body. As in the thinking of Hobbes, Locke’s natural human being is 
endowed with natural right, but the distinction between mind and body means that some are able 
to exercise restraint, check their passions and order their actions according to natural law, which 
they discover by revelation or rational demonstration.”152  
In so doing, they exercise what Locke call “natural liberty” in distinction from “natural 
right.” Natural law’s presence as a substantive moral obligation in the state of nature means that 
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natural right is not completely determined by the passions, and in turn, that society does not 
decline into a state of war: 
And here we have the plain difference between the State of Nature, and the State of War, 
which however some [people] have confounded, are as far distant, as a State of Peace, Good 
Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation, and a State of Enmity, Malice, Violence and 
Mutual Destruction are one from another. [People] living together according to reason, 
without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them, is properly the 
State of Nature. But force, or a declared design of force upon the Person of another, where 
there is no common Superior on Earth to appeal to for relief, is the State of War;
 153
  
 
For Locke, war is certainly possible in the state of nature but not pervasive in the state of nature 
that this becomes its sole feature. Ordered society is still possible in the state of nature for Locke. 
This order comes about as natural humans order their actions according to the natural law. As 
they do this, something fascinating happens, natural man gains property. According to Locke, the 
acquisition of property in the state of nature occurs through labor. Locke says that all people 
have a property/dominium in their own person in the form of natural right, but again, this natural 
right is limited by the natural law. The natural law reminds us that all people are God’s property 
and again, constrains the exercise of natural right to natural liberty.
154
  
Therefore, it is impossible that anyone could possess absolute dominium, for this would be to 
occupy the position of God, and both reason and divine revelation make it clear that God has 
given the earth to “Mankind [sic] in common” so that no one possesses an original private 
dominion over nature.
 155  
Locke not only denied absolute dominium to the monarch, then, but 
also denied such unlimited authority to anyone making similar claims with regard to subjective 
or property rights. All things are for the use of all people, and all people are servants of God.
156
 
That being said, Locke also argues that God’s workmanship have an obligation to subdue and 
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cultivate the earth. Fulfilling one obligation to God requires that one be endowed with the 
authority to appropriate (common) property, and labor is the process whereby one acquires that 
authority.  
For Locke, then, the activity of labor ascribes to one the authority to take common property 
for oneself. “Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left in 
he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes is 
his Property.”157 There are limits to the appropriation of property. As with natural right, the 
acquisition of private property is limited by the natural law. Locke explains that acquisition 
should be limited by the “rule of propriety”, or by “as much as [one] could make use of…”158 to 
what one can use before it spoils. “The same Law of Nature,” Locke says, “that does by this 
means give us Property, does also bound that Property too. God has given us all things richly, 1 
Tim vi. 17, is the Voice of Reason confirmed by Inspiraition. But how far has [God] given it us? 
To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much 
he may by his labour fix a Property in.”159 Private property, and thus dominium, is lawful, and 
even necessary to fulfill God’s purposes, but it is never absolute. It is always originally common, 
can only be acquired through labor, and its use governed by the natural law and the rule of 
propriety.  
Locke’s labor theory of property extends to land as well, and its implications were tested in 
seventeenth century English and colonial American politics. “I think it is plain,” Locke says, 
“that Property in [land] too is acquired as the former. As much Land as [one] Tills, Plants, 
Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his Property. He by his Labour 
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does, as it were, inclose it from the Common.”160 In addition to labor as a requisite for landed 
property, Locke also claimed that rights to land use are distinct from all of other forms of 
property in that they are given only to “the use of the Industrious and Rational…not to the Fancy 
or Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and Contentious.” Only the rational have the authority to 
acquire property, that is, only those who in turn exponentially increase the value of land. As long 
as one improves the land’s value and avoids spoiling its products, its privatization cannot be 
considered unlawful. “…[People] have agreed,” he argues, “to disproportionate and unequal 
Possession of the Earth…by a tacit and voluntary consent…a man may fairly possess more land 
than he…can use the product of…”161   
Locke’s theory of landed property has implications for seventeenth century English society. 
According to economic historian Robert L. Heilbroner, the English landscape had been in the 
process transformation for roughly a century before Locke’s time as a capitalist social order 
emerged.
162
 Pastures once available to entire parishes for grazing cattle were enclosed and 
declared the private property of the lords of manors. Until this time, land enclosures were 
unlawful apart from the consent of the common will, but now enclosures were maintained, 
fortified, and eventually secured by state law. Disenfranchised farmers of the common lands 
became agricultural proletarians, beggars, robbers, or paupers, and English parliament created 
the first modern ghettos to “remedy” the disturbances caused by riots. The newly impoverished 
class was confined there, and wanderers were whipped, branded, or mutilated. Against the 
disenfranchised classes, then, Locke sanctified and naturalized property ownership for the 
emergent bourgeoisie apart from the consent of the common will.  
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Locke not only justified landed bourgeois property ownership against disenfranchised 
classes, but also justified making human property of slaves (slave labor) and criminals. In 
Locke’s thinking, although all persons possess natural right, the natural law determines who is 
slave and free. On the one hand then, Locke affirms against absolutists like Filmer that 
individuals are unable to transfer their natural right to an absolute power because they do not 
possess such a power in the first place: “No body can give more Power than he has himself; and 
he that cannot take away his own Life, cannot give another power over it.”163 On the other, he 
argues that slavery is lawful as an instance of forfeiture, i.e. as punishment for a crime, offense, 
or error. “And  thus in the State of Nature,” he says,  
one Man comes by a Power over another; but yet no Absolute or Arbitrary Power, to use a 
Criminal when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless 
extravagancy of his own Will, but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and 
conscience dictates, what is proportionate to his Transgression, which is so much as may 
serve for Reparation and Restraint. For these two are the only reasons, why one Man may 
lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment.
164
   
According to Locke, then, one’s natural right becomes null and void to extent that one becomes a 
criminal, which for him is not merely a sign of one’s economic condition but of a distinctive 
ontological status. Unlike those who order their actions according to the natural law, criminals 
have becomes “degenerate,” they have “quit the principles of Human Nature” and become “a 
noxious Creature.”165 These persons have not merely stolen property, but have forfeited their 
very status as persons. Locke notes that such a status is actually punishable by death, but the 
lawful conqueror/owner is free to enact this penalty when he so desires. Until said time, the 
criminal – in life, liberty, and labor – belongs to the conqueror. Locke’s theory of property as 
slaves has direct connections developments in the New World, where Locke himself helped to 
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draft the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, a document, which granted every free man 
“absolute power and Authority over his Negro slaves.”166  
In Locke’s state of nature, then, adherence to the natural law results in natural liberty and 
produces a peaceful social life, private property and the unlimited accumulation of money. 
However, Locke’s idyllic state of nature also has an underside. Those unable to order their 
actions according to the laws of nature are not only unable to own land, but also forfeit their 
natural liberty as they are condemned to an existence in which their efforts are appropriated by 
the bourgeois class. The implications of this are simple: the unequal distribution of prepolitical 
goods (land, labor, capital) is legitimate in the eyes of God and nature.  
The Political Body 
 
The formation of Locke’s political body occurs as those in the state of nature endeavor to form a 
political community. As we have seen, Locke’s natural human is markedly different from 
Hobbes’, and thus political society is not formed to prevent war, but to preserve the property that 
Locke’s laboring man acquired in the natural condition. The Hobbesian individual was 
consumed with the egotistical desire for power and glory. Virtue and vice, good and evil are 
caught up in the whims of power, for Hobbes. There was competition in his state of nature, but 
not even the market, property, or sport can prevent social relations from sometimes declining 
into war. Locke’s natural woman is not driven by the passions, but is capable of ordering her 
actions according to the natural law. Locke’s natural human is industrious, rational and 
calculating. She is more disciplined and productive. She works and acquires property and capital. 
Life in the Lockean state of nature is ordered. In forming the political body, then, they do not 
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transfer all of their right. They relinquish the right to punish, but they retain the right to act, and 
this has implications for both Locke’s theory of representation and sovereignty. Locke begins by 
articulating the purpose of political society, which again, is to protect those social arrangements 
and goods established in the state of nature. With the founding of the state, these goods come 
under the direction of the will of the majority. Locke explains, 
Men being…by Nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this 
Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own Consent. The 
only way whereby any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds 
of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a Community, for 
their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living amongst one another…they are thereby 
presently incorporated, and make one Body Politick, wherein the Majority have a right to 
act and conclude the rest.
167
 
As with Hobbes, the people retain (ultimate) authority when they transfer natural right to the 
state, but Locke also enables the people – those people capable of ordering their actions 
according to natural law – to retain the right to political action. Popular sovereignty is established 
through the social contract, and the right to action manifests itself is in the people’s right to 
elected representatives. Locke uplifts representative democracy as the best form of government 
where legislative power is allocated to the powers of state as opposed to the people. In this way 
Locke brings hos aversion to dominium into the political community.  
Representatives, rather than the sovereign people, establish laws in accord with common 
consent. Representatives also provide indifferent judges as well as executive force by which the 
executive power supports legislative and judicial power for the protection of property. In turn, 
this means that the powers of the state are not used, as with Hobbes, for rational utility; “The 
power of society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be suppos’d to extent farther than 
the common good; but is obliged to secure everyone’s property by providing against [defects] 
that made the State of Nature so unsafe and uneasie.”168 For Locke, the cost of utility is too great 
to the social body, and absolutism too great a cost to liberty and natural right. Political society is 
only established and maintained by the willful consent of those who voluntarily transfer their 
natural liberty to the authority of the community, and this for the preservation of those goods 
acquired in the state of nature.  
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On Sovereignty 
 
With Locke, supreme authority remains with the people, and although they are not the 
source of law, the political community still has both a constitution as well as means to a 
modicum of political action through (indirect) representation. In turn, the authority and scope of 
both legislative and executive powers are radically limited in comparison to Bodin and Hobbes. 
The legislative power make laws, but does not possess either the authority to create legislators or 
the authority to circumvent or repeal established laws. Executive prerogative is legitimate only as 
authorized by the people. The government no longer rules for glory or according to the general 
rule of utility, but now has the sole function of protecting the natural liberty of subjects. 
Locke delineates a separation of powers, which circumscribes the scope of civil powers 
and effectively maintains both the authority of the people and their right to act through the 
majority’s will. In Locke’s view, absolute sovereignty can never be lawfully instituted, since the 
political community cannot transfer a power to authorities that it does not possess due to the 
natural law (more on this below). While a supreme legislative power is established and 
individuals are required to wholly relinquish their right to punish, their continued exercise of 
natural right is limited only to the extent that it jeopardizes the viability of the state. This implies 
that the power and acts of government are constrained by the will of the political community just 
as individuals’ wills are limited by God’s natural law.  
And whoever has the Legislative or Supream Power of any Common-wealth, is bound to 
govern by established standing Laws, promulgated and known to the People, and not by 
Extemporary Decrees; by indifferent and upright Judges, who are to decide Controversies by 
those Laws; And to imploy the force of the Community at home, only in the Execution of 
such Laws, or abroad to prevent or redress Foreign Injuries, and secure the Community from 
Inroads and Invasion. And all this is to be directed to no other end, but the Peace, Safety, and 
publick good of the People.
169
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Legislative power is supreme, but it is a fiduciary and non-transferrable power. Locke re-
emphasizes that it cannot be arbitrary but must be bound by known, settled, standing laws and 
authorized judges. It cannot take any part of one’s private property without consent (including 
raising taxes), and this only when necessary.
170
 Another bulwark against absolutism is 
established when Locke separates legislative and executive powers. Even if a monarch has a 
share in state power as executive head, he is supreme only in an executive, not legislative, sense, 
and the executive’s prerogative is only just as authorized by the people. Executive powers must 
always be in existence, but must never usurp legislative power from the majority. The state alone 
is authorized to exercise these various powers, and again, only in accord with the public good as 
determined by the will of the majority. Should the powers of state ever use force without 
authority or the will of the majority violated, the people are placed in a state of war and retain the 
power to alter or remove the legislative by force, and if necessary, by revolution.      
With Locke, sovereignty rests with the people. He has no desire to see a sovereign imperial 
will exercised through the organs of government. He argues instead for a separation of powers 
and a representative government, which are explicitly anti-monarchial and pro-democratic 
formations. Yet, at the social level, Locke’s thinking reflects the logic of sovereignty as 
dominium where rational property owners naturally have claim to the bodies and labor of 
irrational slaves. Locke was an unapologetic defender of both the capitalist social order and 
England’s colonial projects, with the result that his theory is complicit in the justification of land 
enclosures and the conjoined pauperization of a significant portion of the English population 
during the seventeenth century. Locke’s theory of property justified, among other things, the 
commodification and exploitation of human flesh during the transatlantic slave trade (1500s-
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1800s), and this in spite of the undeniable emergent cosmopolitanism in his own thought, which, 
out of reverence for individual liberty, limits the powers not only of the English commonwealth 
but all commonwealths, regardless of their forms of government. This means that while Locke’s 
natural law implies constitutional limits to governmental power, it also provides metaphysical 
legitimation for racist social hierarchies. In the end, Locke’s natural right to natural liberty does 
not translate into universal civil or political rights. Finally, Locke has an anemic account of the 
representational role of subjects, for even as they possess the power of election and the right to 
revolution, citizens cannot engage in direct and/or active forms of (self) representation. These 
more politically conservative aspects of Locke come into sharp relief when compared with Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. For Rousseau, notions of private property and indirect representation come 
under the most vicious criticism as he held that a politically active citizenry was necessary to 
preserve the state. Yet, Rousseau’s thinking contains problematic aspects of its own, most 
notably the return of absolutism, this time in the form of the nation.  
A. Jean Jacques Rousseau  
 
Context 
 
In contrast to Locke’s England, where the Glorious Revolution (1688) secured a constitutional 
monarchy, French kings still wielded absolute sovereignty over the ancien regime well into the 
eighteenth century.
171
 In French feudal society, clergy had the highest order of rights and status, 
followed by nobility with the Third Estate shoring up the least privileged. The old French 
feudalism was not without its old religious feud between Catholics and Calvinists. When Louis 
XIV (1638-1715) revoked the Edict of Nantes (1598) in 1685, the Huguenots lost their civil 
liberties and civil war was incited once again between them and the Catholic establishment. At 
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mid-century, against this background of ecclesial and social tumult, a capitalist social order came 
into formation. This new order challenged the old feudal order as some in the Third Estate were 
able to shake off a low status (routier) and embrace a new bourgeois identity. New cultural and 
intellectual leaders of France, those called the philosophes, saw the emergent order not only as a 
sign of the progress of the arts (e.g. poetry, theater), sciences (physics, astronomy), but even 
more, as progress of human nature itself. For example, figures like Denis Diderot (1713-1784) 
and Voltaire (1694-1778) argued that such progress was a sign of the ‘perfectability’ 
(perfectibilite) of human beings.
 172
 This new order would educate and culture individuals away 
from “lower” forms of life (e.g. intolerant religion, laziness) toward higher, rational forms. The 
philosophes envisioned the French state as a “Republic of Letters,” i.e. as a state directed by the 
public opinion formed in the public discourses of Enlightenment thinkers. This wider public, 
rather than the church or crown, would be the legitimating audience for official knowledge, 
political criticism, and the formation of public opinion. However, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-
1778) noticed problems with this emergent state of affairs, especially the widened gap between 
social orders. He also believed that idealistic Enlightenment thinkers failed to see that all social 
life is marked by the destructive love(s) of self, conquest, wealth, fame or glory. As French 
society poised for evolution, then, Rousseau would call the French republic to account on a 
number of social ills. 
The State of Nature and the Body 
 
Rousseau’s doctrine of the state of nature is more admittedly a work of art than science. He 
did not like the title of “philosopher” but in his Emile (1762, 2000) Rousseau indicates that he 
rejects the “New Science’s” mechanistic view of nature and embraces the empirical approach of 
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“The Science of Man”, represented by figures such as David Hume (1711-1776) and Adam 
Smith (1723-1790). A character in Emile, the Vicar, reflects on his own experiences of the moral 
life and concludes that the will, as known in action, cannot be confined to any mechanistic 
logic.
173
 Rousseau’s use of sentiments, rather than desire or reason, as the core concept in his 
moral theory also reflects influences of the “The Science of Man.” Scholar Jacquelyn Taylor 
notes that David Hume developed the highly influential thesis that human understandings of 
morality and justice are based in natural sentiments.
174
 Sentiment is that (social) feeling of 
acceptance or rejection by others. We see the concept at work in Rousseau’s doctrine of the state 
of nature as imagined in “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men” 
where humanity exists in a state of natural goodness and order. Individuals are ruled by natural 
sentiment, and this gives them a healthy balance of the passions. The individual’s natural love of 
self (amour de soi) works alongside compassion for one’s fellow creatures (pitié) in a way that 
enables humanity to live in perfect freedom, equality, and peace with nature without coercion or 
obligation. In contrast to the Hobbesian multitude, Rousseau’s savages are “free, healthy, good, 
and happy as far as they could by their Nature be, and continued to enjoy the gentleness of 
independent dealings with one another...”175  
From this state of innocence, however, humanity experiences moral decline rather than 
progress, such decline in fact that the multitude is eventually forced from the state of nature into 
political community. Humans begin in a state of moral innocence, where they do not need and 
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have not yet developed moral or political life.
176
 Natural sentiment is an adequate guide. As 
people come into contact with one another, ideas, industry, technology and language advance. 
But these advances are accompanied by the progressive deformation of human sentiments away 
from natural innocence toward ambition and vice; away from amour de soi and pitié toward 
amour-propre. In other words, for Rousseau, civil society itself is the cause of human social and 
even personal moral ills.  
While life in the state of nature is characterized by natural pity for fellow humans, other 
animals and nature in general, social life in civil society is increasingly characterized by the 
destructive love of self, conquest, wealth, and the search for fame and glory. With the demise of 
natural feeling and the growth of reason, it becomes clear that humanity has traded natural liberty 
for the enslaving chains of civil society. Rousseau is especially mindful of the ways in which the 
accumulation of landed property contributes to this decline in social relations. Rousseau 
expounds on this decline at length: 
So long as [people] were content with their rustic huts, so long as they confined 
themselves to sewing their clothes of skins with thorns or fish bones, to adorning 
themselves with feathers and shells, to painting their bodies different colors, to perfecting 
or embellishing their bows and arrows, to carving a few fishing Canoes or a few crude 
Musical instruments with sharp stones; In a word, so long as they applied themselves 
only to tasks a single individual could perform, and to arts that did not require the 
collaboration of several hands, they lived fre, healthy, good and happy as far as they 
could by their Nature be, and continued to enjoy the gentleness of independent dealings 
with one another; but the moment one [individual] needed the help of another; as soon as 
it was found to be useful for one to have provisions for two, equality disappeared, 
property appeared, work became necessary, and the vast forests changed into smiling 
Fields that had to be watered with the sweat of men, and where slavery and misery were 
soon seen to sprout and grow together with the harvests.
177
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Unlike previous theorists of sovereignty, Rousseau offers the first critical perspective on 
civil society. As we have seen, Locke imagines civil society as an ordered and tranquil social 
state, one fundamentally organized according to the dictates of natural law. In almost 
mechanistic fashion, Locke’s natural individual labors, acquires possessions and property, and in 
this way achieves happiness. Likewise, although Hobbes is less optimistic of redemptive aspects 
of civil society, he understands it as an improvement over the natural condition. With Rousseau, 
however, we see a distinctive shift to a critical interpretation of human society. The less 
venerable moral qualities of humans such as jealously, insecurity and the desire for fame and 
attention, make it so that civil society turns out to be less morally and socially beneficial for 
humans than the state of nature.  
According to Rousseau, the vile nature of civil society becomes especially pronounced 
with the accumulation of landed property. That possession, which Locke venerates, Rousseau 
disparages:  
[People] are not naturally enemies, if only because when they live in their primitive 
independence the relation among them is not sufficiently stable to constitute either a state 
of peace or a state of war. It is the relation between things and not between [people] that 
constitutes war, and since the state of war cannot arise from simple personal relations but 
only from property relations, private war or war between one [individual] and another can 
exist neither in the state of nature, where there is no stable property, nor in the social state 
where everything is under the authority of the laws.
178
   
Again, Rousseau notes that 
 
The first [individual] who, having enclosed a piece of ground, to whom it occurred to say 
this is mine, and found people sufficiently simple to believe him, was the true founder of 
civil society. How many crimes, wars, murders, how many miseries and horrors 
[Humankind] would have been spared by him who, pulling up the stakes or filling in the 
ditch, had cried out to his kind: Beware of listening to this impostor; You are lost if you 
forget that the fruits are everyone’s and the Earth no one’s…179 
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Property acquisition, the bane of healthy human sociality, becomes the final tipping point both 
for the decline of natural pity and for the transition from the state of nature into civil society. 
With the original state of nature having forever vanished, the multitude consents to convert their 
wills into one in an effort to insure claims to property. On one hand, then, the rise of political 
community is an acknowledgement that natural goodness and liberty are lost forever. On the 
other, it is a means, perhaps the only one which remains, by which individuals may protect their 
property against the evils of civil society and a permanent state of war. It remains the only 
avenue by which political liberty and moral virtue might be secured for civilized, weak, and 
warmongering peoples. 
Rousseau’s view of the body is comprised of at least a few influences. It not only reflects 
influences from “The Science of Man” and the philosophes, but also Christian Jansenist 
theology. Following Hume, Rousseau claims that natural sentiment is the basis of the moral life 
rather than free will or reason. He also partially embraced the philosophe’s notion of 
perfectibilité. Rousseau scholar Susan Meld Shell explains that “[t]he essential quality of man, so 
understood, is not reason, as ancient thinkers insisted and early modern thinkers still in part 
assumed, but the freedom or perfectability that allows us to connect man in the present age with 
man as he must have been originally.”180 Meld depicts ‘perfectibility as a “flexibility that allows 
men to adapt to different circumstances and also allows them to adopt ends independent of 
nature’s own direction.”181 Rousseau thus agreed with the philosophes that the arts and sciences 
could “perfect” the mind (e.g. knowledge) and body (nutrition). However, Rousseau was not 
content with a purely optimistic view of human nature. Although he appreciated the thinking of 
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the British moralists as well as the French philosophes, he was also convinced that humanity 
suffered from deeply entrenched a moral scar and that civil society was ultimately destructive to 
human moral and physical capacities.
182
 Thus, while the arts and sciences are venerable, it is 
unrealistic to expect them to provoke a voluntary commitment to virtue, i.e. the preference for 
the common good over one’s own interests. Rousseau scholar Mark S. Cladis argues that 
Rousseau found the moral languages of eighteenth century Jansensist theologians more helpful in 
conveying the permanence of human moral corruption.
183
  
According to Cladis, Jansensit theologians influenced by the thinking of St. Augustine (354-430) 
used the concepts of disinterested love (charite), selfish love (amour-propre), and neutral or 
benign self-love (amour de soi) to depict the human condition.
184
 “In the seventeenth century,” 
Cladis contends, “Augustine was a central object of study in France. His works were widely read 
because Montaigne had taken an interest in him and because controversy had erupted over the 
views of the Augustinian Jansenists at Port Royal. To many, the Jansenists appeared seditious 
because they condemned the opulence of the government and the wealthy, and because they 
advocated, implicitly if not explicitly, a retreat from the corrupt secular and political 
domains.”185 The Jansenists tripartite distinction was admittedly a modification on Augustine’s 
dualistic one, namely “the love of “self (concupiscence), which tends toward hatred of God and 
marks the citizens of the earthly city, and the love of God (caritas), which tends toward hatred of 
self and marks the citizens of the heavenly city.”186 Yet, social thinkers like Rousseau found 
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Jansenists modified tripartite vocabulary helpful for making an important distinction “between 
benign and vicious self-love,” between amour-propre and amour de soi. 187 For Rousseau, this 
vocabulary depicted not only the perennial human struggle, but was also indicative of 
humankind’s moral decline as it evolved from the natural condition to civil society. In the 
original state, humanity is marked primarily by amour de soi, but with the advance of civil 
society, humankind is overtaken by amour-propre. Rousseau found this description of the human 
condition more compelling than Enlightenment narratives of progress and optimism, and it plays 
a central role in Rousseau’s view of the body. Rousseau understands the body as caught up in the 
larger, morally corrupting forces of social life. These forces pull us away from innocence toward 
ambition and vice, indeed,  away from amour de soi and pitié toward amour-propre.  
The Political Body 
 
St. Augustine not only exercised an influence on Rousseau’s conception of the body, but 
on his view of the political body as well. Given Rousseau’s depiction of humanity’s moral 
condition, his “remedy” must necessarily exceed those of the sciences and arts. These could only 
cover the vices of civil society with a superficial urbane politeness. Rousseau wanted to bring 
about moral transformation in French society, whereby sentiments are pulled away from self-
interest toward fraternity, love of the fatherland and sacred bond with fellow citizens. Cladis 
expounds on the relationship of Augustinian moral theology to Rousseau’s conception of the 
political body:  
Rousseau shared the commonly held Augustinian view that love of self is the foundation 
of all loves. Many French theologians had asserted that even love of God begins as love 
of self. The task, then, in Rousseau's view, was neither to defeat self-love nor to 
coordinate the agitated activities of individuals being driven by self-love; the task was to 
train the individual to see her or his own body as an intrinsic part of the political body, in 
order that love of self and love of country might become one. Augustinian pessimism 
runs deep here. It is understood, for example, that vanity cannot be vanquished; it can, 
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however, be deflected from the private body to the public body that contains it. On the 
extreme path, there are neither egoists pursuing private interests nor altruists sacrificing 
interests. When the corporate body is seen as one's own true body, altruism loses its 
meaning, for the difference between public and private aims collapses.
188
  
The first move toward the general redemption of human society occurs with the establishment of 
the social pact, and the second, discussed below, is the general will. In theorizing the social pact, 
Rousseau locates himself in the wider “social contract” tradition of political thought, which 
includes previous theorists of sovereignty such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. With them, 
Rousseau’ myth features the coming together of individuals in the state of nature to pledge a 
social pact, thus constituting the political body. Rousseau explains:  
Each of us puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of 
the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the 
whole.  
At once, in place of the private person of each contracting party, this act of association 
produces a moral and collective body made up of as many members as the assembly has 
voices, and which receives by this same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will. 
The public person thus formed by the union of all the others…now assumes [the name] of 
Republic or of body politic, which its members call State when it is passive, Sovereign 
when active, Power when comparing it to similar bodies. As for the associates, they 
collectively assume the name people and individually call themselves Citizens as 
participants in the sovereign authority, and Subjects as subjected to the laws of the 
State.
189
 
The social contract forms the body politic. This association possesses the power to provide 
lasting protection to its members, both from (civil) war and moral decline. Toward this end, 
Rousseau’s natural humans consent to a total alienation of their natural rights. In turn, the people 
become sovereign. “Just as nature gives each man absolute power over his members, the social 
pact gives the body politic absolute power over all of its members.”190 The total alienation of 
one’s rights is not to be confused with despotism, and Rousseau attempts to clear himself of this 
charge in Book I of The Social Contract. He argues that force does not make right, that any 
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convention that stipulates absolute authority on one side and unlimited obedience on the other is 
“vain and contradictory,” even the terms ‘right’ and ‘slavery’ are mutually exclusive.191 For 
Rousseau, the only way that one might completely commit their force and freedom to an 
association without harming themselves is if that association is guided by a “general will,” which 
they help to construct and which has the common interest as its motivation and end. In this way, 
the people retain sovereignty for “sovereignty is nothing but the exercise of the general will.”192  
On Sovereignty 
 
Rousseau locates sovereignty, then, in the general will, which emerges from the public 
assembly and which is directed toward the interest of the state. Rousseau explains that after the 
people have assembled to discuss the common interest, with “every Citizen” stating his own 
opinion, the general will for the common good emerges.
193
  Again, Rousseau notes that “[e]ach 
of us puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of the general 
will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”194 Much like 
the monarch in Bodin’s discourse, this general will operates as the principle of political life and 
sovereign guide in matters of civil law and justice. In the general will, the ‘good of all’ takes 
precedence over individual or associational interests; the whole precedes the parts. In other 
words, what generalizes the will is not so much the number of voices as it is the common interest 
which unites them. “If there were not some point on which all interests agree,” Rousseau says, 
that “no society could exist. Now it is solely in terms of this common interest that society ought 
to be governed.”195 This would-be associational interest is made the legitimate general will only 
if the people gather in public assembly. The sovereign is necessarily a collective being that can 
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only represent itself. The people are not only members of the state, then, but become the 
sovereign body upon assembling.   
The general will is not immutable, as was the case with Locke’s natural law. Moreover, it 
does not produce a lasting constitutionalism. Rousseau refuses to give any substantive content to 
the general will: it is neither reducible to ‘the will of all’or is it the sum of particular wills 
(majority), which may be contrary to common interest. Nevertheless, it is “always upright and 
always attends to the public utility,” and it is only by this will that the desires of citizens and 
magisterial decisions are rightly directed.
196
 Rousseau’s comparison of the general will to 
particular interest shows that the substance of the general will comes from the fact that it 
emerges from the public assembly, the space most reflective of original freedom and natural 
justice. Particular will emerges from amour-propre, the lustful, self-interested and competitive 
passions of everyday social life, but the general will emerges from amore de soi, a patriotic, 
fraternal love.  
In Rousseau’s view, this public sovereignty is not absolute because although the people grant 
authority to the law, which is derived from the assembly, they are not the source of law. A 
lawgiver  is required for this purpose. However, the lawgiver is not an office of the state or a part 
of the people, not even the empire. This rather extraordinary function must be performed by a 
non-resident whose only task is to draft and propose laws for the state.
197
 The people assemble to 
determine the general will, and the ethos generated by the assembly creates the conditions for the 
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lawgiver to constitute the best possible kinds of laws, which the people then approve. In this 
way, the people “freely obey the yoke of public felicity.”198  
It is significant that Rousseau’s sovereign play both a public and private role, directing both 
public laws and private sentiment. He believed that the exercise of sovereignty by way of the 
general will not only rightly directs the political body, but also enraptures participants in an 
experience that transformed their moral sentiments and corrects their wills. Having been part of a 
ritual wherein the people assemble, state their opinion, and determine the general will, and where 
a lawgiver comes forth with divine authority, a conversion of sorts occurs. Amour-propre (self-
interest) gives way to amour de soi (common interest) Love of freedom replaces the love of 
wealth, and devouring greed and unsettled spirits subside even as public service becomes the 
principal duty of all. In this moment, as sentiments shift in the wake of the general will during 
the people’s self-representation, a modicum of original goodness is “recovered,” even if only in 
an artificial sense, and freedom, at both the political and moral level, is realized. So, Rousseau 
beckons, “let us endeavor to derive from the evil itself the remedy which will cure it. By means 
of new associations, let us correct, if possible, the lack of a general association….Let us 
enlighten [man’s] reason with new knowledge, fire his heart with new sentiments.”199 
Collectively, the people become the sovereign, whose will is upright to the extent that it is 
guided by the general will. Individually, persons are cleansed of the vices bequeathed to them by 
civil society. Their wills become upright and their characters virtuous to the extent that they deny 
themselves and tend to the common interest.   
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Rousseau did not imagine the general will as despotic, but his lack of recognition of 
inalienable rights implies that sovereignty is indeed absolute. Rousseau explains his goals for 
political society further in his Considerations on the Government of Poland (1772), where he 
notes that his conception of political association stems primarily from three ancient institutions: 
the Jewish national body (established by Moses), Sparta, (by Lycurgus), and Rome (Numa).
200
 
Each of these institutions, he says, were fastened by bonds that “attach Citizens to the fatherland 
and to one another, and they found them in distinctive practices, in religious ceremonies which 
by their very nature were always exclusive and national.”201 According to Rousseau, this sacred 
bond of fraternity gave to ancients’ souls a vigor unknown to moderns, and from these vigorous 
souls emerged the most magnificent institutions. For example, “Sparta was but a city, it is true; 
but by the sheer force of its institution this city gave laws to the whole of Greece.” Moses made a 
free and lasting people out of a “wandering and servile troop.”202 Rousseau imagines that the 
general will would perform a similar function in modern societies, that is, that it would transform 
individual citizens into a united community. Indeed, Rousseau envisioned an aristocratic society 
modeled on Rome, where all illustrious men – those who lived in the country, owned property, 
and cultivated the land, acted together as sovereign. He believed that the alienation of rights 
would not despoil these individuals, but further secure their legitimate possession.
203
 By way of 
property, as well as the maintenance of political liberty through the exercise of civil freedom (the 
general will), then, these people remain free. This civil freedom must forever remain with the 
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people, for as seen with Rome, relinquishing of self-representation and subsequent dedication to 
blind obedience was one of the principal causes of its ruin.
204
  
Nonetheless, citizens remain without inalienable rights, so that the exercise of the general 
will has alienating effects on those whose opinion differs from the general will. Also, the process 
by which the general will is determined excludes the lowers orders of society. In relation to 
Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau’s social pact first appears to be radically inclusive. He takes pains 
to insist that neither the institution of the state nor the formation of the state’s general will is 
valid unless all of the people are assembled, and more, that the pact/general will arise from 
concord and unanimity. It is also true that the social pact establishes equality among Citizens 
such that all are committed to similar conditions and must all enjoy the same rights. However, 
Rousseau notes that “one law…by its nature requires unanimous consent. That is the social pact 
over other laws are voted on by order.
205
 In eighteenth century French politics, this meant that 
each order would meet in separate chambers to vote on the general will rather than as a collective 
assembly. In fact, Rousseau claims that by the time legislation reaches the people’s assembly, it 
is all but law, and it matters little whether they agree or not. Rousseau argues, “when a law is 
proposed in the people’s assembly, what they are being asked is not exactly whether they 
approve the proposal or reject it, but whether it does or does not conform to the general will, 
which is theirs; everyone states his opinion about this by casting his ballot, and the tally of the 
votes yields the declaration of the general will.”206 As the National Assembly of 1789 would 
demonstrate, this procedure, which tallied votes per order as opposed to per head, always 
truncated the political interests of the Third Estate (that is, the poor), which was far more 
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numerous than other orders.  Yet, Rousseau appears unconcerned with this aspect of his  theory 
of sovereignty. “If…there are some who oppose it,” he says, “their opposition does not invalidate 
the contract, it only keeps them from being included in it; they are foreigners among the 
Citizens.”207  
Conclusion 
 
In Locke and Rousseau’s theories, sovereignty continues the trend of democratization that began 
in the thinking of Bodin and Hobbes, but in Rousseau it recoils in the form of national 
sovereignty. The story of the democratization of sovereignty began with Bodin, for whom the 
monarch was sovereign, and continued with Hobbes’ sovereign monarchial state. This trend 
continues with Locke and Rousseau. For Locke, the power of the natural law pervades the state, 
thus limiting the powers of government and protecting the inalienable rights of the people. In 
Locke’s thinking, the state is never substantive enough to compel subjects to completely alienate 
their natural right. However, as I have discussed in the introduction of this chapter, Rousseau 
tells a different tale of sovereignty. Although we live in a free and civilized society, we have lost 
our original goodness and natural justice. Thus, it is necessary that nations determine for 
themselves what is good and just, and this determination overrides all other claims. In Rousseau, 
the sovereignty of the general will vitiates the democratic potentialities of his thinking. Also 
notable is that the democratization of political representation occurs along with the 
democratization of sovereignty. In both Hobbes and Bodin, the sovereign’s power consisted in 
part in denying the people various forms of representation and political action. In Locke and 
Rousseau, the power of representation moves to the people. According to Locke, the people 
represents itself through elected officials and retains the right to revolution should faith in elected 
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officials fail. Likewise, in Rousseau’s discourse, the people retain the right to self-representation 
in public assembly.  
However, the accelerated democratization of sovereignty and representation is 
counterbalanced by the hierarchicalizaltion of beings in the state of nature. Hobbes’s state of 
nature is chaotic, but fundamentally egalitarian. In the midst of the rise of capitalist orders and 
constitutional regimes predicated on individual rights, Locke and Rousseau feel the need to rank 
humans on a natural scale of sorts. For Locke, nature itself has a ranking system. On the one 
hand, it rewards those who are willing work hard and make rational use of their resources with 
property and peace. On the other, it punishes those who are unwilling to conform to this 
fundamental law of nature, specifically in the form of slavery, a state of existence where the lines 
between humanity and property become blurred and indistinguishable. In similar fashion, 
Rousseau conceives of nature on an evolutionary scale. Although less civilized societies are 
more free and in harmony with nature, the West remains fundamentally more advanced such that 
the general will must be formed in accord with exclusive national interest.  
Thus, his appeal to the “noble savage”, i.e. that idea that less civilized societies as more 
“innocent” than those with more wealth and technology, fails to mask his fundamentally racist 
portrait of the stat of nature. Even as sovereignty is democratized in the form of government, 
then, nature’s ranking system still precludes some from the freedoms of citizenship at an 
ontological level. Rousseau’s doctrine of national sovereignty not only alienates everyone from 
their natural right; it alienates the lower estates, the noble savage, and women altogether. The 
general will also legitimates the use of coercive and paternalistic powers on these same 
vulnerable classes. Locke enslaves those who do not conform to the natural law, not only in 
theory, but quite literally, in practice. Even as his (critical) thinking on sovereignty provided an 
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avenue for the establishment of a democratic state, his philosophy of nature and the body still 
reflect a racial logic, support for the institution of slavery, and a linking of the two.   
Finally, analysis on the discourse of sovereignty in Locke and Rousseau shows that the 
nature of the political body has implications for obligation, injury and justice. In Rousseau, the 
total alienation of rights produces a categorical obligation to the state. The injuries that impact 
the political body take priority over personal injuries. This grounds civil justice in a more 
virtuous sentiment, and justice itself becomes the prerogative of popular will rather than natural 
law in the Lockean sense. In Locke’s discourse, citizens are minimally obligated to the political 
body and personal injury takes priority over that affecting society. This keeps justice oriented 
toward the natural law. In the following two chapters, we witness yet another transformation in 
the discourse on sovereignty, namely, from its democratization to it rationalization as Immanuel 
Kant removes sovereignty from the (revolutionary-prone) people and locates it in reason. And as 
was the case with previous thinkers, this transition in sovereignty cannot be separated from shifts 
in thinking on the state nature and the body. We now turn to Immanuel Kant’s late eighteenth 
century theory of sovereignty.    
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Chapter 3 
Immanuel Kant: The Sovereignty of Reason 
This chapter analyzes the discourse on sovereignty in the thinking of Prussian philosopher 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The outline of the chapter follows the others: first I discuss Kant’s 
context, then his doctrine of the state of nature and the body, followed by his views on the 
political body, and finally his doctrine of sovereignty. Kant effects a sharp transition in the 
discourse on sovereignty. If Locke and Rousseau accelerated the democratization of sovereignty, 
Kant rationalizes sovereignty. That is, he removes sovereignty from all human hands and places 
it in Reason, itself freed from the restraints of traditional rationalism (God, self and nature). The 
fate of the political community thus becomes less tied to a monarch or a political body and more 
attached to the universal laws of reason. For Kant the state is not founded on voluntary contract; 
citizens move from the pleasurable state of nature into the civil state out of obligation to rational 
duty. Thus the notion of a political body, constituted by its many members, fades away in Kant’s 
theory.  
In the state, reason floats transcendent over civil society with objective validity, critically 
regulating its thoughts and practices and evaluating its motives and ends. In these and other 
functions, reason displaces the role that nature played in previous discourses on sovereignty. The 
loss of the political body in Kant is not without consequence, for Kant still imagines human 
nature in ways similar to Hobbes rather than Locke, that is, as primarily driven by desire and 
passion. As a consequence, Kant’s discourse on sovereignty inaugurates the modern state’s turn 
toward militarization. With the loss of the political body, a standing army comes to take on the 
coercive duties of political authority. We begin with Kant’s historical context, and from there 
take account of his views on nature and the body before moving to his political theory.   
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Context 
 
East of France, the Holy Roman Imperium (800AD -1806) entered its final decades as the 
eighteenth century came to a close. In the wake of imperial decline, Austria and Prussia – each 
seeing themselves as rightful heirs to German imperial heritage – began to assert their supremacy 
the one against the other, resulting in costly wars that drained the resources of both countries.  
The German Reich had come into financial troubles in mid-eighteenth century, and a post-Seven 
Years War (1756-1763) recession set in that lasted well into the 1770s.
208
 However, such dismal 
events did not completely determine German social life, for an emergent Aufklarung 
(Enlightenment movement) provided hope for a renewed and prosperous Germany. New social 
clubs were organized for purposes of improving society. As in France, social reforms began to 
take place in Germany; torture was abolished, the social status of Jews improved, peasants were 
emancipated, and education was more widely promoted. German society became more 
hospitable to public, rational debate. As traditional religious authorities were openly criticized, 
many transferred their allegiance from religious groups to the German nation. This nascent 
nationalism was marked by a stress on civic virtue and responsibility, as well as an expectation 
of social progress. Although Frederick William II (1744-1797) stifled the enlightenment ethos 
near the end of the century, the changes administered under the rule of his predecessor, Frederick 
the Great (1712-1786), were so firmly embedded that William II could not rid Germany of their 
cultural effects. Simultaneous with events in France, these conditions in Germany kept the social 
effects of enlightenment at the forefront of political, religious, and philosophical concern.  
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The State of Nature and the Body 
 
Over the course of his career, Kant’s thinking on nature experienced a shift from a 
traditional rationalist to an idealist view. According to philosopher Peter J. Markie, rationalism 
“is the view that reason, as opposed to, say, sense experience [empiricism], divine revelation or 
reliance on institutional authority [traditionalism], plays a dominant role in our attempt to gain 
knowledge.”209 Idealism, one the other hand, is defined by T.L.S. Sprigge as “the view that the 
mind is the most basic reality and that the physical world exists only as an appearance to or 
expression of mind, or as somehow mental in its inner essence.”210 (Sprigge notes that Kant’s 
idealism is mitigated by a “more basic reality behind the mental and physical scenes.”) In his 
early career, Kant firmly identified with the rationalist philosophical tradition, which proceeds 
from the thinking of Rene Descartes (1596-1650).
211
 Philosopher Anthony Kenny explains that 
Cartesian rationalism begins its search for knowledge of the first causes of existence, i.e. the 
unconditioned causes of the universe and the human being. Kenney explains that in his 
Discourse on Method (1637), Descartes method of introspection first proceeds by way of 
hypothetical doubt, through which he radically doubts all that can be doubted. That is, in the 
process of doubting, Descartes notices that the ‘I’ doing the doubting had to itself be a thing. 
“And observing that this truth,” says Descartes, “‘I am thinking, therefore I exist,’ was so solid 
and secure that the most extravagant suppositions of sceptics could not overthrow it, I judged 
that I need not scruple to accept it as the first principle of philosophy that I was seeking.”212  
Kenny explains that from this rational foundation, the cogitio erg sum, Descartes derives 
the key claims of rationalism. First, the human being “is a substance whose whole essence is to 
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think; being a body is no part of my essence.”213 This implies that “whenever I conceive 
something clearly and distinctly, I am assured of its truth.”214 With this first claim established, 
Descartes then turns to material objects to establish a second claim, namely that when one sees 
that shape, size and movement are the properties of material bodies, one perceives that “matter is 
extension in motion.”215 Kenny explains, for Descartes, “everything is to be explained in terms 
of a dualism of mind and matter.”216  Thus the cosmos is divided into two kinds of substances, 
mind, i.e. thought and matter, extension, i.e. to take up space. Descartes’ third postulate assures 
thinkers of the soundness of his or her perceptions of God. He surmises, “only the truthful nature 
of God, to whom I owe my existence as a thinking thing,” guarantees that what I perceive clearly 
and distinctly is true.
217
  God is for Descartes then, the guarantor of (true) knowledge, that is, 
cleat and distinct ideas in contrast to “opinion” or falsehood.  
The Cartesian method was widely dissimulated not only by a thinker such as Baruch de 
Spinoza from the Netherlands but in Germany by thinkers such as Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) 
and Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Philosophers Paul Guyer and Allen Wood note that from this 
method, rationalists went on to establish a four part metaphysical system. “The Leibnizian-
Wolffian tradition,” explains Guyer, “as presented in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's 
Metaphysica (first edition, 1738), which Kant used as the textbook for his lectures on 
metaphysics for virtually his entire career, was divided into four parts: ontology, psychology, 
cosmology, and theology.”218 Leibniz and Wolff were canonical in eighteenth century German 
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philosophical circles and held great influence over Kant’s early thinking, says Kenny.219 Kant’s 
Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces (1746-7), Universal Natural History and 
Theory of the Heavens (1755), and Physical Monadology (1756) stand firmly within this 
rationalist tradition.
220
  
According to Frederick C. Beiser, a well-recognized Kant scholar, traditional rationalism 
uses the human faculty of reason to demonstrate a metaphysical foundation of physics and 
nature, one constituted by God, providence, and immortality.
221
 “[The] task of the metaphysics 
of nature,” says Beiser, “is to discover the inner forces of things, the first causes of the laws of 
motion and the ultimate constituents of matter.”222 Metaphysics determines the dynamics of the 
world, what Beiser calls the “ultimate forces and particles of nature,”223 namely “God, 
providence and immortality”224 (Kenny uses the term “freedom” for Beiser’s “providence”).225 
Rationalist metaphysics grants maximal assurance of the truth of these realities by rational 
demonstration alone. Rationalists believe in apodictic certainty, i.e. rational demonstrations in 
the analysis of nature, knowledge of the laws of nature may be established a priori. Such 
knowledge is most certain, which is necessary and universal. These rational demonstrations do 
not only provide certainty about ultimate forces, but provide rational grounding for human moral 
choices, which are moved by free will and not necessity.
226
 Apodictic reasoning thus provides 
certain knowledge of God, providence or freedom, and immortality of the soul. Knowledge these 
realities enable one to discover their true vocation and moral obligation.  
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Over the course of his career, Kant transitioned from rational search for the metaphysics 
of nature to a rational inquiry into the (metaphysics of) the human mind. The shift was gradual, 
not instant, but formative for Kant in this respect was the thinking of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
including figures such as Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), Edmund Burke (1729-1797) and 
David Hume (1711-1776). According to philosopher Patrick Frierson, “Hume was to have the 
most lasting influence on Kant.”227 Hume, a Scottish radical empiricist, argued that all human 
judgments are based on sense experience. As a traditional rationalist who believed that reason, 
rather than sense experience, plays a dominant role in gaining knowledge, Kant found Hume 
unsettling, to say the least. Kant articulates with clarity the differences between radical 
empiricism and metaphysical thinking in his 1783 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: 
Let us consider first the sources of metaphysical knowledge. The very concept of 
metaphysics ensures that the sources of metaphysics can’t be empirical. If something 
could be known through the senses, that would automatically show that it doesn’t belong 
to metaphysics; that’s an upshot of the meaning of the word ‘metaphysics’. Its basic 
propositions can never be taken from experience, nor can its basic concepts; for it is not 
to be physical but metaphysical knowledge, so it must lie beyond experience. Outer 
experience is the source of physics properly so-called, and inner experience is the basis 
for empirical psychology; and metaphysical knowledge can’t come from either of these. 
It is thus knowledge a priori—knowledge based on pure understanding and pure 
reason.
228
 
 
In this passage Kant expresses a strong distinction between empirical knowledge and 
metaphysical knowledge. This opposition is grounded in Hume’s skepticism regarding the 
concept of “necessity”, which Kant defines in his Prolegomena:  
Hume’s primary starting-point was a single important metaphysical concept, namely that 
of the connection of cause with effect (including derivative concepts like those of force 
and action and so on). Reason purports to have given birth to this concept, but Hume 
challenged reason thus: Explain to me what entitles you to think there could be a thing x 
such that: given that there is x, there must necessarily also be something else y—for 
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that’s what the concept of cause says. He showed beyond question that it is completely 
impossible for reason to have—in an a priori way and purely through concepts ·with no 
input from experience·—the thought of such a union of x with y, because the thought of 
such a union includes the thought of necessity. We cannot at all see why, given that one 
thing exists, some other thing necessarily must exist, or how the concept of such a 
connection could arise a priori. From this he inferred that reason is utterly deluded 
regarding the concept of cause, wrongly thinking it to be among her own children when 
really it is a bastard child of the imagination that was got in the family way by 
experience.
229
    
 
Kenny notes that Hume challenged the important concept of necessity, i.e. the necessary 
connection between a cause and its effect. This notion was not birthed from reason but 
custom.
230
 In reading Hume and realizing that the concept of necessity could not be proved either 
by deductive reasoning or experimental inquiry, Kant abandoned his earlier traditional 
rationalism and embraced the empiricist method. Kenny moreover notes that Kant attacked his 
former “metaphysical psychology, metaphysical cosmology and metaphysical theology,” all of 
which are grounded in rational proofs and are thus held a priori, i.e. certain, necessary and 
universal, truths.
231
 Kant destroys the “notions of an immaterial immortal soul, of a surveyable 
cosmic whole, and of an absolutely necessary being” says Kenny.232 Like all other empiricists, 
Kant now held that all human knowledge about the self, the world and beyond begins with the 
senses and is contingent, particular and fallible. If rationalism were grounded on a priori claims, 
then empiricism is grounded on a posteriori claims. Thus, humans can never claim absolute 
knowledge about a real or true world beyond appearances. 
 
Although Hume’s argument converted Kant to empiricism, his conversion was highly 
mitigated as he considered that radical empiricism had discredited the scientific status of a priori 
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truth claims but not what Kant called “synthetic a priori judgments.”233 According to Paul Guyer 
Kant defines “the ordinary function of judgment as that of subsuming a particular under a 
universal that is antecedently given to us…he now calls that function ‘determining 
judgment’…[or with] ‘reflecting judgement’…we are given a particular for which we must seek 
to find a universal, a concept or rule of some kind that we are no immediately given.”234 To 
Kant’s mind, radical empiricism threatened the possibility of human judgment because it had 
destroyed the universals of traditional rationalism (self, world, God). However, radical 
empiricism had not discredited synthetic a priori judgments, or judgments as particulars brought 
under synthesized universals. According to philosopher J. Michael Young, synthesis is “[t]he act 
of…‘putting different representations together and of grasping what is manifold in them in one 
cognition,” it “‘gathers the elements for cognition and unites them to form certain 
content,’…[a]nd hence it is what first gives rise to cognition.”235 Synthetic a priori judgments 
are thus those judgments that provide the necessary conditions for the possibility of human 
cognition and experience of objects. As Paul Guyer says, these judgments “go beyond what can 
be derived from the mere analysis of concepts yet also claim universal and necessary validity.
236
 
Kant says: 
All synthetic a priori principles are simply principles of possible experience; they can 
never be applied to things in themselves, but only to appearances as objects of 
experience. Hence pure mathematics as well as pure natural science can never bear on 
anything except appearances.
237
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These synthetic a priori principles, or principles of possible experience, cannot be justified based 
on sense experience. Yet they are still objective, determinate conditions that ground the 
possibility of human observation and perception and bestow unity and order to the world of 
appearances.
238
 Thus although Kant agreed with the radical empiricist claim that the concept of 
causality was not “a merely logical or analytic necessity arising from reason alone (purely ‘from 
concepts’),”239 he nevertheless recognized that experience itself required that humans notice the 
“law-governedness” of appearances, a notion that experience could not justify.240 Philosopher J. 
Michael Young notes that Kant associates the notion of synthesis with apperception, of grasping 
up an appearance and assimilating it to an established body.
241
 Kant thus wrestled with a 
paradox, namely that humans somehow operate with the notion of a law-governed natural world, 
even though this notion could not be justified rationally or empirically. As Kenny notes, 
synthetic a priori principles show that “there cannot be a world of mere appearances…that do 
not fall under any categories or instantiate any rules. But we cannot conclude from this that there 
is a non-sensible world that is established by the intellect alone.”242 Thus Kant found himself 
torn between his roots in traditional rationalism and the torrential Humean winds of radical 
empiricism.  
For Kant, the human capacity for synthetic a priori judgments implied that the priority of 
metaphysics should not be nature, but the human mind. Metaphysics is now concerned with the 
mental capacities by which we perceive nature’s apparent objects. In tracking the development of 
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Kant’s doctrine of the state of nature, then, we see that his doctrine of the state of nature 
necessarily follows the path of his metaphysics into human psychology. We see this as early as 
his 1770 Dissertation of the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds. 
According to Beiser, Kant first argues here that metaphysics should not be about “speculation 
about the world of spirits…[but] to determine the first principles or basic concepts of our reason. 
Metaphysics [is]…not an ontology in the traditional sense of a science about some kind of thing. 
Rather, its aim should be to determine the conditions under which it is possible to think any 
object whatsoever according to reason.”243 If the previous task of metaphysics was to arrive at a 
priori proofs for the objects of an immortal self, the world and God, the new task of metaphysics 
is to understand the universal features of human cognition. Thus with Kant’s the state of nature 
shifts from the cosmological to the psychological field of analysis. The state of nature meets now 
the criteria established by the features, powers and limits of the human understanding.   
According to philosopher Gary Hatfield, Kant criticized both traditional rational 
psychology and empirical psychology.
244
 Kant defines rational psychology as “the science of the 
object inner sense, or the ‘I’: ‘the expression ‘I’, as a thinking being…[based on] what can be 
inferred independently of all experience (which determines me more specifically and in 
concreto) from this concept ‘I’, so far as it is found in all thought.’”245 Hatfield notes that for 
Kant, many of rational psychology’s claims (e.g. the immortality and incorruptibility of the soul) 
“exceed the bounds of possible experience and hence advance claims that transcend the domain 
of possible metaphysical knowledge.”246  Kant also recognized the limits of empirical 
psychology. Empirical psychology, for Kant holds that “empirical study of the human mind can 
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importantly inform investigations of the characteristics and limitations of human cognition,” says 
Hatfield.
247
 While empirical psychology was of some use, it was an inadequate answer to Kant’s 
“philosophical questions about what he termed the ‘origin’ and ‘validity’ of cognitive claims…or 
the possibility of necessary judgments.”248 
Kenny explains that Kant’s own psychology begins with both an acknowledgment of 
sense experience as the source of all human knowledge and a sharp distinction between senses 
and the intellect. “But within the intellect,” says Kenny, “he makes a new distinction of his own 
between understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft).”249 All rational beings sensibly 
apperceive representations of experience under a “law-governedness” and unite them in one 
consciousness.
250
 The understanding accomplishes this task in cooperation with the senses.  
“[T]hrough the senses objects are given to us; through the understanding they are made 
thinkable. Experience has a content, provided by the senses, and a structure, determined by the 
understanding.”251  The pure concepts of the understanding (e.g. substance, quality, quantity, 
modality) organize sense experience and perceptions, thus enabling a conversion from subjective 
to objective perceptions, i.e. from subjective judgments to metaphysical claims.
252
 Says Kant: 
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Now since all possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension, but 
the latter itself, this empirical synthesis, depends on the transcendental one, thus 
on the categories, all possible perceptions, hence everything that can ever reach 
empirical consciousness, i.e., all appearances of nature, as far as their combination 
is concerned, stand under the categories, on which nature (considered merely as 
nature in general) depends, as the original ground of its necessary lawfulness (as 
natura flrmaliter spectata). The pure faculty of understanding does not suffice, 
however, to prescribe to the appearances through mere categories a priori laws 
beyond those on which rests a nature in general, as lawfulness of appearances in 
space and time. Particular laws, because they concern empirically determined 
appearances, cannot be completely derived from the categories, although they all 
stand under them. Experience must be added in order to come to know particular 
laws at all; but about experience in general, and about what can be cognized as an 
object of experience, only those a priori laws offer instruction.
253
 
 
Thus Kant ‘rescues’ the possibility of metaphysics after Hume’s devastating critique by 
transferring the grounds for the possibility of general laws of nature from either the inherent 
structure of the cosmos or human experience alone to the powers of human intellection. Again, 
Kant sees the faculty of the understanding as distinct from that of reason. The understanding 
works to orient perception and judgment of sense experience, but it ultimately needs the sensible 
world in order to operate. However, reason is “autonomous” or “pure” because it is in no way 
determined by empirical conditions such as causal laws of nature or human sentiments. Reason 
“distinguishes the world of sense and the world of understanding from each other and thereby 
[marks] out limits for the understanding itself.”254 It is this faculty of pure reason, then, that 
distinguishes human beings from all other things.   
 According to Friedman, although Kant identified “synthetic a priori” principles in 
general, those he focused on most consistently were space and time.
255
 In his Prolegomena to 
Any Future Metaphysics (1783), Kant identifies space and time as universal and necessary laws 
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that provide the conditions for possibility of experience and govern representations such that 
they operate within these laws. He does so as he distinguishes his criteria for truth from that of 
Anglo-Irish philosopher George Berkley (1685-1753). Says Kant:     
It follows from this contrast between Berkeley and me that because truth rests on 
universal and necessary laws as its criteria, experience for Berkeley can have no criteria 
of truth, because its appearances (according to him) have nothing underlying them a 
priori, from which it follows in turn that they are nothing but sheer illusion; whereas for 
me space and time (in combination with the pure concepts of the understanding) 
prescribe their law a priori to all possible experience, and this at the same time yields the 
sure criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion in experience.
256
 
 
For Kant, truth rests on the universal laws of time and space. These laws cannot be discerned by 
perception. Nevertheless, because these laws are required for any possible experience at all, Kant 
argues that they, and not the laws of causality, are his new metaphysics of nature. They are the 
laws that bring objective unity and order to nature’s particulars. Philosopher Karl Ameriks 
explains Kant’s understanding of the universal laws of space and time in relation to the famed 
German rationalist Gottfried Liebniz. He notes that although Kant held that all experience 
postulates space and time, space is not “a certain order in the community of substances” and time 
is not “the dynamic sequence of their states.”257 The understanding does not extract these 
synthetic a priori “laws” from nature, says Friedman. Rather, the understanding “prescribe[s] 
them to, nature.”258 This notion, that the understanding prescribes synthetic a priori laws to 
nature, signals Kant’s rejection of traditional rationalist metaphysics and the birth of 
(transcendental) idealism.  
In the end, Kant’s transcendental idealism leaves open the possibility for what he called 
“transcendental principles”, namely space and time as the conditions of possible experience and 
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thought. His transcendental thinking is the result of the amelioration of rationalism and 
empiricism. “My principles, “says Kant, “which limit the use of reason to possible experience, 
could in that way become transcendent, and the limits of our reason might pass themselves off as 
limits of the possibility of things in themselves.”259 Philosopher Charles Parsons explains that 
Kant’s transcendent principles “are [the] forms of our sensible intuition…they do not apply to 
things as they are in themselves and are thus in some way subjective.”260 Kant therefore left a 
window open to metaphysical thinking as transcendental idealism even as Hume closed off the 
possibility of a priori human judgments. Kant’s thinking leaves room for transcendental 
schemes, i.e. doctrines of the soul, the world, and knowledge of God that conform to the laws of 
possible experience in space and time determinacy.  
Kant’s thinking signals a watershed event in the discourse on sovereignty. The 
significance of Kant’s shift in metaphysical thinking for this dissertation is that with the rise of 
transcendentalism idealism, practical reason takes over the duties once ascribed to nature and 
history, including its role as a backdrop to the notion of the political body. The early signs of the 
shift in Kant’s understanding of the task of reason can be seen as early as 1764 in his 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime.
261
 Kant notes how he had been 
deeply influenced by Rousseau’s Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750), where Rousseau 
laments that the arts and sciences did little to improve the moral condition of civil society.  
“Rousseau has set me right,” says Kant. He continues, “This blinding prejudice vanishes, I learn 
to honor human beings, and I would feel by far less useful than the common laborer if I did not 
believe that this consideration could impart value to all others in order to establish the rights of 
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humanity.”262 Kant did not interpret Rousseau’s critique as the death blow to the arts and 
sciences, but as impetus for reason to take on the task of rightly ordering and directing the arts 
and sciences.
263
 “If there is any science that the human needs,” says Kant, “it is that which 
teaches [one] properly to fulfill…the position that has been assigned to [one] in creation, and 
from which [one] can learn what one must be in order to be a human being.”264 With traditional 
rationalism, the task of reason was to be the ultimate judge of the validity of any claims to 
knowledge immaterial being.”265 Upon reading Rousseau, however, Kant begins to transform 
reason into the ultimate judge of the validity of claims to knowledge in the arts and sciences, that 
is, into the sovereign.    
It is now (pure) reason which unifies classifies, specifies and relates the various 
particulars of nature. (Pure) reason now grounds both theoretical and practical arts and sciences, 
and it is also their ultimate judge of the validity of any claim to knowledge. Theoretical reason 
operates in scientific inquiry and in discerning empirical truth, and practical reason performs the 
highest human function, producing a good will through its moral law.
266
 Philosopher Thomas 
Wartenberg notes that for Kant, reason takes on a regulative, rather than constitutive role for 
both of these forms of reason.
267
 Kant’s “use of the term ‘regulative,’” Wartenberg says, 
“characterizes the knowledge of reality determined by this principle of reason ‘as synthetic a 
priori propositions, that have objective but indeterminate validity’…That is, in characterizing the 
use of reason as regulative rather than constitutive, Kant is making reference to the relation of 
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this use of reason to empirical objects, phenomena. Kant is claiming that the use of reason is not 
constitutive of such objects.”268 Reason doesn’t create the world’s objects, but is necessary for 
experience as such. More than this, it becomes the sovereign authority over both theoretical and 
practical sciences.  
Some twenty years after Observations, Kant extends the role of reason definitively in his 
essay “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” (1784). Kant argues that German 
society should be an enlightened society, which Kant describes as one where people use their 
own understanding (as opposed to that of religious authority, for example) and publicly voice 
their own opinion. Kant affords this privilege nto only with respect to religion, but law as well. 
“But the attitude of mind of a head of state who favors freedom in the arts and sciences,” Kant 
says, “extends even further,…there is no danger even to his legislation if he allows his subjects 
to make public use of their own reason and to put before the public their thoughts on better ways 
of drawing up laws, even if this entails forthright criticism of legislation.
269
 In the previous 
chapters we have seen with thinkers such as Bodin, Locke and Descartes that the moral and 
physical laws of nature were intrinsic to the structure of the cosmos. The faculty of the 
understanding discerns these laws to procure a good life. With Kant this shifts, so that the law-
governedness of the world is an artifice of the human mind rather than a demonstrably intrinsic 
property of objects in nature. The transcendental laws of the human mind frame the conditions of 
the possibility for mental representations of nature under the objective and determinate 
conditions of time and space. Thus human reason takes on the task ascribed to nature in previous 
theorists on sovereignty (Bodin, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau), namely establishing relations among 
nature’s particulars through an ordering principle, determining whether people are fundamentally 
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good or evil, directing moral and political affairs, and establishing rightful claims to various 
phenomena such as property, the fruit of labor and (enslaved) human bodies. 
Just as theoretical reason (e.g. mathematics, natural science, metaphysics) allows 
empirically derived forms of knowledge (i.e. Newtonian laws of nature) to present themselves as 
synthetic a priori truths, so, too, Kant says, does practical reason (ethics, politics) impose “itself 
upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori proposition…”, that is, as a moral law.270 The moral law, 
like other synthetic a priori principles, is an objective, determinate condition which provides the 
condition of possibility for moral judgments. Grounded in pure practical reason, the imperative 
of the moral law are categorical rather than prudential. Thus moral obligations are intrinsically 
necessary apart from human nature or empirical determinants such as sentiment, self-love, or 
happiness. Indeed, the form of the moral law is a universal command. Kant offers a form of the 
categorical imperative: “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it become a universal law.”271  
The most critical implication of this law is the rational necessity of human freedom. 
According to Paul Guyer, Kant has a tripartite account of freedom, consisting of two negative 
and one positive aspect. Negatively, freedom is both freedom from domination by one’s own 
natural drives and freedom from domination by others. “On the one hand” Guyer says, “freedom 
consists in a person’s ability to determine his ends independently of domination by his own 
inclinations and desires; on the other hand other, freedom consists in a person’s ability to select 
and pursue his own ends independently of domination by other persons.”272 Guyer explains that 
these two forms of negative freedom are only attainable through positive freedom, which Kant 
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defines as “the ability to determine oneself by reason.”273 Beiser’s interpretation is similar, 
defining freedom as “the power of the will to prescribe universal laws.”274 Freedom is not 
discovered by either deductive reasoning or empirical reality. Reconciling freedom with reality, 
one must simply assent to the “dialectic of reason”; even as reason can never comprehend or 
explain the necessity of freedom, it can neither negate its determinacy. Human freedom is a 
postulate of pure practical reason and as such it is a nontransferable right of nature (natural 
right).
275
 
According to renowned Kant scholar J. B. Schneewind, Kant’s rational agent, the one 
whose will is directed by reason, is thus “capable of being fully self-governing in moral matters. 
In Kant’s terminology, we are ‘autonomous.’”276 Autonomy consists of two basic features, says 
Schneewind. First, “no authority external to ourselves is needed to constitute or inform us of the 
demands of morality. We can each know without being told what we ought to do because moral 
requirements are requirements we impose on ourselves.”  Second, “in self-government we can 
effectively control ourselves. The obligations we impose upon ourselves override all other calls 
for action, and frequently run counter to our desires.”277 Therefore, rational agents are those who 
are not governed by their desires or heteronomy, but “must be allowed a social space within 
which we may freely determine our own action.”278 
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The Political Body 
 
Kant’s moral theory lays the foundation for political right (juridical laws). In turn, the 
doctrine of right functions as the legitimating foundation and authoritative check for political 
sovereignty. According to Kant Scholar Wolfgang Kersting, Kant’s concept of right is defined as 
“the totality of conditions, under which the will [Willkur] of one person can be unified with the 
will of another under a universal law of freedom”279 The principle of right helps us to distinguish 
equitable and inequitable distributions of freedom. This doctrine deals with two branches, first, 
private/natural right, which consists of property, domestic, and contract right. The other branch 
is public right, which is the state’s rights for the preservation of the rights of man. Here, Kant 
notes that possession (possessio) may only be called rightful possession if it is recognized as 
such within a civil/rightful condition. Compared to Locke, private possession is not based on 
labor, physical holdings, force, or other empirical conditions, but on the authority of reason; only 
reason provides the authority to obligate others to refrain from using private objects of choice 
(e.g. land, contracts, and domestic servants). Since rational freedom is the only innate right, 
“rightful possession” must be grounded in principle on practical reason, for only then does one’s 
control of an external object of which one does not physically possess make it rationally 
legitimate. In the state of nature, then, right of possession is provisional, and only become 
conclusive under civil conditions. Right of passion based on civil society’s claims trump 
“savage” claims to original acquisition. Such an argument was no doubt useful in Russia, 
Prussia, and Austria’s partitioning and annexation of Poland in 1772. 
According to Kersting, right is analytically connected with the authorization of coercion for 
the purposes of protecting one’s property against the unfree. For Kant, right “defines the domain 
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that each may consider his own, occupy as he pleases, and defend against injuries to its 
boundaries”280 Kersting points out that Kant’s doctrine of right is a universal principle of 
obligation and coercion, for all are obligated to conform their wills to the laws of freedom. This 
obligation entails yet another to coerce those who are not autonomous.
281
 Kant insists that one’s 
property isn’t authorized unless they subject their right to juridical confirmation in a rightful 
condition.
282
 This claim should not be understood apart from European claims that their rightful 
condition necessitated that “savages” (e.g. American Indians, Hottentots, and New Hollanders) 
be forced into conditions of slavery or colonization.
283
 Kant makes another claim about private 
right, namely that the “right of human beings” limits one’s capacities (potestas) as master in 
cases of domestic and contractual possession. The right of human beings is the right of rational 
beings to be treated as intrinsic ends and never as mere objects for the master’s use. The master 
may only act as owner and use an objects as he pleases when dealing with things like apples or 
land, and only here does an object become property (dominium). Says Kant:  
An external object which in terms of its substance belongs to someone is his property 
(dominium), in which all rights in this thing inhere (as accidents of a substance) and 
which the owner (dominus) can, accordingly, dispose of as he pleases (ius disponendi de 
re sua). But from this it follows that an object of this sort can only be a corporeal thing 
(to which one has no obligation). So someone can be his own master (sui iuris) but 
cannot be the owner of himself (sui dominus) (cannot dispose of himself as he pleases) – 
still less can he dispose of others as pleases, since he is accountable to the humanity in his 
own person.
284
  
 
Kant’s emphasis on rightful coercion as coercion in accord with the principles of right signals his 
rejection of a political body, voluntarily constructed or otherwise. With previous theorists of 
sovereignty (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau), the state was founded on the collective will of the 
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people: the united act of authorization for Hobbes and the social compact for Locke and 
Rousseau. For Bodin the political body was even more determinate, since natural rather than 
artificial. Kant’s distrust of the human will which is mired in the vicious passions of nature 
prevents him from allowing it to serve as foundation for state. Kersting compares Kant’s 
thinking on the social contract to other social contract theorists:  
In classical modern political philosophy the path from the natural condition to the civil, 
juridical, political condition, or the state, leads through a contract of each person with every 
other...Where, as in the case of Kant, the transition from the natural to the civil condition is 
conceived of as juridically necessary and commanded by reason, and where it is a duty to 
leave the state of nature rather than something that is merely prudent and in the interest of 
each person, then, naturally, the presuppositions of a voluntaristic foundation for the state 
and a recourse to individuals who bind themselves by a contract for the purposes of its 
legitimation no longer hold.
285
   
With Kant, the political body falls away as the iron hand of reason emerges to compel the 
conditions of civil society. Kersting notes that Kant has a noncontractualist, non-voluntaristic 
theory of consensus.
286
 One’s commitment to political community is a command of reason and a 
duty rather than a choice. The implications of this are that neither the monarch nor the state, nor 
the people are sovereign. All stand under the sovereignty of reason. Thus we find that with the 
decline of metaphysical thinking on nature and the rise of sovereign reason’s transcendental 
principles, there is also the decline of the political body and the rise of a polarized 
autonomy/coercion logic. Those who conform to the obligations, duties and laws of freedom are 
also free in the state, but those who fail to acknowledge reason’s sovereignty are subjected to its 
coercive forces.     
Public right consists of those laws promulgated to bring about a rightful condition, that is, 
that its power of procedural rational bureaucracy is legitimate insofar as it provides the 
conditions for the administration of justice and the rightful use of force and authority. More, 
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public right grounds claims to united consent concerning possessions and property. Kant does 
not offer a narrative of the transition from a state of nature to civil society, but claims that public 
right is established by the general united will of all citizens as Rousseau. This will is exercised in 
the relationship amongst three authorities in the state: the sovereign authority in whom reason of 
sovereignty rests as legislative power; the executive authority who guarantees the law; and the 
judicial authority, the arbiter of the law (potestas legislatoria, rectoria et iudiciaria).
287
 
Combined, these three authorities are superior to and command the state’s subjects. However, 
none of these authorities is unlimited. Instead, they are “subordinate (subordinatae) to one 
another, so that one of them, in assisting another, cannot also usurp its function; instead, each has 
its own principle, that is, it indeed commands in its capacity as a particular person, but still under 
the condition of the will of a superior.”288 Thus these authorities are limited by their coaction.  
On Sovereignty 
In the state, the legislative authority is supreme, and it can only belong to the will of the 
people. All right proceeds from this general united will. ‘The people’ are citizens, i.e. those who 
are independent insofar as they owe their own existence and preservation to their own rights and 
powers. They may vote and represent themselves as political actors. Those dependent on 
citizens’ wills, as a “servant to a master or wife to husband,” are passive citizens and cannot 
participate in active management of the state. The people, however, are required to institute laws 
that correspond to the laws of freedom for all so that “anyone can work his way up from this 
passive condition to an active one.”289 Because sovereignty rests in the general united will, one 
cannot rightfully rebel or revolt against the state. The executive authority is the guarantor of the 
people’s sovereignty, so that ruler (monarch) takes on the right of the people, exercising it as a 
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representative or servant of the people’s will in accordance with the principles of right. The ruler 
is authorized by the sovereignty of the people to direct the operations of government and 
administration even while, subject to the law without violating his patriotic duty to serve the 
native land or becoming a despot. Should he exercise authority in violation of right, the people 
may take away the ruler’s authority. Neither the legislative nor executive authorities can judge in 
such matters of state, for such authority is reserved to juridical power. The courts, occupied by 
judges appointed by the people, have the sole authority to apply the law. Only the people, then, 
can give judgment upon one of its members, but only indirectly through representatives. 
Ultimately, all of these co-acting powers of the state are limited in that they stand under right, a 
principle of sovereign reason.   
With Kant, the fate of the political community becomes less tied to a common past, a 
collective agreement, wise rulers, or patriotic Citizens. Instead, Kant weds the fate of politics, 
both local and global, to a community’s conformity to the universal laws of reason. This in 
essence neutralizes the causes of revolutionary action while still maintaining a public space to 
express one’s political opinions. We might further illuminate Kant’s thinking by comparing it 
with Rousseau’s. Even as Rousseau and Kant restrict the privilege of political participation to 
male property owners, Kant’s view of participation is less active than Rousseau’s. That is, 
Kantian subjects do not achieve virtue through political participation in a context of fraternity 
and love of country as with Rousseau, but as an outgrowth of a rationally governed life lived in 
conformity with the universal moral law. Thus political participation and patriotism are de-
emphasized. While civil freedom, in the form of voting, is important to Kant, autonomy or moral 
freedom is the true telos of the Kantian subject. With Kant, the subject trades the passionate civic 
conversion of Rousseau for the autonomous, self-legislated life of reason.  
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Finally, in sharp distinction from Rousseau, Kant embraced an enlightenment narrative of the 
rational progress of the arts and sciences and thus of civil society and history. While Rousseau 
was the first to introduce historical consciousness into the science of politics, he was by no 
means a philosopher of history, i.e. he did not offer a theory of the unity, continuity, and goal of 
history. With Kant, however, history assumes a definite historical telos under reason’s sovereign 
guidance of civil society. In gradual, nonlinear fashion, Kant imagines that history progresses 
from the irrational and brute conditions of physical life (barbarism) toward civil life and a 
“kingdom of ends” where all are treated as ends in themselves and not as means only. Such a 
state of affairs is possible as the wills of people is determined not by natural drives but by the 
laws of freedom. Right relations are facilitated by the public use of critical reason in scholarly 
argument and by human actions that are in accord with the laws of freedom. As reason thrives in 
these ways, society expands in knowledge and enlightens its public will, humanity is oriented in 
rightful moral and political relations, and states collectively move toward the highest political 
good and universal telos, which is perpetual peace.  
Conclusion 
In Kant’s discourse on sovereignty, the fate of the political community becomes less tied to 
wise rulers or patriotic citizens. Instead, Kant weds the fate of politics, both local and global, to 
the universal laws of reason. It is now reason, rather than nature itself, which orders the 
particulars of nature. It thus plays an authoritative role in aesthetics, anthropology, gender 
relations, and national character.
290
 Kant also assigns reason an active role in both statecraft and 
governance, so that reason, rather than the monarch or the people, now floats sovereign over the 
state, regulating its actions and aims and evaluating its motives and ends. Politically, Kant’s 
emphasis on reason emphasizes the individual rights of autonomous agents as citizens, and does 
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so to the effect that the notion of the political body evaporates in his theory. In its place, Kant 
imagines an international cosmopolitan political community consisting of rational citizens under 
the authority of the universal laws of freedom.   
However, these liberal aspects of Kant’s theory must be taken up along with his heightened 
emphasis on the state’s use of coercive techniques, most notably his recommendation that the 
state develop a standing army. For Kant, spaces of freedom are only afforded to the rational; 
those who remain in non-rightful spaces and irrational states of mind (such as the African) bear 
the brunt of that state’s coercive forces. Thus, Kant’s universal laws of freedom are promulgated 
by means of what Cornel West calls “escalating authoritarianism” and “aggressive 
militarism.”291 While these political dynamics ensure a secure and comfortable life for the global 
society of free persons, they run counter to democratic energies for the great majority of the 
globe’s population, especially the non-rational natives of Africa and the Americas.  In the 
following chapter we turn to German philosopher GWF Hegel, who also emphasizes the 
sovereignty of reason, but takes account of reason as both a metaphysical subject and as its 
actualization in the form of nationalist spirit. In his theory, Kantian autonomy is subsumed under 
the rationality of state, which, as an iteration of the absolute spirit, is inherently a vehicle of 
freedom, regardless of its particular form of government.  
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Chapter 4 
G.W.F. Hegel: Sovereignty and the Rationality of State 
 
This chapter continues the critical discourse analysis of sovereignty in canonical Western 
texts, this time turning to G.W.F Hegel (1770-1831). From the beginning until the end of his 
theory, Hegel seems intent on emphasizing the social, cultural, and historical dimensions of 
human existence over solitary ones, and consciousness’ ultimate unity in absolute spirit. As a 
result, Hegel downplays (Kantian) individuality and re-emphasizes both the monarchialism seen 
in theorists such as Bodin and Hobbes (chapter 1) as well as the nationalism that first appeared in 
Rousseau (chapter 2).  Hegel is a constitutional monarchialist, but the constitution is easily 
subsumed by monarchial right, especially with respect to the decision to engage in war explicitly 
to generate patriotic sentiment. Hegel’s doctrine of national sovereignty is thus far more 
insidious the Rousseau’s. Not only is it combined with monarchialism, but it also takes form as 
compelled patriotism where national sentiment is introduced into the everyday lives of citizens, 
whereas Rousseau’s nationalism was far more “episodic.” In addition, Hegel’s patriotism takes 
its highest form as war, whereas Rousseau’s to form as the general will.  
Although Hegel theorizes sovereignty as monarchial right and patriotic sentiment, his 
fundamental claim is that the dialectics of sovereignty, i.e. the life and death struggle in its 
various forms, forms the foundation of reality itself. Thus, Hegel’s theory of sovereignty has far 
more thoroughgoing implications. Long before sovereignty is a feature of the nation or the 
monarch, it is an aspect of nature itself and a method by which nature transcends itself. The state 
of nature is not merely a state of war, but of face to face life and death struggle. One must not 
only accord sovereignty to the nation, but must also actively seek recognition in civil society. 
One must not only ascribe sovereignty to the monarch, but must also understand war as the 
highest expression of monarchial right.  In Hegel’s thinking, sovereignty is no longer simply 
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about the preservation of one’s life, property or state, but also their existence and recognition 
within it and within the grand unfolding of history.  
Context 
 
Historian Eda Sagarra notes that “[a]t the beginning of the nineteenth century, the people of 
Germany were subjects of secular and ecclesiastical rulers governing more than 300 sovereign 
political units.”292  Moreover, “[s]ome 1,500 territories…[had] semi-sovereign status.”293 Some 
states such as Austria and Prussia bragged of being substantial European powers, others were 
“no larger than an English gentleman’s country estate,” says Sagarra.294 Around 1800, Germany 
had no capital city, and its social structure was reflective of an earlier age of traditional feudal 
orders. Nobility enjoyed privileged legal, political, social, and fiscal status to the neglect of serfs 
and peasants. Germany lacked a large indigenous mercantile class, even as it enjoyed a vibrant 
intellectual life. Being so fragmented, Germany lacked an active public sphere. Matters of trade 
were regulated by guilds in towns. However, the rise of Napoleon acted as catalyst for the 
German state infrastructure. He rationalized the German Reich by reducing its number of 
sovereign states to one-tenth their number. Thus, from 1806 – 1813, the “Confederation of the 
Rhine” was the most authoritative body. It was comprised of client states of the first French 
Empire and constituted by member monarchies of the Reich.  
Although the political structure remained monarchial, the Napoleonic code instituted 
religious toleration, especially for Jews and the abolition of feudal rights.  French occupation not 
only brought with it the centralization and reduction of political powers, it also stimulated the 
rise of the capitalism: serfs were emancipated, municipal self-government were introduced, and 
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selling of land increased mobility. With the Treaty of Luneville (1801), Napoleon declared that 
the ‘secularization’ of ecclesial lands were to be turned over to German and other princes, thus 
fundamentally changing the estate structure by reducing the number of ecclesiastical princes 
from eighty one to only three.
295
 This was the beginning of the end for the Holy Roman Empire 
that endured from 1006-1806. 
With Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, the Confederation of the Rhine was displaced by the 
German Confederation (1815-1866). Thus began the Great Restoration, where a modified 
monarchic system enabled German princes to be restored to their territories and renew the pre-
French revolutionary alliance of the crown-nobility-church. With the 'restoration,’ Germany 
began its shift from the feudal order to a capitalist political economy.  Aggressive land reforms 
were introduced and populations were forcibly mobilized as Germany experienced the first pangs 
of capitalization: pauperism, mobility, social unrest, growth factories and new communications 
network. German society once based on the feudal order and its hierarchies was transformed into 
a  mobile political economy characterized by education, greater wealth, increased mobility, and 
better diets that transformed social stratification. Contracts gradually replaced custom and 
traditional rights and property in the form of capital, which increasingly determined the social 
pecking order. Thus emerged a ‘fourth class’, analogous to France’s Third Estate, marking a 
changeover from a corporate society based on estates to modern class societies. In corporate 
society, hierarchies were seen as God ordained. They were based on privileged estates, each with 
its singularly defined function. Nobility marked the first estate; the clergy the second, and then 
the peasants. In the turn to class based society, peasants no longer live off the land and, although 
a small merchant class accumulated wealth and experienced upward mobility, a great majority of 
the population felt the pangs of pauperization.  
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Until 1848 most of the German population appeared content to deal with the less desirable 
aspects of capitalization.
296
 Their loyalty was largely sustained by German nationalism. Concepts 
such as revolution, emancipation, and equality among citizens became associated for many 
Germans with conquest, exploitation, and national humiliation. German nationalism galvanized 
support for the German monarchy, for this represented a return to German culture, history and 
tradition. Many of the German intellegntia and cultural leaders thus traded off their “idealist” 
hope in a universal moral reason of sovereignty for the “historicist” attitude,297 which stems from 
their rejection of a philosophy of history that posited the fundamental unity of history (i.e. 
universal history). The history with which Jean Bodin set out to establish sovereignty so long ago 
had been shattered into fragments.  
For historicists, if there is a principle at work in history, one must turn to the historical basis 
of life itself and the particular history of one’s ethnic or national group. The historicist attitude 
assumes that the most important questions for philosophy of mind are not those dealing with 
sources that transcend history but with those based on “historical origins, historical causes, 
historical effects, and historical evolution.”298 For German historicists, many who were also 
romantic, German history and cultural artifacts (denkmal) functioned as hermeneutical frames 
that grant access to the forgetfulness of past cultural understanding (verstehen). This cultural 
understanding stood over against the unstable natural passions and universal raison. From this 
cultural germ, German thinkers resisted the hyper rationalism of the German enlightenment 
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represented by Kant and his followers and restored their native Volk spirit in the wake of French 
imperialism.
299
 
The State of Nature and Geist 
We have already seen in Kant the passing away of the perennial myth of the state of nature 
and its imagined multitudes that so preoccupied the thinking on sovereignty from Bodin to 
Rousseau in the French context, and Hobbes and Locke in England. Moreover, where human 
interests prevailed as the ground motive for sociality, whether by threat of a state of war or the 
loss of a primordial innocence, with Hegel the dialectical force of human consciousness of being 
in becoming constitutes the speculative basis for Hegel’s historico-idealist anthropology and the 
condition for the possibility of the nation-state’s supreme rationality. Thus for Hegel, absolute 
spirit is sovereign over all of nature, and this takes the form of the sovereignty of an imperial 
nation-state. In Hegel’s view, the nation, as a moment of actualization of consciousness in 
becoming, stands sovereign over the citizen. Thus the national spirit stands as the supreme 
earthly actualization of the spirit, whether in a democratic, aristocratic, or as Hegel preferred, a 
monarchial state.     
Although Hegel appreciated the social sciences, he remained skeptical of what philosopher 
Paul Franks calls its “speculative materialism”. Franks explains that Hegel criticized the 
positivistic natural science of his day,
300
 which conceived of nature as a “holistic monisism”. 
“Such a system,” Franks explains, “is (a) holistic, insofar as every finite element is what it is 
only in virtue of its role within the whole. And (b) it is monistic in the sense that the whole is 
constituted as a whole – as opposed to a mere aggregate – by a single immanent first 
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principle.”301 The holistic monist system is “virtuously circular: the totality of the finite requires 
the infinite first principle as its ground, but the immanence of the infinite first principle means 
that it cannot be without the totality of the finite.” Thus the infinite is “hen kai pan, one and all, 
[thus] it lacks any contrast by virtue of which it could be determinate, so it is ouden kai panta, 
nothing and all things.”302 In this way, the positive science of nature destroys nature’s qualitative 
aspects, the human mind, and God, so that “no matter what [one] says about God, his system is 
atheistic. And no matter what he says about freedom, his system is fatalistic...it cannot make 
room for individuality, whether divine, human, or natural.”303 Franks designates this view, 
traceable to the philosophy of Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677), as “speculative materialism” 
because “it contextualizes modern natural science within a “conceptualized mechanism”.304  
Hegel was concerned that this system was fatalistic and that it threatened the possibility of any 
kind of individuality. However, Hegel did not follow Kant in emphasizing the individual against 
a system or determinacy. Franks explains that Hegel instead embraces the nihilistic attitude of 
speculative materialism to its logical conclusion in order to root out philosophical dogmatisms. 
Franks notes that Hegel’s method ultimately gives birth to both phenomenology and speculative 
logic.  
According to philosopher and Hegel scholar Stephen Houlgate, Hegel’s metaphysics begins 
by letting the simplicity of thought unfold according to its own “inherent living determinations” 
or its intrinsic principles.
305
 This can be seen especially in both Hegel’s Science of Logic (1817), 
and his earlier Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).  Philosopher Kenneth Westphal shows in Logic 
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how Hegel deploys speculative logic with respect to the “inherent logical features” of the 
ontological categories (e.g. being, existence, quantity, essence…), the principles of logic (e.g. 
identity, excluded middle, non-contradiction), and the concepts and principles of natural science 
(force, matter, measure, cognition; etc).
306
 Westphal explains that Hegel’s examination discloses 
three aspects concerning the features and relations of these concepts. First, Hegel “show[s] that 
the concepts and principles analyzed…are in fact instantiated in nature and are reflected…in 
natural scientific knowledge. [S]econd, [Hegel] show[s] that the concepts, principles, and forms 
of classification and explanation used in natural science in fact capture genuine features of nature 
and so are not merely conventional expression…[and] third…[he] show[s] the great extent to 
which the world, nature, is knowable.”307 In other words Hegel engages in this “examination in 
order to justify his rationalist aspiration to show that all the fundamental features of the world are 
knowable and knowable by us, even if philosophy makes only a limited contribution to that 
knowledge.”308 Westphal explains that these three features combine in force to demonstrate “the 
necessity of the concept” or “the extent to and the ease in which we are justified in using various 
concepts and principles in genuine cognition of natural phenomena.”309  
In beginning with thought, Hegel distinguishes himself from past metaphysical 
preoccupations with a priori determinations of being, and thus aligns himself with Kant. Being is 
not an immaterial essence that exists prior to thought. As was the case for Spinoza, Being is for 
Hegel described as ‘substance,’ ‘nature,’ ‘actuality’ in extension and thought. Thus, Houlgate 
notes that Hegel can assert that “there is being and…that the structure of being itself can be 
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discovered in the structure of the categories of thought.”310 Kant had already attempted to evade 
methodological naturalism by turning from the natural world to the pure concepts of the 
understanding. For Kant, human beings apperceive the natural world through synthetic a priori 
judgments (i.e. space and time). Following these judgments, the content of sense experience is 
brought under the (universal) concepts of the understanding so that the natural world may be 
properly represented. With Hegel, the categories do no only allow us to represent the natural 
world, but enable us to discover the very structure of being itself. Houlgate explains that the 
“speculative [logician] philosopher does not, therefore, look out into the world in order to 
discover the nature of being, but sets out to derive and clarify the categories of thought in order 
to discover the nature of being in them.”311  
 The nature of being itself, transcends both the determinacy and the contingency of the 
natural world and acquires a “self-reliance” that serves a self-grounding function. Logic thus sits 
at the root of relations among actualizations of the spirit in life in the natural world. The structure 
of logic gives coherence and unity to nature’s particulars, and also organizes the various 
moments in nature within a certain order. The movement of logic enables one to assimilate all 
knowledge and science, discover their essence, and endow them with universal value in light of 
absolute truth. As Westphal notes, it allows Hegel to discern a “conceptual sequence of stages 
and substages” of concepts and principles that would serve to structure and organize all of life, 
including human social, moral and political life.
312
  
If the nature of reality is logical, this also implies that reality is both dialectically related and 
progresses along a dialectical historical path. For Hegel, the method of speculative logic is able 
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to discern the nature of being because it (unlike speculative materialism) observes reason’s 
intrinsic “dialectical” movement in history and nature. It is this dialectical movement that 
enables human beings to transcend the limitations of natural life, and also that which allows 
individuals to find meaning and purpose beyond the immediacy of the gratification of desires. 
For our purpose, perhaps no other moment in Hegel’s dialectical discourse has gotten as much 
discussion as his Mater/Bondsman dialectic.  
 Hegel’s Phenomenology is thus a history of the dialectical unfolding of consciousness in 
and beyond the natural world. Just as thought unfolded in Hegel’s Logic to critically reconstruct 
the categories’ relations, so the dialectical history of consciousness unfolds in Phenomenology to 
critically (re)construct the relation of moments of consciousness (e.g. individual, family, nation) 
to one another. Hegel’s story goes on to include the transition of consciousness from self-
consciousness to reason, from reason to Spirit, or Geist, and after this, to Absolute Spirit, which 
is disclosed in various forms of natural, aesthetic, and revealed religion.
313
 Reason, as Absolute 
Spirit, is sovereign, and not merely in the transcendental capacity to which Kant appointed it. For 
Hegel, reason is metaphysically sovereign, that is determinate of the course of nature and history. 
Hegel’s entire narrative of the dialectic of consciousness from its several incomplete forms into 
Reason as Absolute Spirit cannot be recounted in this dissertation, but certain key moments have 
become canonical in interpretations of Hegel’s narrative. Thus, Hegel’s Lord/Bondsman or 
Master/Slave dialectic--as it is often called--describes the dynamic of sovereignty as if unfolds in 
the notions of ethical spirit of nationalism.  
  
 
 
                                                        
313
 Hegel, Phenomenology, 306 
 116 
The Political Body 
 
In Philosophy of Right, Hegel applies the speculative method to the Idea of ‘right.’ (Recht). 
Just as philosophy proper observes the immanent development of reason from the concept to the 
Idea, the philosophy of right observes the immanent development of right from concept to its 
actualization.
314
 This grounds the legitimation of public right beyond historical conditions toward 
the eternal realm of the spirit, which is the realm of the free will. Or as Hegel says, “The basis 
[Boden] of right is the realm of spirit in general and its precise location and point of departure is 
the will; the will is free, so that freedom constitutes its substance and destiny [Bestimmung] and 
the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit produced from within 
itself as a second nature.”315 Hegel stresses that Philosophy of Right is an observation of the 
historical stages in the development of will on its way toward its final telos-- completed Idea of 
the will. Thus the state is not a voluntary social contract amongst free individuals, but a 
distinctive moment of right’s actualization within the immanent development of the will, which 
in this text includes a progression from formal or abstract right (as personality) to subjective 
individuality (as morality) and finally concludes in a three-tiered final stage of the ethical life (as 
family, civil society and state). For our purpose, I will highlight certain themes relevant for this 
discourse analysis of sovereignty in Hegel’s philosophy.  
For Hegel, the state is the highest moment in the development of the spirit.  The state is 
distinct because it alone harmonizes all particular human interests with universal ends while civil 
society merely mediates individual interests separated from objective ends. The state is then the 
true ground and substantial unity of all other moments or determinations of the actualization of 
right. “In actuality,” Hegel explains, “the state in general is in fact the primary factor; only 
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within the state does the family first develop into civil society, and it is the idea of the state itself 
which divides into these two moments.”316 As such, the state can neither be reduced to an 
artificial being predicated on arbitrary individual wills and social contract nor can the primary 
purpose of the state be to protect private property. Rather, “[t]he state in and for itself is the 
ethical whole, the actualization of freedom.”317 Hegel goes on to drive home his conception of 
state sovereignty:  
The state consists in the march of God in the world, and its basis is the power of reason 
actualizing itself as will. In considering the Idea of the state, we must not have any particular 
states or particular institutions in mind; instead, we should consider the Idea, this actual God, 
in its own right [fur sich].
318
  
 
As a unity of objective and subjective freedom, the state is the true actualization of the Idea of 
freedom, the highest actuality of the ethical spirit, and even the rational destiny of world history. 
Thus, Hegel likens the state to God, a voluntary God who arbitrary will construes right and law 
of its own accord. This is a God much like the God theorized by Duns Scotus and embraced by 
Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. Because the state is the highest determination of the spirit, it 
possesses the highest right and absolute power. In this world, the state has all power and is 
guided by the sovereign command of absolute spirit.
319
 In the modern world, the state’s task is to 
organize its powers in the formation of a “political constitution” in which both individual 
freedom and obligation to the state as an absolute authority are actualized.
320
 
For Hegel, a political constitution refers to an organic system of mediating relations that links 
the powers and operations of government to the two essential pillars: family life and civil 
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society.
321
 Hegel was one of the French revolution’s most well-known advocates. Although he 
held that the emergence of constitutional monarchy, rather than the republic, was the 
achievement of the modern world,
322
 he agreed with Rousseau that ethical feeling and patriotism 
were necessary for the establishment and guarantee of the modern nation-state. Hegel thus claims 
that the state constitution is in one sense “the spirit of a nation (Volk)…both the law which 
permeates all relations within it and also the customs and consciousness of the individuals who 
belong to it.”323  
Indeed, Hegel links the state constitution fundamentally to national and racial character from 
the beginning of the Philosophy of Right. Early on we find Hegel repeating a theme that he 
highlighted in Phenomenology, which is the stress on national and racial allegiance as the most 
meaningful and substantive end in this life. For Hegel, positive determinations of right, which 
are the highest forms of the spirit in the natural world, are first disclosed in the racial and 
national character of a people, and only after that in laws and their particular application. 
According to Hegel: 
Right is in general positive (a) through its form of having validity within a [particular] state; 
and this legal authority is the principle which underlies knowledge [Kenntnis] of right, i.e. 
the positive science of right. (b) In terms of content, this right acquires a positive element  (α) 
through the particular national character of a people, its stage of historical development, and 
the whole context of relations governed by natural necessity; (β) through the necessity 
whereby a system of legal right must contain the application of the universal concept to the 
particular and externally given characteristics of objects [Gegenstande] and instances- an 
application which is no longer [a matter of] speculative thought and the development of the 
concept, but [of] subsumption by the understanding; (γ) through the final determinations 
required for making decisions in actuality.
324
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If the state is sovereign for Hegel, its content is located first in the national character of a people. 
Thus commitment to one’s nation or patriotism is paramount to virtue for Hegel, and unlike 
Rousseau, who understood patriotism as an occasional experience that occurred in public 
assemblies, patriotism for Hegel is an everyday, ordinary attitude and way of life. “The political 
disposition, i.e. patriotism in general,” Hegel says, “is certainty based on truth…and a volition 
which has become habitual….Patriotism is frequently understood to mean only a willingness to 
perform extraordinary sacrifices and actions. But in essence, it is that disposition which, in the 
normal conditions and circumstances of life, habitually knows that the community is the 
substantial basis and end.
325
 For Rousseau patriotism was a moment of redemption. For Hegel it 
is a disposition. Although the customs and consciousness of a particular nation “depend on the 
nature and development of self-consciousness” and thus influenced by the contingencies of 
history and society, they have the authority of a natural “law” to the extent that they form the 
ethical substance of a people.
326
  
Although Hegel lauded the revolution, like Kant he saw sentiment as its key flaw, no rather, 
its totalizing grip on the will of the state to the point that executive and legislative powers 
dissolved into one another. Patriotism and feeling are needed, but are not “qualified to determine 
the powers of state on its own.”327 Feeling operates in more strategic and peaceful ways when 
absorbed by the estates, which sit as mediating institutions between civil society and the powers 
of government. In this way, German governmental powers would not be overwhelmed by the 
blind passion of patriotism. The authority of customs also take on more explicit form in the 
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(legal) constitutional guarantee of the freedom of press, speech, and the right of the estates to 
assemble.
328
  
Although the state is in one sense the national spirit, then, the true source of the powers of 
state is the authority of the Idea, and only the Idea (not patriotic passion) can correctly determine 
the appropriate scope and role of executive, legislative, and sovereign powers.
329
 In a way, Hegel 
notes, the particular form of government is irrelevant, since the uniquely modern responsibility 
of states – to protect the freedom of conscience of its subjects and itself as a whole – can be 
achieved under any form of government.
330
 In another sense, Hegel claims, the more rationally 
progressed constitutions are marked by the monarch as the “absolutely decisive moment of the 
whole.”331 The monarch as sovereign best embodies and actualizes the unity of the state and is 
thus a natural symbol of the Idea. Like the Idea of state, the monarch has the unique capacity to 
actualize himself as either an individual or totalizing will at different moments, for the latter is 
the state’s salvation in times of crisis.  
In the sense that the absolute spirit is sovereign, Hegel signals a rejection of Rousseau’s 
notion of popular sovereignty. He thought that Rousseau was right to consider the “will” as the 
principle of the state but Rousseau did so without any reference to a self-determining higher will. 
(e.g. the Idea).
332
 Rousseau tried to give the state a rational basis, but having failed to take 
account of the Idea, the totalization of “the people’s” self-representation was disastrous 
culminating in lawlessness and an oppressive despotism both in the regime of Robespierre and 
Napoleonic military aggressivism. With Hegel, executive powers of the state (the judiciary and 
the police) carry out the sovereign’s decision and confirm every official that civil society elects 
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to the estates.
333
 Laws determined by tripartite body of the monarch, the executive powers and 
the estates. Although the sovereignty investing the monarch is absolutely self-determining, the 
monarch is not ruled by an arbitrary or despotic will but by absolute spirit and thus acts for the 
“the welfare of the state” and to protect the freedom of conscience.334 To the extent that the ruler 
of the state stands under the sovereignty of reason, Hegel resembles Kant’s thinking. However, 
unlike Kant, who attempted to articulate normative principles for the operations of state, Hegel 
holds that Right enables one “to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational 
entity. As a philosophical composition, [philosophy of right] must distance itself as far as 
possible from the obligation to construct a state as it ought to be…but rather at showing how the 
state, as the ethical universe, should be recognized.”335 For Hegel, the state is no longer 
accountable to a norm, but is always already to be recognized as a moment of concrete 
actualization of absolute spirit and sovereignty in the rationality of state.  
The Dialectics of Sovereignty  
 One of the most influential aspects of Hegel’s history of consciousness is the dialectic of 
the Lord and Bondman, or Master and Slave. Hegel introduces his discussion of lord/bondsman 
as two opposed shapes of self-consciousness, each of which exists in that it “exists for another 
self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or “recognized.”336 Ideally, 
there would be mutual recognition between the two. “They [would] recognize themselves as 
mutually recognizing one another.”337 However, self-consciousness relates to another within a 
context of “disparity”, where there has been a “break-up of the middle term into the extremes, 
which, qua extremes, are opposed to one another, and of which one is merely recognized, while 
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the other only recognizes.”338 When one self-consciousness faces another, it disturbs their sense 
of certainty about themselves. In Hegel’s words, self-consciousness “has come outside itself…it 
has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being; secondly it has thereby sublated that 
other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.”339 For 
Hegel, the forces of anxiety and antagonism at play between the two shapes of self-
consciousness eventually bring their conflict to a head in the extreme condition of a face to face 
mortal combat.  
The relation of both self-consciousnesses is in this way so constituted that they prove 
themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle. They must enter into this 
struggle, for they must bring their certainty of themselves, the certainty of being for 
themselves, to the level of objective truth, and make this a fact both in the case of the 
other and in the own case as well. And it is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained; 
only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare 
existence, is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance, is 
not its mere absorption in the expanse of life…[E]ach must aim at the death of the other, 
as it risks its own life thereby.
340
     
Although the relation between these two forms of self-consciousness is posited in the 
extreme terms of a life and death struggle, Hegel surmises that such a confrontation diffuses or 
settles into hierarchical relations between two types of self-consciousness - master and slave. 
Hegel distinguishes these by noting one whose “essential nature is to be for itself; the other is 
dependent, and its essence is life or existence for another. The former is Master, or Lord, the 
latter the Bondsman.”341 According to Hegel, the lord is the self-consciousness that has the 
capacity to retain independence in relation to a thing, that is, to defeat its desire for the object. 
On the other hand, the bondsman is bound to the master only because of a deeper servitude to 
fear of death. Thus “[t]he master relates…to the bondsman mediately through independent 
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existence, for that is precisely what keeps the bondsman in thrall; it is his chain, from which he 
could not in the struggle get away, and for that reason he proved himself to be dependent, to have 
his independence in the shape of thinghood.”342  
One of the key themes in Hegel’s theory of the Master and the bondsman is that society is 
fundamentally and permanently based in one-sided and unequal forms of recognition. According 
to philosopher Robert B. Pippin, Hegel understands self-consciousness as “a social struggle for 
recognition between independent and dependent subjects.”343 Not only is the self intrinsically 
“social”, but Hegel is clear that this social dimension of self-consciousness is not one marked by 
universal freedom, but by complex webs of dependence and independence. The master is “the 
power controlling this state of existence”, and thus also the power dominating the bondsman. He 
“gets the enjoyment…without qualification and without reserve,”344 as well as all of the 
recognition as an independent, and thus true, self-consciousness. The bondsman, on the other 
hand, cannot annihilate this situation so he does what he can, that is, “he merely works on it”.345 
The bondsman’s dependent social position gives rise to a perverse form of self-recognition. 
Hegel explains:  
…the other consciousness [the bondsman] cancels itself as self-existent, and, ipso facto, itself 
does what the first does to it….But for recognition proper there is needed the moment that 
what the master does to the other he should also do to himself, and what the bondsman does 
himself, he should do to the other also. On that account a form of recognition has arisen that 
is one sided and unequal.”346 
 
 Hegel’s theory is not a simple theory of natural inequality, nor one grounded in labor as 
with Locke or autonomy with Kant. For Hegel, the social condition of inequality as master/slave 
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dialectic initially begins as a condition where self-consciousness has the potential to defeat both 
its desire and another (self) consciousness. As Hegel scholar Paul Redding notes, “it is important 
that the bondsman’s role has been chosen, rather than simply accepted as ‘given.’ His existence 
is implicitly independent…The bondsman has, we might say, committed himself to this identity 
in exchange for his life and he holds himself to this commitment in his continual 
acknowledgement of the other as his lord by treating him as such.”347 Given these conditions, 
Hegel theorizes that self-consciousness will always relates to others within this master/bondsman 
frame, where the master, is recognized as such for having retained his “for-self” character and 
the bondsman, being at root “for-another”.  
 According to Redding, Hegel’s Lord and Bondsman myth is central to understanding his 
social thinking, as it endows social agents with guiding concepts for permanent social roles. 
“This structure of holding and being held to commitments” says Redding, “is constitutive of such 
social roles and is, for Hegel, fundamentally conceptual or rule governed, the interactions of lord 
and bondsman being mediated by the linked pair of action-guiding concepts, “lord” and 
“bondsman”. Because of this participation of conceptuality, this primitive form of sociality is an 
instantiation of reason within the realm of life, albeit a primitive one.”348 Hegel does 
acknowledge a shift in these relations. The lord can only be recognized as such and assured in his 
self-existence by another independent self-consciousness, and thus feels unrecognized and 
unsure in his self-existence. The lord also recognizes that “[t]he truth of the independent 
consciousness is accordingly the consciousness of the bondsman…[L]ordship showed its 
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essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to be…”349  Just as there comes about a 
reversal in the status of lordship, “so, too,” says Hegel, “bondage will, when completed, pass into 
the opposite of what it immediately is: being a consciousness repressed within itself, it will enter 
into itself, and change round into real and true independence.”350 Labor is the vehicle to freedom 
for the bondsman. “Through work and labour, however, this consciousness of the bondsman 
comes to itself…in fashioning the thing, self-existence comes to be felt explicitly as his own 
proper being, and he attains the consciousness that he himself exists in its own right and on its 
own account.”351  However, Hegel is clear that the conditions of labor must be marked by “fear 
and service”, and Hegel has no imaginings of such conditions passing away. 
Hegel’s Lord-Bondsman myth maybe interpreted in one of two ways, says Redding. The first 
is a Marxist reading, as represented by Alexandre Kojeve’s Introduction to the Reading of Hegel 
(1969). On this reading, “the lord-bondsman episode, and the struggle for recognition which it 
exemplifies, are taken as the interpretive key…describing the bondsman’s – effectively 
humanity’s – historical self-liberation through the collectively achieved conscious fashioning of 
the world.”352 Redding rejects this interpretation for his own, which is that “the lord-bondsman 
dialectic is just one of a series of similar dialectics within which the notion of ‘recognition’ plays 
a central role.”353 On Redding’s reading, struggle is not the central concept, but recognition, 
Hegel “seems to be inviting us, as philosophical readers” Redding says, “to recognize ourselves 
in the history of developing forms of consciousness: it is our history, and in grasping this we 
return from this ‘meta’ position to the world itself. With this, the circle of spirit as self-conscious 
life is finally closed. Qua readers of the Phenomenology we supposedly have now been brought 
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to the standpoint of science – philosophy – itself.”354 In Redding’s view, Hegel’s myth, and the 
Phenomenology overall, is a story of the fundamental human quest for reciprocal recognition, a 
quest which may be realized when we learn to recognize ourselves as entangled in the greater 
flow of history, i.e. the unfolding of consciousness into the Idea. We should be mindful, 
however, of the ways in which Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, rather than doctrine of natural 
right, frames the conditions for the possibility of political community. An African American 
political theology acknowledges the strengths and limits of both of these interpretations. With 
respect to the Marxist view, which foregrounds the struggle for recognition, African American 
political theology acknowledges struggle as an essential aspect of recognition. However, it is 
also mindful to interrogate the methods and aims of struggle. With respect to Redding 
interpretation, which emphasizes recognition over struggle, African American political theology 
agrees that we should recognize ourselves within the context of a larger consciousness. It also 
agrees that this consciousness is spirit, at least in part. However, African American political 
theology disagrees with orthodox Hegelians regarding the nature and content of this 
consciousness. African American political theology is also be mindful of the ways that this 
second reading may justify complicity with current problems rather than provoke criticism, since 
awareness of a larger consciousness may provoke political quietism rather than revolution.    
In addition to the Hegelian myth of the Lord/ Bodsman dialectic, Hegel’s construal of 
consciousness as ethical life, or nationalism, is another key moment in Hegel’s thinking on 
sovereignty. Baillie sheds light on Hegel’s general view of social life when he says that “[w]hen 
self-conscious individuals are regarded s merely ‘together’, as coexisting without consciously 
controlling common purposes, they resemble a community or herd of animals…It is not an 
accidental but essential aspect of society; it is indeed the indispensable basis of community 
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which is in one respect like a community of ants…”355 Although Hegel sees value in Kantian 
autonomous individuality, Baillie notes that Hegel also believes that individuality in finally only 
satisfied as it is taken up into a higher mode of consciousness, since “individuality is itself only 
realized as a part of a concrete whole of individuals: its life is drawn from common life in and 
with others.”356 As Hegel sees it, individuality contributes to the construction of human law,357 
while one’s family, race and nation are what lie at the root of political allegiance. Consider teg 
passage below: 
This moment which expresses the ethical order in this element of immediacy or mere 
being, which, in other words, is an immediate consciousness of self (both as regards its 
essence and particular thisness) in an ‘other’ – and hence, is a natural ethical community-
this is the Family. The family, as the inner indwelling principle of sociality operating in 
an unconscious way, stands opposed to its own actuality when explicitly conscious; as the 
basis of the actuality of a nation, it stands in contrast to the nation itself; as the immediate 
ethical existence, it stands over against the ethical order which shapes and preserves itself 
by work for universal ends; the Penates of the family stand in contrast to the universal 
spirit.
358
  
 
 For Hegel, the life of the nation, which begins in the family, stands as the supreme form 
of consciousness for the individual self-consciousness. Hegel expresses this view not only in 
Phenomenology, but in Philosophy of Right (1820), as we will see below. In Phenomenology, 
Hegel expounds at length on the significance of “community” for politics:  
Spirit finds in this way its realization or its objective existence, and the family is the 
medium in which this realization takes effect. But spirit is at the same time the force of 
the whole, combining these parts again within the unity which negates them, giving them 
the feeling of their want of independence, and leeping them aware that the life only lies in 
the whole. The community may thus, on the one hand, organize itself into the systems of 
property and of personal independence, or personal right and right in things; and on the 
other hand, articulate the various ways of working for what in the first instance are 
particular ends-those of gain and enjoyment-into their own special guilds and 
associations, and may thus make them independent. The spirit of universal assemblage 
and association is the single and simple principle, and the negative essential factor at 
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work in the segregation of isolation of these systems. In order not to let them get rooted 
and settled in this isolation and thus break up the whole into fragments and let the 
common spirit evaporate, government has from time to time to shake them to the very 
centre by War. By this means it confounds the order that has been established and 
arranged, and violates their right to independence, while the individuals…are made, by 
the task thus imposed on them by government, to feel the power of their lord and master, 
death.
359
  
 
Hegel’s reflections on sociality, family, community and nation have different interpretations. For 
Hegel scholar Michael Forster, Hegel’s point in the Phenomenology is to show that “none of the 
various ways in which one might try to validate our commonsense intuition that meaning is 
something which could in principle be purely individual, and which can be achieved 
determinately by an individual at a particular point within his life, is defensible.”360 For Forster, 
the Phenomenology is fundamentally a refutation of individualism and a treatise for collectivism 
of some kind. For Baillie, however, Hegel’s theory pointedly argues that “the substance of social 
life is constituted out of the quasi-natural phenomena of human genus and species, of race and 
nationality, on the one hand, and purely natural element of specialized individual sex, on the 
other.” Baillie explains that “[t]hese two aspects go together; the sex-relations of individuals 
maintain race and nationality, the nation lives in and through its sexually distinct individuals. 
The social order as an order is realized and maintained in the medium of these elements.”361  
 Indeed, Hegel’s nationalism does carry with it an incipient racism as Nordic 
exceptionalism. In his grand metaphysical scheme (found in Science of Logic and 
Phenomenology of Spirit), all things find their ultimate unity and determinacy in the “absolute 
Idea”, which Houlgate explains is “the conception of being as a self-determining totality. This 
totality includes all the determinations that have been analyzed in the course of speculative logic 
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[the phenomenology of spirit].”362 The absolute idea, Houlgate explains, unites all of these 
determinations into a “self-determining whole.”363 Hegel does unite difference. However, as 
Hegel’s dialectic unfolds, consciousness unleashes violence on itself and on other objects in the 
world, the dialectic of consciousness takes on relations of master/slave, and race and nation 
become supreme forms of consciousness over the individual. Thus, while Hegel argues that the 
German state, as a moment of the world spirit, has been given the task of implementing the 
“Nordic principle”364 of faith, hope and love, his fundamental logic of the master/slave dialectic 
and the life and death struggle neutralize Hegel’s good intentions. Hegel was aware that the 
theory of sovereignty posed the danger of an “arbitrary will of increasingly monstrous 
proportions.”365 Still, he would argue that the Nordic principle will carry world history beyond 
the temporary setbacks of sovereignty to the self-realization of absolute spirit as the rationally 
ordered state. These trends toward racism and authoritarianism will find their force of violence 
as the discourse on sovereignty continues in the political theology of Carl Schmitt in the next 
chapter, and in chapter six, Hannah Arendt will make clear the implications of the race-thinking 
and the nation-state for modern politics.   
Conclusion 
To summarize, Hegel’s political thought is not so much normative as it is hermeneutical. Its 
aim is to understand the sovereignty of the modern state as a rational entity to critics of the 
established regime. He justifies this attitude, i.e. legitimacy of the established regime within the 
context of a nation imbibed with the historicist attitude, because history itself was guided by a 
transcendent and unifying rationality. Unlike Kant, who delays the complete fulfillment of the 
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modern state until an unknown future moment, Hegel realizes the present moment of the state as 
the actualization of the spirit. Thus national sovereignty in support of monarchial directives takes 
priority over private right. Hegel’s nationalism is more insidious than Rousseau’s. It takes the 
form of daily governmental indoctrination and subservient labor. Without much recourse to 
political action other than patriotism, subjugated bondsmen must endure the abuses of a political 
community that persists under the control of the lords. Moreover, for the sake of cultivating the 
spirit of patriotism among citizens, the state must periodically go to war, and subjugated 
bondsmen and women no doubt supplied many of the bodies for the state’s military. In the grand 
scheme of things, none are freed from the life and death struggle, but in civil society, the 
property owners are granted life while the laborers are delivered over to death. In the following 
two chapters, we observe the history of effects of Hegel’s discourse on sovereignty in the 
political theology of German jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt (chapter 5) and political 
theory of Hannah Arendt (chapter 6).   
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Chapter 5 
Carl Schmitt: The Political in Totalized Sovereign Dictatorship 
This chapter continues the discourse analysis on sovereignty in Western canonical 
political thought, this time in the thinking of early twentieth century German jurist and Nazi 
affiliate Carl Schmitt (1888-1985).  For the past two chapters we have followed the trail of 
sovereignty through Prussia-cum Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
and now we study its discourse in the early twentieth century. In the wake of the decline of 
German idealism (a la Kant and Hegel) and the rise of Bolshevism at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Carl Schmitt argued for a totalized dictatorial sovereignty, bolstered by an 
ideologically defined political body. For Schmitt, the recently established Weimar Republic 
(1919-1933) sat on the unstable foundation of liberalism, and thus could not account for what 
Schmitt called “the political”, i.e. the possibility of state enemies that impose life or death 
decisions on people, as well as other problems that could not be solved by discussion or trade. 
The unpleasant reality of the political requires that political bodies jettison (morally) optimistic 
liberal views of the state of nature and the body and instead internalize a myth more akin to 
Hobbes’s. For Schmitt, a key aspect of this myth is that it creates unity by having the state wage 
war on a common enemy. Schmitt’s racist myth echoes his predecessor Hegel a century before 
him, as does his call for a nationalist form of sovereignty. Yet, Schmitt no longer lives in the era 
of monarch. He thus calls for a sovereign dictator, who key power is the power to decide on the 
exception, that is, when the law does and does not apply, and to whom the full and direct powers 
of the bureaucracy are granted.  
Schmitt is also noted as reviving the phrase and study of “political theology”, and he does 
this specifically when theorizing sovereignty. Schmitt understood the problem of sovereignty as 
intrinsically tied to the renewal political-theological discourse. Thus his thinking on matters of 
 132 
state, law, the appropriate form of government and the question of sovereignty include 
theological reflection. Schmitt represents the (post) modern revival of the relevance of 
theological discourse for politics and statecraft. In addition to philosophy and law, Schmitt also 
(critically) returns to the writings of fourth century Catholic theologian St. Augustine (354-430), 
especially his City of God (426 AD). Schmitt finds affinity with much of Augustinian theology, 
but Schmitt’s post-liberal context led him to jettison Augustine’s clear distinction between the 
“city of heaven,” founded on the truth of the one true God, and the “earthly city” founded on 
fratricide and false gods.
366
  
According to Schmitt, inquiries into the nature of the state can no longer be categorically 
separated from (Christian) theology. In the American context, similar implications can be drawn 
from American neopragmatist thinkers such as Victor Anderson (Pragmatic Theology, 1998) and 
Jeffrey Stout (Democracy and Tradition, 2004), both of whom argue that theology cannot be 
excluded from the American public and its problems. However, Schmitt’s argument will always 
be somewhat unsettling in a land where a venerable tradition of the separation of church and 
state endures. This chapter begins historically, setting Schmitt’s context. It then surveys his 
views on the state of nature and the body as well as his conception of the political body and 
sovereignty.   
Context 
According to Arendt, late nineteenth and early twentieth century German politics (1884-
1914) was marked by a mindset of eternal unlimited expansion or what she also called 
imperialism.
367
 These expansionist policies had decimated the body politic of the state and 
                                                        
366
 See St. Augustine’s City of God, esp. books VI, VII, and XI 
367
 See Hannah Arendt’s Imperialism (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1968), 3 
 133 
intensified antagonistic tensions among German populations.
368
 As the twentieth century opened, 
Germany was riddled with the social fragmentation effected by the state’s culture struggle with 
both the Catholic Church (the Kulturkampf) and socialists (the kampfzeit). Germany’s 
international relations suffered as well. The German empire imagined itself responsible for 
setting the international agenda, extending goodwill to nations on its own terms (or not), and 
even engaging in pre-emptive continental war to rid European lands of German enemies. 
According to Arendt, German imperialism would thus contribute to the breakdown of the 
European comity of nations and would serve as a catalyst for the Great War of the early 
twentieth century.
369
 This, along with the more immediate 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand (1875-1914), heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, provoked an allied military 
response (France, Great Britain and Italy) against the German Empire that declined into the First 
World War between the Allied and Central Powers (1914-1918). The Allied powers defeated the 
German Empire and other Central powers (Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire), and this in turn 
freed German citizens to wage revolution against their oppressive regime in 1918. Just before the 
revolution, Social Democrats, Democrats, and the Catholic Center Party had formed a coalition, 
and this proved to be the decisive factor in the institution of the Weimar Republic. In Germany 
(1919), emperors and kings were deposed and a democratic republic was established. However, 
from the beginning, the republic was unstable. 
Although the republic had been established, the social problem – mass suffering in the wake 
of industrialization and economic deregulation – continued to plague the state.370 The costs of 
war and a destructive totalitarian government were only made worse with the Treaty of 
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Versailles (1919), which left Germany alone responsible all losses of the war.
371
 From the 
postwar period until 1923, Germany faced a host of problems, most notably a currency crisis and 
political polarization. A radical right sought a return to the monarchy or some kind of nationalist 
alternative. Although many leftists, and the key coalition formed among the Social Democrats, 
Democrats, and Catholic Center Party gave initial support to the republic, workers grew 
increasingly disenchanted with the revolution and the new constitution because their gains were 
at best modest. This tenuous political situation meant that president Friedrich Ebert (1919-1925) 
had a difficult time governing, and frequently resorted to the exercise of emergency powers as 
granted by the Weimar Constitution (Art. 48). Horrible working and living conditions were made 
worse by tax hikes, dilapidated educational facilities, and eventually by the emergency 
instantiation of absolute veto power by Prussian political authorities regarding military, tax, and 
constitutional matters.
372
 Germany experienced a period of relative stability from 1923-1928, but 
even this was minimal, for although there were no attempted coups during this period, the 
government was generally unable to rely on a broad base of support. Nor was it able to institute 
more major reforms. In 1929, with the onset of the Great Depression, even this unstable cohesion 
was lost, and the republic began its slide toward 1933 and the rise of the Third Reich. At one 
point during the Depression roughly six million Germans were unemployed. 
Post WWI Germany was not simply dealing with social unrest. According to Arendt, WWI 
exploded the European comity of nations beyond repair, and in Germany, an atmosphere of 
social disintegration developed alongside the rise of the constitutional (Weimar) republic.
373
 
Arendt says that “[n]ow everybody was against everybody else, and most of all against his 
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closest neighbors – the Slovaks against the Czechs, the Croats against the Serbs, the Ukranians 
against the Poles.”374 Here we witness the proliferation of what Michel Foucault would later call 
“dividing practices,” whereby a social and personal identity is imposed on an internal marginal 
population as part of a larger process of exclusion and domination.
375
 In the case of the Jews, 
German authorities had labeled them the “scum of the earth”376 Arendt notes that anti-Semitism 
had existed in Germany for some time. Ironically, although the Jews (and not the bourgeois) had 
been willing to finance the state’s beginnings’ in the nineteenth century, they were still victims 
of discrimination at the height of imperialism. Now, in the early twentieth century, having been 
tied to the label of scum of the earth – and thus undeserving of citizens’ rights – Jews found 
themselves subjected to the authoritarian government of the Nazi regime. In 1933, Adolf Hitler 
was appointed chancellor of the Weimer Republic, and began to consolidate power by 
eliminating opposition even as the physical condition of then President Paul von Hinderburg 
(1847-1934) worsened. Through policies like the Reichstag Fire Decree (1933), which removed 
many German civil liberties, and the 1934 Enabling Act, which allowed Hitler and his cabinet to 
pass laws without consent of president or constitution, Hitler gradually consolidated power so 
that when Hindenburg passed of lung cancer in 1934, he was able to declare a state of 
emergency, suspend the Republic’s constitution, and effectively institute a fascist government, 
the Third Reich (1933-1945).  
Schmitt was writing in the wake of a post-imperialist society, wherein the German (and 
Russian) state had been overrun by totalitarian movements, and where an entirely new 
population of stateless, rightless people had been produced by discriminatory laws. Schmitt was 
one of Germany’s most preeminent legal scholars throughout the short life of the Weimar 
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Republic (1919-1933), and rose to even greater prominence during Nazi rule before finally 
finding himself the object of both Nazi and Ally hostility. Schmitt was a critic of the Weimar 
Republic from its inception, primarily because he believed that it tried to found a new democratic 
republic without ridding itself of the parliamentary system that had been with Germany since the 
time of the rise of the empire in the mid-nineteenth century. However, Schmitt was no ally of the 
Reich either. Although he found common ground with Nazi ideology on anti-Semitism and anti-
liberalism, Schmitt’s strong statist orientation positioned him against National Socialism, which 
was not statist, that is, concerned with the preservation of the state, but was a party that reflected 
a totalitarian movement. The National Socialist party served as a vehicle for introducing 
totalitarian movements to the organs of government. This was one of Schmitt’s primary fears 
about liberalism. He was concerned that liberalism and the parliamentary system were 
unprepared for such movements. For Schmitt, liberal thinkers from Locke to Kant had forgotten 
Hobbes’ age-old teaching about the state of nature being a war of all against all.      
The State of Nature and the Body 
Schmitt’s understanding of the doctrine of the state of nature is stated in his Political 
Theology (1922), where he explicitly discusses the relationship of metaphysics and politics. “The 
metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the world,” Schmitt says, “has the same 
structure as what the world immediately understands to be appropriate as a form of its political 
organization. Monarchy thus becomes as self-evident in the consciousness of that period as 
democracy does in a later epoch.”377 Metaphysics provides the conditions of possibility for 
political organization; it sets the tone. “A continuous thread,” Schmitt says, “runs through the 
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metaphysical, political and sociological conceptions that postulate the sovereign as a primeval 
creator.”378 Schmitt points to the writings of Rousseau as an example: 
“Imitate the immutable decrees of the divinity.” This was the ideal of the legal life of the 
state that was immediately evident to the rationalism of the eighteenth century. This 
utterance is found in Rousseau’s essay Political Economy. The politicization of 
theological concepts, especially with respect to the concept of sovereignty, is so striking 
that it has not escaped any true expert on his writings. Said Emile Boutmy, “Rousseau 
applies to the sovereign the idea that the philosophes hold of God: He may do anything 
that he wills but he may not will evil.” In the theory of the state of the seventeenth 
century, the monarch is identified with God and has in the state a position exactly 
analogous to that attributed to God in the Cartesian system of the world.
379
  
 
 According to Schmitt, metaphysics provides the backdrop to politics, especially to 
questions of sovereignty and form of government. Thus, his own twentieth century political 
situation could not be understood apart from what he saw as the nineteenth century decline in 
metaphysical thought. The idea of an omnipotent, all powerful God “dressed” the monarchy with 
legitimacy and glory before the nineteenth century decline, especially in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Schmitt uses the writings of Descartes as an example: “Descartes once 
wrote, ‘It is God who established these laws in nature just as a king establishes laws in his 
kingdom.’ The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were dominated by this idea of the sole 
sovereign.”380 This once glorious epoch began to fade with the French Revolution. Since 1789 
until his own time, Schmitt contends:   
the consistency of exclusively scientific thinking has also permeated political ideas, 
repressing the essentially juristic-ethical thinking that had predominated in the age of the 
Enlightenment. The general validity of a legal prescription has become identified with the 
lawfulness of nature, which applies without exception. The sovereign, who in the deistic 
view of the world…had remained the engineer of the great machine, has been radically 
pushed aside.
381
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 For Schmitt, then, the state of nature doctrine cannot be understood apart from what he 
saw as the decline of metaphysics, i.e. the decline of theology in the eighteenth century and the 
rise of scientific liberalism in the nineteenth century as observed in thinking of Kant and Hegel 
in this dissertation. Schmitt engages liberalism substantively in his 1923 The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy. There he describes liberalism’s basic principles: that “the truth can 
be found through an unrestrained clash of opinion and that competition will produce 
harmony.”382 Schmitt was not convinced by liberalism’s claim that discussion, the economy, 
industry, and technology will eventually enable ‘humanity’ to surpass politics, war and the state. 
The root problem of liberalism is its denial of “the political.”  
 According to Schmitt scholar Heinrich Meier, “the political” signifies the state of affairs 
that obtain in exceptional cases, i.e. where the universal norms and ideals of liberalism give way 
to relations defined by a friend/enemy dualism, when “two come together and join forces against 
an enemy.”383 In his The Concept of the Political (1932), Schmitt argues that the political is 
similar to other provinces (economics or ethics) in that all rest on key distinctions: the aesthetic 
rests on the distinction of the beautiful/ugly, the moral on good/evil, the economic on 
profitable/not, and the political on friend/enemy. Beyond these basic similarities, however, 
Schmitt argues that the political, when it emerges, is the most authoritative province. It signifies 
the most extreme antagonism. The friend/enemy distinction denotes “the utmost degree of 
intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation.”384 In the case of the 
political, as opposed to the moral or legal, there is no previously determined norm and here is 
where liberalism falls short. In case of the political, where enemies face one another, only the 
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actual participants can recognize and settle the conflict. Liberalism attempts to neutralize and 
depoliticize these antagonisms by transforming enemies into competitors (economics) or debate 
partners (ethics). However, as Bolshevism showed, an enemy is neither of these nor a private 
adversary, but exists only when one ‘fighting’ collectivity of people confronts another. (The 
enemy is solely a public enemy). Because the political justifies a different mode of behavior, 
because the enemy concept entails the ever-present possibility of combat and real physical 
killing, and because the political is always oriented toward the most extreme possibility, it 
defines the decisive human grouping. We may like to believe that social entities take priority 
over the political, but no one can stop the government from making the decision in the extreme 
case.  
Although Schmitt’s exhaustive account of “the political” was offered in his The Concept of 
the Political (1932), it emerged as early as a decade before in Political Theology (1922). In 
Political Theology, Schmitt’s language about “the political” emerges from a discussion of his 
own Catholic anthropology. Schmitt begins the discussion by appealing to French counter-
revolutionist thinkers Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821), Louise de Bonald (1754-1840) and 
Spanish Catholic Juan Donoso Cortes (1809-1853) as authorities in matters of anthropology.
385
 
They, like Schmitt, were absolutely opposed to liberalism’s view of human nature.  
Every political idea in one way or another takes a position on the “nature” of man and  
presupposes that he is either ‘by nature good’ or ‘by nature evil.’…For the rationalism of 
the Enlightenment, man was by nature ignorant and rough, but educable…To the 
committed atheistic anarchists, man is decisively good, and all evil is the result of 
theological thought and its derivatives, including all ideas concerning authority, state, and 
government…[T]he starting point for the Catholic Spaniard was the dogma of Original 
Sin. But Donoso Cortes, in contrast radicalized this polemically into a doctrine of the 
absolute sinfulness and depravity of human nature…When he spoke of the natural evil of 
man, he polemicized against atheist anarchism and its axiom of the good man…386  
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Schmitt not only used Cortes to oppose liberalism’s view of human nature. He also turned to 
Cortes for a most vivid philosophy of history, one marked by images of tempestuous waters and 
war. Consider Schmitt: 
The pictures in which [Cortes’] impressions of human history were objectified were full 
of dread and horror: Humanity reels blindly through a labyrinth that we call history, 
whose entrance, exit, and shape nobody knows; humanity is a boat aimlessly tossed about 
on the sea and manned by a mutinous, vulgar, forcibly recruited crew that howls and 
dances until God’s rage pushes the rebellious rabble into the sea so that quiet can prevail 
once more. But the typical picture is a different one: the bloody decisive battle that has 
flared up today between Catholicism and atheist socialism. According to Donoso Cortes, 
it was characteristic of bourgeois liberalism not to decide in this battle but instead to 
begin a discussion.
387
   
 
Schmitt, then, articulates a pessimistic view of human nature and a much darker philosophy of 
history than liberal thinkers. It is one where a “bloody, decisive battle” has become central, the 
determining force of events even. He follows this discussion with a sustained criticism of 
liberalism, and then with the following words, gestures toward “the political” on the penultimate 
page of the book:  
Today nothing is more modern than the onslaught against the political. American 
financiers, industrial technicians, Marxist socialists, and anarchic syndicalist 
revolutionaries unite in demanding that that the biased rule of politics over unbiased 
economic management be done away with. There must no longer be political 
problems…Donoso Cortes was convinced that the moment of the last battle had arrived, 
and in the face of radical evil the only solution is dictatorship…388    
 
For Schmitt, then, problems with the Weimar Republic in the early twenty first century could be 
traced to the shift in metaphysical thinking from early modern immaterial and theological 
metaphysics to liberalism’s scientific metaphysical thinking. Liberalism’s metaphysical thinking, 
which included an optimistic view of human nature, supported the modern state structure of the 
bourgeois Rechtsstaat.
389
 Schmitt locates the emergence of liberalism’s political structure, the 
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bourgeois Rechtsstaat constitution, in Germany in 1815 with the birth of the German 
Confederation.
390
 Here, Germany’s incorporation of a rechtstaat (rights-state) component into its 
constitution produced a state that protected bourgeois freedom, i.e. “personal freedom, private 
property, contractual liberty, and freedom of commerce and profession.”391 The bourgeois 
Rechtstaat’s primary aim is to protect individual freedom. Its primary marks are thus a 
‘separation of powers,’ the protection of basic rights, a formal concept of law (i.e. law derived 
from reason, not command, veritas, not auctoritas) and a parliamentary system of government 
(Schmitt’s examples were constitutions of England in 1688, France in 1791, the U.S. in 1787, 
and Germany in 1815).  
While Schmitt appreciated that the sovereignty of the constitution in the bourgeois 
Rechtsstaat provided helpful checks against absolutism and the “power state,” he argued that a 
perennial problem with this type of constitution was the formation of political will. For all of its 
benefits, the bourgeois Reschtsstaat has trouble producing a truly unified and thus truly 
democratic, political action. Against those who would point to the parliament as evidence of 
unified action, Schmitt argued that parliament promotes discussion rather than unity, and that 
parliament loses its legitimacy once people believe – as they did in his day – that its real business 
happens in secret.
392
 While it adequately accounted for governmental and legislative forms of 
power, it did not, and could not, account for constitution-making power, i.e. power of the act, 
which constitutes the form and type of the political unity, i.e. that power by which, through a 
bearer, “political unity reaches for itself, and provides itself.”393 Schmitt also believed that 
parliament was too dominated by the particularities of party interests to foster unity. Parties had 
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“mechanized” the state, turning it from an institution of cohesion into an instrument for 
associational, or class interests.  
Moreover, liberal metaphysics and the bourgeois rechtstaat also led to a conceptual 
conflation of state and law. Liberalism does not construe the state as a particular form of unity 
and representation but as a bearer of a system of norms or a legal order. In Schmitt’s day the neo-
Kantian thinker Hans Kelsen (1871-1973) was a key representative figure, arguing that “pure” 
law was conceptually distinct from culture and morality. It was legitimated instead by a rational 
grundnorm.
394
 For Kelsen, the foundation of law is reason as opposed to command, veritas as 
opposed to auctoritas.
395
 It stands above the Machiavellian dimensions of life and provides the 
highest expression of political will. For Schmitt, “pure” law could never resolve problems of 
legitimacy or sovereignty but served only  to justify the “rule of law.” In the rule of law, law 
itself becomes equivocated with statute (as it is now separated from command) and statutory law 
becomes divorced from legal application (since the executive and legislative authorities have 
been separated).  
Deprived of personal aspects, statutory law becomes the primary means of displaying state 
authority, even as command was the prince’s. This conflation of law and state also raises 
questions of legitimacy. In Schmitt’s view of liberalism, the state “validates its power and 
legitimacy through reference to a pure realm of objective legal norms and the processes through 
which these norms are applied.”396 Both the conflation of state with law and the grounding of 
their legitimacy in an objective system of norms were inadequate for Schmitt.
397
 What he said of 
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law might also be applied to state: “The legal idea cannot translate itself independently…In 
every transformation there is present an auctoritatis interpositio.”398 As Hobbes rightly 
recognized, there can be no law without command, no legitimate grounds for state law other than 
personalistic sovereignty.
399
 
According to Schmitt, then, the decline of theological metaphysics and the rise of 
liberalism provided the conditions for the possibility of the decline of the monarchy and rise of 
the bourgeois rechtsstaat. He argues that the turn to liberalism as a rationality of state was only 
possible in the wake of the seventeenth century turn away from Christendom’s view of history as 
ruled by God’s providence. Thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau turned to a deistic 
metaphysics where history is ruled by nature and human artifice. Liberalism, then, is quite 
literally a new faith; one that rejects the providence of the Christian transcendent God and 
expresses faith in technical progress.
400
 It holds that humanity may, bring about a utopia (e.g. 
universal cosmopolitanism, the kingdom of ends, a world state) by its own authority, reason, 
resources. Because liberalism assumes that technology will solve all problems, but is not 
concerned with political unity or formation of the will but with individual freedom and the 
legitimacy of the status quo. However, liberalism was only possible with “the elimination of all 
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theistic and transcendental conceptions and the formation of a new concept of legitimacy…the 
pouvoir constituant of the people.”401  
For Schmitt, “the political” reminds liberals that bourgeois norms and justifications operate 
with a conceptual gap by ignoring the reality of conflicts between friends and enemies, conflicts 
that cannot be dissolved into aesthetic, moral, or economic disagreements. Liberal theory does 
not discuss the use of the ius belli, where the state must determine whether one is an enemy and 
if state powers should be used to fight, and it rarely deals with the ever-present possibility of 
combat and/or killing. Yet, these issues, as opposed to economics or aesthetics, most heavily 
determine a state’s preservation or demise, and ultimately give the law, the constitution and the 
republic its real content and legitimacy. In fact, to the extent that a situation is of the political, it 
imposes itself on other provinces and compromises their autonomy. The question of friends and 
enemies and that of legitimacy are necessarily political questions. They cannot be answered 
technically or administratively as liberalism would have it.  
To the extent that a state cannot effectively address these political matters, it will fail to 
maintain its sovereignty. The reality of the political thus implies the necessity of sovereignty; i.e. 
the capacity to make definitive political decisions in life or death (i.e. political) situations. 
Schmitt surmizes, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” he who, in deciding “what 
constitutes, the exception,” has authority to suspend the law.”402 Having traded all decisive, 
personal, and political elements for the sake of neutrality and objectivity, the limits of liberalism 
and its bourgeois rechtsstaat are exposed in political situations. Liberalism cannot give an 
account of the personality of state. It compromises, destabilizes and delegitimates the state’s will 
and in exceptional/i.e. political cases, the bourgeois rechtsstaat is either forced to abandon its 
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liberal principles or to accept the fact that holding fast to liberal principles will leave one 
powerless against the enemy. 
The concept of “the political” gave Schmitt the tools to articulate the meaning of his 
statement that the “age of discussion” had come to an end with the Bolshevist Revolution 
(1917).
403
 Three signs pointed to the collapse of the intellectual foundations of rationalism and 
parliamentary thought. First, in pursuit of their revolutionary aims, workers circumvented 
parliament, organized syndicates and deployed the technique of “direct action” (i.e. unlimited 
strikes, work stoppages). Schmitt saw this new “active” method of revolt as a sign that the 
Enlightenment projection of human moral and political advancement, through rational means, 
had been rejected by the working class.
404
 In Enlightenment thought (the French Revolutionaries, 
Kant, Hegel, and even Marx), progress was conceived as a gradual historical and/or educational 
process that would eventually transform human consciousness. With the rise of Russian 
syndicalism, Schmitt realized that the working class had ceased to wait on history and became an 
“active people.”  
They had abandoned the assumptions of what Hannah Arendt would call the vita 
contemplativa and sought to actualize a more ideal society based on the principles of the vita 
activa and methods of direct action.
405
 The second sign of the demise of the age of discussion 
was the “metaphysical duality” with which the syndicalists operated. In previous epochs, all 
reforms, revolts, and reactions assumed a “metaphysical centrism,” i.e. assumed that social 
reality was an all-embracing system. Whether the world were fundamentally united by God, 
reason, democracy, or the state, all assume an ultimate unifying authoritative ideal, which allows 
for the ultimate possibility of the peaceful reconciliation of difference. By contrast, the 
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syndicalists operated with a metaphysical duality, and thus rejected all notions of an eventual 
metaphysical unity/reconciliation and insisted on an inevitable, decisive, destructive and bloody 
battle.  
Along with these two signs that pointed to the end of the age of discussion, the third and 
most clear was the theory of myth that rested at the center of Russian syndicalist thought. As 
noted, syndicalists rejected German rationalist thought. In rejecting reason, they also rejected all 
rationally fabricated utopian goals such as Hegel’s “absolute reconciliation” and Marx’s future 
communist society. Syndicalists turned instead to a myth that emerged from the very life instinct 
and ethos of the workers themselves: “The General Strike.” This myth, constructed on a 
metaphysical duality of class struggle, evoked from the proletariat heroic acts of world-historical 
significance, those which rationally-derived notions of “duty” could never compel. Myth was a 
more powerful motivator than reason. All three signs – the turn to the vita activa, metaphysical 
duality, and myth - combined to form what Schmitt called an “irrationalist theory of direct use of 
force.”406 It stood in direct opposition to liberalism and was far more vital than rationalist 
approaches to social problems, including Marxist strands. Schmitt’s message to the 
parliamentarians, then, was twofold. First, “science has ceased to be the obvious foundation of 
social practice for the current generation”407 and second, this was “a specifically new means of 
struggle, which make the simple repetition of old political and military tactics completely 
impossible.”408 Schmitt’s own response to the situation was to construct an anti-Jewish, anti-
Semitic German nationalist myth in an effort to strengthen national unity. He is also infamous in 
recommending a sovereign (commissarial) dictatorship to “save” the exhausted German state.  
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Schmitt locates the roots of the turn from Christendom to liberalism in the thought of 
Thomas Hobbes. To be sure, Hobbes has no faith in historical progress. Also, his anthropology 
remains “Christian,” according to Schmitt, in that it highlights humankind’s “dangerousness” or 
“riskiness,” not goodness. Hobbes thus successfully grafted a theory of the state into a Christian 
view of history and humanity.. However, Hobbes was the foremost theorist of the positive 
constitutional state, where the state is an artifice of freely-consenting individuals and 
neutral/agnostic with respect to the question of religious truth. Its basic features are liberty of 
conscience, freedom of thought, and inalienable rights.
409
 Hobbes was also the first to conceive 
of the state as a great machine (as clockwork, an automaton or apparatus). “The decisive 
metaphysical step,” Schmitt says, “in the construction of the theory of state occurred with the 
conception of the state as mechanism. All that followed…[the] steam engine, to the electric 
motor…resulted in the further development of technology and scientific thinking, which did not 
need any new metaphysical determination.”410 Hobbes tried to prevent the mechanization of state 
by positioning two other gods alongside the state as a mechanism, namely the sovereign person 
(prince or parliament) and the Leviathan. Thus for Hobbes, the state is something more than a 
covenant concluded by individuals. However, the political symbol of the leviathan failed to 
attain mythic status and was unable to compel loyalties. “Hobbes’ theory of the state was thus 
perceived by his own people as an unnatural deviation and his image of Leviathan was regarded 
as the symbol of a monstrosity. What could have been a grand signal of restoration of the vital 
energy and political unity began to be perceived in a ghostly light and became a grotesque horror 
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picture.”411 Rather than an institution of dignity, majesty, and honor, the state became 
mechanized, indeed, an instrument.  
For Schmitt, then, Hobbes’ individualism, contractarianism and his picture of the state as a 
mechanism all stand under the mechanistic metaphysics of modern science. His turn to modern 
science and technology was not metaphysically neutral. Hobbes turned away from medieval 
notions of a community by divine institution, for Leviathan fights against all religiously 
determined thought of state, i.e. against political theology. Leviathan establishes a unity of 
religion and politics on the basis of its own absolute power. If Hobbes considered this a necessity 
given his context of religious warfare, this was also the undoing of leviathan’s power, since the 
sovereign representative and the law is now only the product of human artifice and intelligence. 
“The idea of the modern constitutional state, Schmitt says, “triumphed together with deism, a 
theology and metaphysics that banished the miracle from the world. This…rejected not only the 
transgression of the laws of nature through an exception brought about by direct intervention [i.e. 
miracle] but also the sovereign’s direct intervention in a valid legal order.”412 Schmitt argues that 
a continuous thread runs through metaphysical, political, and sociological conceptions that 
postulate the sovereign as a personal unit and primeval creator.
413
 During the Enlightenment 
period and through the revolution the architect of the world and state was viewed as a legislator, 
in correspondence with the deistic worldview. In Schmitt’s day, deism has been traded for 
positivism, so that the will of the people was now intrinsically right.   
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On “The Political” Body 
 
The Hobbesean Leviathan failed as a political symbol to attain mythic status in the creation 
of political unity and thus establish the authority of the monarchial sovereign. Schmitt’s political 
theology aimed to re-establish political unity against the unpolitical worldview and ‘political’ 
practices of liberalism. “The accurate, central, and systematic concept for the politico-theological 
problem has to be oriented towards political unity and its presence or representation.”414 
Schmitt’s most lucid elaboration on the concept of political theology occurs in Political 
Theology II (2012).
415
 His basic point is that with the institution of the bourgeois rechtsstaat, the 
domain of “society” (the social) now impacts both church and state and dissolves the distinction 
between theology and politics. Most theologians, Schmitt contends, continue to operate as if the 
“Augustinian” view of church/state relations still holds, where one posits an impregnable 
distinction between the city of God (civitas dei) and the Earthly city (civitas terrena).
416
 
However, as the early twentieth century crisis in German theology demonstrates, theology can no 
longer escape history through dogmatics. Theology must abandon its “Augustinian” perspective 
on this matter and take into account its potential links to current political realities. In this new 
context, the state has lost its monopoly on the friend/enemy discourse i.e. on the political, and the 
discourse may be taken up by theology. Here is Schmitt: 
[T]heology is the continuation of the revealed logos in the form of concrete discussion. 
There is only theology in the time between Christ’s first and second coming…[theology] 
made [it]self secure [from politics] through a dogmatic theology. But, given the changing 
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friend-enemy constellations throughout history, theology can become a political tool of 
the revolution as well as of the counter-revolution.
417
  
 
 Schmitt warns that a theologian who still holds Augustine’s antiquated “two-cities” view 
may unwittingly deploy a theology that “dresses up” (i.e. gives divine sanction to) a particular 
political form. One example of this is Schmitt’s parallel between the monarch of a parliamentary 
regime and the idea of a passive being in a higher sphere. However, beyond this example, 
Schmitt attempted to articulate the nature of this correlation in a number of ways. “The juridical 
formulas of the omnipotence of state,” he says, “are, in fact, only superficial secularizations of 
theological formulas of the omnipotence of God.”418 Again, “the metaphysical image that a 
definite epoch forges of the world has the same structure as what the world immediately 
understands to be appropriate as a form of its political organization.”419 Another concrete 
example of this is how Christian and Jewish propaganda has used the politico-theological 
concept of monarchy to justify the superiority of God’s people coming together in the ecclesia 
Christi over polytheistic belief of pagans. Schmitt also notes how theologian Erik Peterson’s 
(1890-1960) writings on monotheism, especially the formula “one God” as a public acclimation, 
can be an affirmation of a particular God or king.  
 While links between theology and politics (e.g. monotheism and monarchy) are not 
absolute, the two can not be categorically separated. It is possible that theology has little political 
significance, but it is likely that theology plays a role in politics such that le roi regne, mais il ne 
gouverne pas [the king reigns, but he does not govern]. Schmitt also justifies the blending of 
church/state into “the political” with a theological rationale. Theology must be related to political 
realities, since “the second person of the Godhead represents the perfect unity of the two natures, 
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the human and the divine.”420 From historical, political and theological perspectives then, the 
politics of theology and the theology of politics cannot be denied. In the modern state, there has 
been a transition from a church/state dichotomy to “the political”. Moreover, this category, i.e. 
friend/enemy constellations, may be taken up by either theological or political theoretical 
discourses.  
In addition to legitimacy and political unity, Schmitt also looked to political theology for 
three other purposes. First, renowned German-American political philosopher Leo Strauss notes 
that Schmitt aimed to “strike at the root” of liberalism by replacing the liberal concept of 
(bourgeois) culture – individualism, contractarianism, the state as mechanism – with an insight 
“into what is specific to the political.”421 For Schmitt, this insight was the “dangerousness” of 
people, which is the truth and reality of the state of nature. If for Hobbes the state of nature is the 
state of war, for Schmitt the state of nature as the state of war is “the genuinely political 
status...‘the natural’ character of the relationships of human groups.”422 Schmitt notes the striking 
political significance that animal fables hold with respect to getting at the problem of the 
political; “almost all [animal fables] can be applied to a real political situation: the problem of 
aggression…the question of guilt…justice between states.”423  
Schmitt also looked to political theology for a second purpose, namely to acknowledge and 
correctly conceptualize the enemy, an unpleasant task for bourgeois liberal sensibilities. This 
insight is nonetheless vital, as it shores up identity and makes political unity possible. According 
to Schmitt:  
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The key question [of] the political concerns the reality of an enemy whose concrete 
possibility I can still see in its entirely de-theologised counter-image. Its transposition from 
the old political theology [e.g. Cromwell’s enmity for papist Spain grounded in the truth of 
revelation] into a pretentious and totally new, purely secular and humane humanity needs to 
be watched closely and critically, for it remains indeed the permanent function of any 
scientific struggle for knowledge.
424
  
 
Schmitt understands the category of the enemy to be a vital clue to the political. To the extent 
that theology may assist in understanding the enemy, theology is called to this specific political-
theological task. Further, political theology has a third task that is mindful of the conceptual 
relationship between theology and jurisprudence: “The scientific conceptual structure of both of 
these faculties has systematically produced areas in which concepts can be transposed, among 
which harmonious exchanges are permitted and meaningful. It is only a question of the right 
attunement of the instrument.”425 Schmitt’s thought points toward a new form of political-
theological constitution and, at times, a (counter) Reformation.
426
 
On Sovereignty 
Given the loss of the political situation, as Schmitt sees it, his theory of sovereignty venerates 
sovereign dictatorship as the most appropriate form of government. As with monarchialism 
government, the dictator is “an agent of central [bureaucratic] power”, one essentially “opposed 
to the provincial and local cooperatives” to the extent that these local provinces continue 
maintain “an autonomous judiciary, government and administration.”427 Thus, dictatorship is an 
inherently unitary form of government and categorically opposed to more federative political 
formations. The theme of centralization, however, is the only thing that the dictator has in 
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common with the monarch. Beyond this, Schmitt notes other features that distinguish the 
dictator.  
First, dictatorial bureaucratic centralization differs from monarchial centralization in that a 
dictatorship achieves unity by overwhelming and annulling rather than harmonizing other 
intermediary powers of the state. In a monarchial regime, intermediary powers such as the 
“aristocracy, the seigneurial and patrimonial sphere of jurisdiction, the clergy and the 
independent law courts which acted as…[storehouse of laws], and also the French 
parliaments…” buffer the impact of monarchial activity.428 In a monarchial regime these 
intermediary powers create conditions such that unity can only be achieved by consensus 
(between king and parliament, for example). However, with dictatorship, “the functions of all 
other magistrates were nullified…[the dictator] becomes an absolute power, overruling all 
existing authorities.”429 Schmitt characterizes it as the “direct exercise of stately power – that is, 
any exercise that is not mediated through autonomous intermediate institutions – and understand 
by it centralized government, in contrast to decentralized.”430 
In addition to the nullification of intermediary powers, dictatorship implies the suspension of 
the legal order for the specific task of destroying an enemy. “Dictatorship is omnipotence 
without law [Gesertz]: it is lawless power.”431 Drawing from Rousseau’s The Social Contract, 
Schmitt notes that “the dictator dominates the law without representing the legislature” so that 
“during dictatorship laws are ‘dormant’, the dictator can silence laws but cannot make them 
speak…”432 Schmitt is clear that these structural dynamics occur specifically in response to a 
concrete enemy. “The success achieved by the actions of the dictator gains a clear content 
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through the fact that the enemy, who has to be eliminated, is immediately present.”433 Schmitt 
continues: “for the concept of dictatorship, too, one must retain the immediate actuality of a 
situation that needs to be resolved…Dictatorship is like the act of self-defense: never just action, 
but also reaction…[it] protects a specific constitution against an attack that threatens to abolish 
this constitution.”434 Because of this specific task of dictatorship, Schmitt notes that dictatorial 
regimes often makes use of certain phrases such as “in the interest of surete [security] and ordre 
publique [public order], extraordinary means are necessary in extraordinary circumstances; laws 
must not be inflexibles [unbending], such that their bureaucratic formalities may become 
detrimental when there is immediate danger; the lawmaker must foresee that he cannot foresee 
everything.”435 These expressions convey that the dictatorial task requires that one suspend the 
legal order and cancel any ‘separation of powers’ for the explicit purposes of destroying an 
enemy. In essence, modern dictatorial regimes exchange a bill of rights for a bill of attainder.
436
    
Finally, Schmitt makes a distinction between two kinds of dictatorships, one commissary and 
the other sovereign. In the case of a commissary dictatorship, the dictator is “authorized by a 
constituted organ and has an identity in the existing constitution”437 “[T]he commissary 
dictatorship,” Schmitt says, “suspends the constitution in order to protect it.”438 This suspension, 
however, does not make the constitution invalid. The constitution itself remains valid, and the 
dictator thus functions as an arm of the law and ultimately remains bound by duty or charge. The 
“dictator dictates to the outside world, but insofar as he is a commissar he himself must 
(internally [im Innenverhaltnis]) be dictated to.”439  
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With the sovereign dictator, which Schmitt endorses, “[d]ictatorship does not suspend an 
existing constitution through a law based on the constitution – a constitutional law; rather it 
seeks to create conditions in which a constitution – a constitution that it regards as the true one – 
is made possible. Therefore [sovereign] dictatorship does not appeal to an existing constitution, 
but to one that is still to come.”440 Sovereign dictatorship occurs when the dictator is given the 
power to create a constitution.
441
 Schmitt thus highlights the fact that unlike the commissar, the 
sovereign dictator is marked by a necessarily arbitrary pouvoir constituent [constituent or 
constituting power].
442
 With the sovereign dictator, a constitution may represent its constituting 
power, but may also inhibit it and thus a true “constituting act in all its sovereignty…must have 
the choice between an old and a new regime.”443 While a commissary dictatorship comes to an 
end when the concrete enemy is defeated, a sovereign dictator’s task is completed with the 
constitution of a new government.
444
 Schmitt sums up the key distinction between the two kinds 
of dictatorships as follows: “The commissary dictator is the unconditional commissar of action 
of a pouvoir constitue [constituted power], and sovereign dictatorship is the unconditional 
commission of action of a pouvoir constituant [constituting power].”445  
Conclusion 
Following Hobbes, Schmitt was an authoritarian statist. He was reluctant to undermine or 
divide in any capacity the classical authority of the state and for him sovereignty took the form 
of the decision rather that the rule of law. If for Hobbes this decision came from the monarch, for 
Schmitt it rests with the dictator, who decides both on and in the exceptional case. The 
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significance of this is even more appreciated when we learn that Schmitt’s view of nature and 
history itself might be reduced to the exception. Not even a natural law, then, could limit the 
dictator. For Schmitt, political unity takes only this form. Citizens may support through 
nationalism and obedience to the dictator, but they are restricted from taking form as “the party”, 
“the movement”, “the people” or the legal constitution.446 Schmitt didn’t see dictatorship as 
categorically opposed to democracy, only liberal democracy. In fact, he argued that since 
parliamentary regimes fragment the political will (i.e. democracy without the demos), modern 
states needed even stronger executives to secure democratic formations. Still, critical to 
Schmitt’s political analysis, Hobbes’s Leviathan failed to attain mythic status in the role of 
political theology when political myths were capturing the imaginations of “the masses.”  
Schmitt’s age signaled the eclipse of the dominance of rationalist epistemology in Germany 
and context now ripe for political theological myths. He witnessed during his own lifetime the 
power of the socialist myth of the Strike and Musollini’s myth of the nation. Schmitt’s statistism 
was much more in accord with Mussolini than with the internationally-oriented socialists. Yet, 
he also acknowledged the power of the socialist myth. Schmitt thus turned to political theology 
to offer a symbol powerful enough to achieve mythic status, thus countering all other politically 
efficacious myths circulating in his context. In spite of his authoritarianism, his totalizing 
conception of the political, and his anti-Semitism, Schmitt reminds us that the possession and/or 
loss of the constitutional legitimacy of the state is the most pressing concern for all sectors of 
society, and perhaps most important for those groups that deal with theology, politics, and their 
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relation. Legitimacy is necessarily of a politico-mythical, rather than technical or administrative, 
nature. Law and discussion alone cannot effectively mediate political conflict.   
Beyond his authoritarianism, both Schmitt’s concept of “the political” and his anti-Semitism 
deserve attention.
447
 Schmitt’s concept of the political replaces previous conceptions of social 
struggle in the discourse on sovereignty such as the Hegelian struggle for life and death or the 
Lockean emphasis on labor. The political is the moment of contest which brings to light the true 
nature one’s existence. According to Meier, Schmitt’s mistake was that he conceived of the 
political in a totalizing rather than authoritative manner. “The political,” Meier explains, “can be 
conceived as what is authoritative…as it is able to lay claim to the individual on behalf of the 
whole or because…it is able to lay claim to him wholly.”448 It may be the community, which has 
a claim on the individual because it makes possible “the entire reality of their actions,” or it can 
be that which “grasps the whole man because this state faces him with the most important 
decision, confronts him with the greatest evil, and compels him to make the most extreme 
identification. Schmitt chooses the second path.”449  In the context of Nazi Germany, this 
required that all citizens take oaths of allegiance to the commissarial dictator.  
Alongside his conception of the political, Schmitt’s racism is also problematic. Just as Meier 
highlighted Schmitt’s disturbing conception of the political, so he also notes Schmitt’s anti-
Semitism. Five years into the total fuhrer-state, and even as Schmitt was rethinking his criticisms 
of liberalism, he held fast to anti-Semitism. This is especially evident in Schmitt’s Leviathan in 
the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, where he argues that Leviathan, to Jews,  
represents ‘the cattle upon a thousand hills’…namely, the heathens. World history appears as 
a battle among the heathens…But the Jews stand by and watch how the people of the world 
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kill one another. This mutual ‘ritual slaughter and massacre’ is for them lawful and ‘kosher,’ 
and they eat the flesh of the slaughtered peoples…”450  
 
Schmitt’s ideology legitimated the detainment and possible deaths of millions of persons in early 
twentieth century Germany. He held that both his anti-Semitism and totalizing conception of the 
political were explainable by way of his particular brand of political theology. An African 
American political theology rejects such claims and takes a critical posture toward both 
totalizing conceptions of the political and racist ideology. Both function as idolatries that call 
into question the sovereignty and lordship of the Christian God.    
Schmitt’s views rested fundamentally on the rejection of the liberal worldview and the 
turn to Catholic counter-revolutionary thought. His views on the state of nature and the body 
were largely pessimistic. He rejected progressive liberal optimism as well as its companions of 
metaphysical naturalism and the political principle of discussion. For Schmitt, the only answer to 
those with more “activist” metaphysics (i.e. Bolshevists) was through sovereign dictatorship 
bolstered by a revived counter-revolutionary political theology. Because “the political” is a 
reality for Schmitt and not an artifice (as for Hobbes), Schmitt’s view of the political body 
internalizes the state of nature, as a perpetual state of warring interests. In the next chapter we 
take up German-Jewish political thinker Hannah Arendt discourse on sovereignty. Like Schmitt, 
Arendt also wrote in a post-imperialist European context, but she would envision the problems of 
sovereignty and the political from a more critical perspective.    
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Chapter 6 
Hannah Arendt: The Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and Revolutionary Politics 
 
The chapter continues the discourse analysis on sovereignty in canonical Western political 
theory by taking up the thinking of German-Jewish political philosopher Hannah Arendt (1906-
1965). Like Schmitt in the previous chapter, Arendt wrote in the wake of European imperialism 
and totalitarian societies. However, if Schmitt wrote in support of the Nazi state, Arendt was 
writing from the underside of Nazi policies in support of revolutionary movements against 
sovereignty. Arendt’s discourse on sovereignty emerges from an actual context of statelessness, 
i.e. existence without political protection, representation or power. With Hitler’s rise to power in 
1933, Arendt was forced to flee her German homeland, first to Paris and then in 1941 to New 
York. Meanwhile back in Germany, the state had transitioned from a democratic republic to a 
fascist regime. Arendt identifies this new form of government as totalitarianism, which meant, 
for her, that the populations of these countries were governed by a sovereign (fascist or 
communist) ideology rather than by the appropriate political authority (e.g. the people). Agaisnt 
the rule of law in democratic regimes, these ideologies posit their own “laws of nature” as guides 
for government. Totalitarian government thus erodes the liberal state and extinguishes 
constitutional freedoms, throwing populations into literal situations of statelessness. Arendt’s life 
was given to research into alternative forms of political authority, ones more conducive to 
revolutionary democratic politics than a totalized dictatorial regime.    
Context 
 
With the passing of the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, Jews were stripped of basic rights and 
Europe witnessed for the first time the emergence of what Arendt calls “stateless people,” whose 
primary feature is that they have no government to represent them. As early as April 7, 1933, the 
first piece of anti-Semitic legislation had been passed in the “Law for the Restoration of the Civil 
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Service,” which banned Jews and other non-Aryans from participating in the German civil 
service.
451
 Additional laws banned Jewish students form public schools and Jewish lawyers and 
medical professionals as well. By 1935, German officials had conditioned the atmosphere such 
that anti-Semitic laws were already part of the culture. The infamous Nuremberg Laws of 1935 
consisted of essentially two laws. The first, the Reich Citizenship Law, endowed the Reich with 
exclusive prerogative in matters of citizenship. Citizens of the Reich had to be of German blood 
and only Reich citizens were granted full political rights.
452
 The second law, the Law for the 
Protection of German Blood and Honor, forbid marriage and/or sex between Jews and those with 
“German-related blood.” This first law aimed to exclude Jews from political life, but the second 
marginalize Jews socially and existentially.  
The modern conditions of imperialism and the Pan-Movements in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries had undermined the stability of Europe’s nation-state system from the 
outside, and now as the post WWI German state experienced internal disintegration, the rule of 
law began to fracture. Following this breakdown of the rule of law, the most pressing political 
issue became the permanent status of minority populations, and the state transformed from an 
instrument guided by law to one driven by the interests of the nation. Minority treatises 
throughout Europe “said in plain language what until then had been only implied…namely, that 
only nationals could be citizens, only people of the same national origin could enjoy the full 
protection of legal institutions, that persons of different nationality needed some law of exception 
until or unless they were completely assimilated and divorced from their origin.”453 Thus, Jews 
had to live either under the law of exception or in conditions of absolute lawlessness. Now the 
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primary points of conflict were not between nationalities, but between nations and these new 
stateless people, and talk of “human rights” in this context was little more than groundless 
idealism. As Arendt notes, forced migration was not new in the history of peoples but the 
impossibility of finding a new land was (save for the African American experience, which 
Arendt fails to acknowledge). The stateless are not simply landless. They are also rightless. That 
is, they have lost both their homes and the ability to create a new one.                   
Stateless people have been deprived of the power of political representation and the 
possibility of asylum. This means that that they now had no right to freedom of thought and to 
politically significant opinion or action. Even savages were granted natural rights by the early 
modern political theorists, but the stateless, viewed as ‘innocent’ in the sense of a complete lack 
of responsibility, are disallowed all common human responsibility. At the moment when most 
needed, it the nation-state was incapable of providing a law for those who lost protection of 
government. The state placed the matter entirely in the hands of the police, which no longer 
enforced the law but functioned as a ruling authority independent of government and ministries. 
Germany had become a police state. This manifested itself in the form of the Nuremberg Laws, 
which distinguished between (full) Reich and (second-class) national citizens”: “A citizen of the 
Reich is that subject only who is of German or kindred blood and who, through his conduct, 
shows that he is both desirous and fit to serve the German people and Reich faithfully.” (Art 2, 
Sec. 1)  Stateless people were now facing a police-organized foreign policy independent of law 
and government officials. Once equality before the law broke down, the rule of law was replaced 
by the “arbitrary” rule of the police. For Hitler, the solution to the Jewish problem was more 
authoritarian forms of government, and, as Arendt notes, internment camps are the only 
substitute for a non-existent homeland. Secret police, curfews, segregation, targeted 
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unemployment, forced dispossession and forced migration – either abroad or through the ghettos 
and work camps to concentrations camps – characterized the lives of the stateless. Such practices 
only escalated with the outbreak of WWII, and especially from 1941 and 1944 as Germany’s 
totalitarian government expanded. Nazi authorities deported millions to ghettos and to killing 
centers, so that Europe’s (or Germany’s) Jewish population exceeded nine million before the 
war, nearly 2/3
rd
  of them had been murdered at the end of the Third Reich in 1945. Other 
victims included some 200,000 gypsies and at least 200,000 mentally or physically disabled 
persons. The latter, housed in state institutions, were murdered in the so-called Euthanasia 
Program.    
The State of Nature and the Body 
For Arendt, the emergence of stateless people in the European context was not a natural 
process, but the product of an entirely new form of government: totalitarianism. Arendt scholar 
Margaret Canovan notes the difficulty of defining totalitariansm. I quote her at length: 
There are almost as many senses of “totalitarianism” as there are writers on the subject, 
but a few broad similarities have tended to hide a fundamental difference between Arendt 
and most other theorists…[T]hese apparent similarities conceal more than they reveal, 
and much confusion has arisen from failure to realize that there is not just one 
“totalitarian model”…The better-known model depicts a totally coherent socio-political 
system: a state built in the image of an ideology, presided over by a single party 
legitimized by the ideology, employing unlimited powers of coercion and indoctrination 
to prevent any deviation from orthodoxy…[H]ers is quite different from this dominant 
model…Metaphorically, one might say that if the dominant picture suggests the rigidity, 
uniformity, transparency, and immobility of a frozen lake, Arendt’s theory evokes a 
mountain torrent sweeping away everything in its path, of a hurricane leveling everything 
recognizably human…Arendt’s sense means a chaotic, nonutilitarian, manically dynamic 
movement of destruction that assails all the features of human nature and the human 
world that make politics possible.
454
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Given Canovan’s understanding of totalitarianism, Arendt describes certain features of 
totalitarian government rather than provide a simple definition. Although totalitarianism cannot 
be reduced to “a state in the image of an ideology”, Arendt does acknowledge its ideological 
aspects. In “Ideology and Terror” (1953), she describes ideology as “the logic of an idea” 
applied to the “course of events,” i.e. to history.455 With ideology, the logic of an idea explains 
past, present and attempts to calculate the unfolding course of historical events according to the 
motion inherent in a particular idea (e.g. race). “The movement of history and the logical process 
of this notion are supposed to correspond to each other, so that whatever happens, happens 
according to the logic of one ‘idea.’”456 Once this idea is correlated with the course of historical 
events, it then becomes the authoritative principle for the operations of state. Arendt argued that 
totalitarian government erodes the republican body politic and produces one founded on the 
“natural laws” of a particular ideology. She draws on the thinking of Charles Darwin and Karl 
Marx as examples of ideology:  
If one considers…the basic philosophies of both men, it turns out that ultimately the 
movement of history and the movement of nature are one and the same…[Darwin’s] ‘natural 
law’ of the survival of the fittest is just as much a historical law…as Marx’s law of the 
survival of the most progressive class. Marx’s class struggle, on the other hand, as the driving 
force of history is only the outward expression of the development of productive forces [and] 
the ‘labor-power’ of men…In these ideologies, the term ‘law’ itself changed its meaning: 
from expressing the framework of stability within which human actions and motions can take 
place, it became the expression of the motion itself.
457
 
 
For Arendt, each ideology posits that the course of natural or historical events is guided by an 
overarching, sovereign law: the natural law of the fittest race for Darwin and class for Marx. 
While politically neutral, Darwinism especially “offered two important concepts: the struggle for 
existence with optimistic assertion of the necessary and automatic ‘survival of the fittest,’ and 
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the indefinite possibilities which seemed to lie in the evolution of man out of animal life and 
which started the new ‘science’ of eugenics.”458  
 For Arendt, totalitarian rule occurs when the principle of action for government shifts 
from constitutional law to an ideology’s sovereign law. This sovereign law does not take form as 
statutes, but in a particular (biological) group that is said to be the physical incarnation of this 
law. As representatives of the sovereign laws of nature or history, this group holds claims to the 
rights of sovereignty, and in the name of ‘development’ toward an inevitable telos, they justify 
illegal acts and even terror. The job of a totalitarian regime is thus to ‘speed up’ these ‘natural’ 
laws. It seeks to play out their internal logic, translating the “law of movement” into reality as a 
principle of empirical history, politics, policy and individual existence. “Far from being 
‘lawless,’” Arendt says, “[totalitarian rule] goes to the sources of authority from which positive 
laws receive their ultimate legitimation…superhuman forces…what it assumes to be the law of 
History or the law of Nature.”459 The implications of ideology in government are profound: 
“Totalitarian government…has exploded the very alternative on which all definitions of the 
essence of governments have been based in political philosophy…the alternative between lawful 
and lawless government, between arbitrary and legitimate power.”460  
Arendt notes other unique features of totalitarian regimes. First, they are based on the human 
experience of loneliness, “on the experience of not belonging to the world at all.”461 Totalitarian 
governments use various strategies to create experiences of loneliness (via isolation), fear 
(propaganda, terror), instability (forced movement), and purposelessness (concentration camps). 
These experiences render populations ready subjects for totalitarian ideology. A second feature is 
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that totalitarian governments are marked by “the co-existence of an ostensible and a real 
government”.462 “[A]ll serious students of the [totalitarian state] agree at least on the co-
existence (or the conflict) of a dual authority, the party and the state.”463 “It has also been 
frequently observed,” Arendt says, “that the relationship between the two sources of authority, 
between state and party, is one of ostensible and real authority, so that the government machine 
is usually pictured as the powerless façade which hides and protects the real power of the 
party.”464 Arendt notes that both the Soviet and Nazi totalitarian regimes possessed this dual 
structure, and that the state was reduced to the machinations of party ideology. Arendt observes 
other features: “totalitarian government always transformed classes into masses, supplanted the 
party system, not by one-party dictatorships, but by a mass movement, shifted the center of 
power from the army to the police, and established a foreign policy openly directed toward world 
domination.”465  
While Arendt criticized totalitarian formations of Marxian and Darwinian ideologies, she 
argues that the most vicious ideology is nationalism, birthed in the French Revolution.
466
 She 
defined nationalism as the idea that grants “full civil and political rights only to those who 
belonged to the national community by right of origin and fact of birth.”467 Nationalism is not 
only based on an outdated view of political reality, i.e. sovereign national states. Arendt also sees 
it as a pathology of citizenship. “The nation,” she says, “…conceived of its law as an outgrowth 
of a unique national substance which was not valid beyond its own people and the boundaries of 
its own territory.”468 It subordinates the state to the nation, takes on an expansionary notion of 
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nationhood beyond the boundaries of the state, interferes with law and ultimately subverts the 
nation-state itself. Arendt however pauses to laud some aspects of the fusion of nationality and 
the state during the French Revolution. To the extent that it was grounded in the experiences and 
products of a firmly rooted and emancipated peasant class, and was about the public good rather 
than one’s private personality, French nationalism was nationalism par excellence.469 Even at its 
best, however, the nation-state idea is problematic and in the French Revolution the state was 
conquered by the nation, which meant that the state was no longer defined by the rule of law and 
the Rights of Man, but by national supremacy to the exclusion of non-nationals. In the end, the 
nation-state consisted of popular representation and national sovereignty.
470
  
According to Arendt, it was ultimately the case that “the nation-state both contributed to, and 
was the helpless victim of, much more dangerous and predatory ideologies that simply trampled 
over the mere state.”471 For her, the nation and the state are intrinsically opposed to one another, 
so that bringing them together destroys the state as a moral-juridical shelter for its citizens. As 
Ronald Beiner notes, even after a Jewish state was established in 1947, Arendt believed that 
Zionism (Jewish nationalism) was not the answer, as it too easily capitulated to imperialist 
politics and was ultimately “an elite contrivance that passed over ‘the genuine national 
revolutionary movement which sprang from the Jewish masses.’”472 Instead, she advocated for a 
federated structure based on local Jewish-Arab relations, showing herself a strong advocate for 
(pro)-Jewish politics even as she criticized Jewish nationalism and the nation-state system of 
organization. Consider below: 
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The alternative proposition of a federated state, also recently endorsed by Dr. Magnes, is 
much more realistic; despite the fact that it establishes a common government for two 
different peoples, it avoids the troublesome majority-minority constellation, which is 
insoluble be definition. A federated structure, moreover, would have to rest on Jewish-Arab 
community councils, which would mean that the Jewish-Arab conflct would be resolved on 
the lowest and most promising level of proximity and neighborliness. A federate state, 
finally, could be the natural stepping-stone for any later, federated structure in the Near East 
and the Mediterranean area.
473
  
  
Arendt was moreover critical of the tribal nationalism that emerged in the mid-late nineteenth 
century in the wake of Pan-German and Pan-Slav movements. For her, “Nazism and Bolshevism 
owe more to Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism (respectively) than to any other ideology of 
political movement.”474 The Pan-movements had a contempt for the nation-state. While the 
movements were vague about their goals and changed political views on a day to day basis, they 
were successful to the extent that they “generated an all-embracing mood of total predominance, 
of touching and embracing all human issues, of ‘pan-humanism’…”475 and appealed to an 
“‘enlarged tribal consciousness’ which was supposed to unite all people of similar folk origin, 
independent of history and no matter where they happened to live.”476 Arendt distinguishes this 
tribal nationalism from “chauvinistic” nationalism when she explains that “the chief difference 
between even the most violent chauvinism and this tribal nationalism is that the one is 
extroverted, concerned with the visible spiritual and material achievements of the nation, 
whereas the other, even in its mildest forms…is introverted and concentrates on the individual’s 
own soul which is considered the embodiment of general national qualities.”477 Tribal 
nationalism also insists that one is constantly surrounded by one’s own enemies. For Arendt, 
tribal nationalism, wherein the nation exists within one’s soul, can only grow out of an 
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experience of rootlessness. Her primary concern was that this sort of nationalism provided a 
breeding ground for political movements whose aims run contrary to the aims of the state, which 
is to protect the “Rights of Man” established in the French Revolution.  
In The Human Condition (1958), Arendt’s view of the body is articulated in her 
understanding of the vita activa. She explains, “With the term vita activa, I propose to designate 
three fundamental human activities: labor, work, and action. They are fundamental because each 
corresponds to one of the basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man.
478
  
The notion of vita activa signifies the three types of human activity. Arendt distinguishes the 
nature of each activity: Labor refers to bodily experiences of toil and trouble done of necessity to 
keep the (human) organism alive; it corresponds to the biological processes of the body.
479
 If 
labor corresponds to the natural needs of the human being, work or fabrication “corresponds to 
the unnaturalness of human existence…Work provides an ‘artificial’ world of things, distinctly 
different from all natural surroundings…work is worldliness.”480 Action (which Arendt later 
combines with ‘speech’) is distinct from labor and work in that it is the “only activity that goes 
on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter [and] corresponds to the 
human condition of plurality.”481 Action by its very nature requires plurality, i.e. recognition 
“that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.”482 Through action human identity is 
disclosed, relationships are formed, the singular capacity to start something new is realized. It 
reminds us that although we must die, we are “not born in order to die but in order to begin 
something new.”483 Arendt explains that action is also “the condition…of all political life.”484 
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Only action can establish a political body, i.e. create “the condition for remembrance, that is, 
history.”485  
Finally, totalitarian regimes also destroy the body politic. Terror, Arendt argues, does not 
only produce physical destruction, but as we have seen, also erodes human individuality as 
disclosed through spontaneous thought, speech and/or action. This in turn erodes a) the human 
capacity for collective remembrance and b) the body politic, which is for Arendt the only space 
where truly human freedom can be achieved. Ideology complements this terror by eliminating 
the capacity for individual thought and experience beyond its logic. Individual experience and 
action is insignificant in light of what must happen according to an ideology. With the political 
rule of ideology, the government may dispense with the concern for (democratic) human will to 
action, as all people can now only be either executioners or victims of the inherent law of history 
or nature. The most disturbing manifestation of this aspect of totalitarian regimes was the 
concentration camp. The camp creates a space of extreme isolation and purposelessness. The 
status of the inmates to those in the world of the living was such that it was “as though they had  
never been born.”486 From the point of view of normal society, they are superfluous, for 
extermination only happens to human beings already dead. Thus political theorist Margaret 
Canovan describes totalitarianism as a “monumental torrent sweeping away everything in its 
path, or a hurricane leveling everything recognizably human…[it is] a chaotic, nonutilitarian, 
manically dynamic movement of destruction that assails all the features of human nature and the 
human world that make politics possible.”487 
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In looking for commonalities between two early twentieth century totalitarian regimes (Nazi 
Germany, Soviet Russia), Arendt concludes that totalitarian regimes combine tactics of terror 
with an ideology that portrays such acts as a necessary part of history, even though these 
histories may be largely skewed and inaccurate and terrorist tactics destructive of large 
populations of human life. Arendt claimed that the masses were susceptible to such destructive 
political regimes because of their own feelings of superfluousness in the world – the masses were 
plagued with feelings of homelessness, ‘uprootedness’, and instability in the world. In this 
position, the masses were ready to believe the ideologies of the mob, which purported to give 
insight into the past, the present, and the future; indeed, into one own purpose and destiny.     
 Arendt considered the presence of totalitarianism an indication that the modern political 
order of nation-states and “the Rights of Man” had broken down. Totalitarianism signaled a loss 
of proper authority, an aberration of the State and the destruction of the political order intended 
to provide stable spaces of free action for people. For her, the conditions for totalitarianism are 
created by imperialism, i.e. eternal unlimited expansion. “For Arendt,” Canovan asserts, “both 
preconditions and precedents [of totalitarianism] were to be found in the economic, military, and 
political upheaval known as ‘imperialism’ which had in the late nineteenth century seen 
European conquest of great tracts of the world in the wake of capitalist expansion, and which had 
also disrupted European states, economies, and societies.”488 This disruption caused people to 
feel uprooted and anxious, and it was at this moment that fear and ideology, persuasively voiced 
by a political figure, began to pervade populations.  
Arendt recounts this narrative in Imperialism (1968). Imperialism, the mindset of unlimited 
eternal expansion, grew out of European colonialism and that the nation-state system was 
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incongruent with colonialism’s economic and industrial developments.489 “Expansion as a 
permanent and supreme aim of politics is the central political idea of imperialism,” she says. 
“Since it implies neither temporary looting nor the more lasting assimilation of conquest, it is an 
entirely new concept in the long history of political thought and action. The reason for this 
surprising originality…is simply that this concept is not really political at all, but has its origin in 
the realm of business speculation…”490 According to Arendt, imperialism was born when 
capitalists imposed the law of constant expansion on governments. The modern state is plagued 
with two demons, ideology (of nationalism) and imperialist expansionism. These two demons are 
not only deadly to the state, but also are fundamentally in conflict with one another. Arendt 
explains: 
The inner contradiction”, “between the nation’s body politic and conquest as a political 
device has been obvious since the failure of the Napoleonic dream…The French, in 
contrast to the British and all other nations in Europe, actually tried in recent time to 
combine ius with imperium and to build an empire in the old Roman sense. They alone at 
least attempted to develop the body politic of the nation into an imperial political 
structure, believed that ‘the French nation (was) marching…to spread the benefits of 
French civilization…The result of this daring enterprise was a particularly brutal 
exploitation of overseas possessions for the sake of the nation.
491
  
 
Arendt elaborates on imperialist tactics noting that “[t]wo new devices for [imperialist] 
political organization and rule over foreign peoples were discovered…One was race as the 
principle of the body politic, and the other bureaucracy as a principle of foreign domination.”492 
For Arendt, race and bureaucracy are the primary strategies of imperialist politics. “The fact” she 
says “[is] that racism is the main ideological weapon of imperialistic politics…”493 Race unity 
often functions as a substitute for political emancipation. Alongside race is bureaucracy, which 
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inherently replaces political participation with administration and replaces laws with temporary 
and changing decrees.
494
 Ultimately, Arendt saw that the state was losing the battle against 
imperialism and its attendant ideologies, and that totalitarian governments were now a perennial 
threat to the modern state and the Rights of Man. Thus Arendt’s constructive thought aimed to 
produce a new political order.  
On the Political Body 
Arendt’s search for the structures of a new political body was targeted at establishing a 
pluralistic participatory democratic culture. This new political body would thus institute the 
conditions of possibility human freedom. She began this project by identifying the root problem, 
namely, Hobbes’s philosophy. According to Arendt, totalitarian movements came into power as 
a result of alliances between mobs and cultural elites who agreed on the (Hobbesian) principle of 
power politics. “Power, according to Hobbes is the accumulated control that permits the 
individual to fix prices and regulate supply and demand in such a way that they contribute to his 
own advantage.”495 For Hobbes, “the Commonwealth is based on the delegation of power, and 
not of rights...Security is provided by the law, which is a direct emanation from the power 
monopoly of the state.”496 The body politic is not only founded on power, but must also sustain 
itself by these means. “Only by acquiring more power, “says Arendt “can [the community] 
guarantee the status quo; only by constantly extending to authority and only through the process 
of power accumulation can it remain stable.”497 Arendt argues that Hobbes philosophy of power 
gained traction as ‘capitalists allied with the mob to embark on projects of eternal unlimited 
expansion (i.e. imperialism) for the sake of economic interests. The state thus became and 
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instrument for “never-ending accumulation of power necessary for the protection of a never-
ending accumulation of capital”498   
This view of politics, as fundamentally rooted in power rather than law or reason, finally 
settled into political culture with the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie. Such a view, 
according to Arendt, cannot help but decimate the political body. “The concept of unlimited 
expansion that alone can fulfill the hope for unlimited accumulation of capital, and brings about 
the aimless accumulation of power, makes the foundation of new political bodies-which up to the 
era of imperialism had been the upshot of conquest-well-nigh impossible. In fact, its logical 
consequence is the destruction of all living communities, those of the conquered peoples as well 
as of the people at home.”499  
According to Arendt, Hobbes’s claim that power and self-interest lie at the foundation of a 
body politic also bequeathed to modern political thought the prerequisite for ideology. Arendt 
explains that Hobbes’s view of the body politic has implications for foreign politics:  
The philosophy of Hobbes, it is true, contains nothing of modern race doctrines, which not 
only stir up the mob, but in their totalitarian form outline very clearly the forms of 
organization through which humanity could carry the endless process of capital and power 
accumulation through to its logical end in self-destruction. But Hobbes at least provided 
political thought with the prerequisite for all race doctrines, that is, the exclusion in principle 
of the idea of humanity which constitutes the sole regulating idea of international law. With 
the assumption that foreign politics is necessarily outside the human contract, engaged in the 
perpetual war of all against all, which is the law of the “state of nature,” Hobbes affords the 
best possible theoretical foundation for those naturalistic ideologies which hold nations to be 
tribes, separated from each other by nature, without any connection whatever, unconscious of 
the solidarity of mankind and having in common only the instinct for self-preservation which 
man shares with the animal world.
500
  
 
And later: 
 
If it should prove true that we are imprisoned within Hobbes’ endless process of power and 
accumulation, then the organization of the mob will inevitably take the form of the 
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transformation of nations into races, for there is, under the conditions of an accumulating 
society, no other unifying bond available between individuals who in the very process of 
power accumulation and expansion are losing all natural connections with their fellow-
men.
501
  
 
 For Arendt,  the endeavor to accumulate more and more wealth and power will 
necessarily bend societies toward racial ideologies, which in turn signifies the destruction of the 
traditional (i.e. pre-modern) Western political world. The idea of race signals closure on the idea 
of humanity. Arendt notes that race denies the equality and solidarity of all peoples guaranteed 
by humankind, even as it remains tied to various conceptions of national mission that seek to 
“uplift” “lower” races.502 Because race-thinking gives the appearance of national respectability 
and seems to have the sanction of tradition, we miss its “utter incompatibility with all Western 
political and moral standards of the past.”503 Countering this destructive force requires that one 
imagine and act in ways that transcend Hobbes’ naturalistic ontology. The problems of race-
thinking and power politics, then, drive Arendt’s constructive political thinking. 
Arendt’s constructive political thinking may thus be interpreted as an attempt to actualize the 
ideal of humanity in politics once again after the shoah. Even as she acknowledged the realities 
of the shoah, anti-Semitism, imperialism, and other social evils, Arendt remained hopeful for a 
human community that transcended the particularities of tribal and national loyalties. For her, 
this community is grounded in the uniquely human capacity for novelty. Novelty implies that 
“human initiatives set off processes that are hard to stop and that may threaten or undermine the 
stable human world.”504 This means that “the future is open” for humanity, not only to negative 
possibilities, but to more hopeful ones as well. Novelty implies the possibility transcendence 
beyond racial doctrines toward a non-warring human community, one which recognizes the 
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purposiveness of peoples beyond one’s particular political community. Humanity is thus 
Arendt’s objective regulating ideal in international law and in states that protect rights. Humanity 
also grounds such freedoms as the freedom of thought, opinion, action, the right to 
representation, and property rights.
505
 It was thus humanity that could move German history 
beyond the “factual territory” of cross cultural hostility between Germans and Jews. Against 
those like Carl Schmitt who hold humanity to be an unrealistic liberal utopian hope that only 
lives by denying ‘the political,’ Arendt advocates for humanity. “Unless both peoples decide to 
leave this factual territory,” she says “the individual Jew will no more be able to abandon his 
fanatical hatred than will the individual German be able to rid himself of the complicity imposed 
upon him by the Nazis.”506  
In constructing the political foundations for the possibility of humanity, Arendt looked to 
antique and modern politics (Rome, Athens, France, America) to reimagine political space. 
Arendt’s political framework is constituted by two major themes:  theatricality and an impartial 
narrative structure. These themes, which circulate throughout her writings, provide the 
conditions for both humanity and human freedom. In terms of theatricality, political theorist J. 
Peter Euben argues that Arendt turned to Greek culture for the ways in which politics was 
analogous to Hellenistic theatricality as opposed to Greece’s actual political practices.507 He 
argues that we should read Arendt through the lens of tragedians, who thought of themselves as 
political educators of democratic citizens.
508
 “The Greeks” Euben says, “invented the Olympian 
gods, ‘imposing a world of art between themselves and a world of suffering, casting a veil of 
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beauty over the abyss.’ The gods are a conscious self-deception…that allows the Greeks to look 
at and look away from the abyss.”509 Theater, with its gods of drama, has the ability to provide a 
space for human self-critical judgment. Euben explains that “the balance of proximity and 
distance from contemporary issues afforded by the theatrical experience provided a place and 
time for the Athenians to become spectators of themselves. Attaining a certain distance from the 
press of decisions and events provided an occasion for a reflectiveness impossible in other public 
settings.”510 Euben reminds us that theatricality is important because the polis is less a physical 
entity or specific historical configuration than an ever-present possibility.
511
 For her part, Arendt 
writes the following on the polis: it is “not the city-state in its physical location; it is the 
organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together…It is, we might say, a 
myth, or an invention like the Olympian gods.”512  
Political theorist Jacques Taminiaux argues that Arendt turned to Greco-Roman sources for a 
particular kind of narrative, namely an “impartial narrative” that treats both victor and 
vanquished with equal sympathy.
513
 This ‘impartial narrative’ is the second theme in Arendt’s 
thinking on the political body. Taminiaux points out that Greek history (i.e. Homer) was distinct 
in that it centered on “the judgment of those who act” whether victor or vanquished, as opposed 
to the modern “judgment of history,” which knows only victors.514 “Thus Greek history treats 
with equal sympathy the victors and vanquished. There is an ‘impartiality’ in these narratives, 
and this erases the (necessary) annihilation of one party.”515 Taminaiux notes how Arendt also 
looked to Rome. Although Greece practiced impartiality within the polis, they failed to do so 
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beyond its borders; here there was only “violence and the domination of the stronger [and] 
annihilation of the weaker.”516 “The Greek city-state” says Taminiaux, “acknowledged that there 
cannot be a common world without a plurality of perspectives. But the acknowledgement was 
not broad enough to include the perspective of enemies or…foreigners.”517 On the other hand, 
Arendt found that Romans “consciously ascribe their political existence to a defeat followed by a 
new foundation on a foreign ground. At the outset they thus were able to recognize the cause of 
the vanquished.”518  
Arendt thus looked to Greco-Roman sources for insights into theatricality and for certain 
narrative structures to help restore the European political communities. For Arendt, these two 
themes provide the political space for the possibility of actualizing the ideal of humanity. From 
the perspective of an African American Political Theology, Arendt’s theme of theatricality can 
be useful, first as a reminder that the political is an ever present imaginative possibility rather 
than a physical location, second because it allows one to take up questions about the meaning of 
suffering, and third , theatricality opens up a space for people to engage in self-critical judgment. 
However, Arendt’s “impartial narrative” is partially problematic from the perspective of an 
African American political theology. One positive aspect of such a narrative it that it provides a 
sense of peoplehood rooted in alliances rather than a history of war. In this way, political 
antagonisms resolved at a deeper level without reducing such antagonisms to simplistic 
disagreements. However, the extent that the narrative is impartial, it fails to acknowledge the 
particularity of African American experience. As womanist theologian M. Shawn Copeland 
notes, “suffering is universal, an inescapable fact of the human condition…”, and again, “there 
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can be no ranking of oppression or suffering…”519 Nevertheless, we must acknowledge the “’the 
maldistribution, negative quality, enormity, and transgenerational character’ of the suffering of 
black women” and black men. This is done not to romanticize African American culture, but 
with the hope that this particularizing of the African American narrative will enable us “to 
respond to the human condition in new and graced ways.”520 After beginning with this 
particularity, which may be discovered in the various slave narratives of black Americans, an 
African American political theology must find meaningful connections with the narratives of 
other oppressed and poor peoples.
521
   
On Sovereignty 
In Arendt’s view, sovereignty is to be resisted not only by the separation of powers and the 
rule of law, but also by citizens’ continued democratic participation in local townships and 
movements even after the state has been established. Arendt looked to America for a (distinct) 
source of authority for both government and law. The French Revolution was admirable for its 
revolutionary spirit, it’s strong ties to Roman and Machievellian absolutism gave Arendt reason 
to pause. Arendt wanted to rid political thinking of the notion that “the founding of republics 
must be done by one man”.522 According to her, the fault of the French revolution was that the 
authority for both government and law came from the same source (i.e. the people). Thus, the 
expression of the general will became law and revolution itself became the higher law. However, 
Arendt was convinced that violence was not necessary for political foundations. For her, the 
American Revolution (1765-1783) proved that the act of beginning carries within itself its own 
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principle and saves it from its inherent arbitrariness.
523
 Here, revolution did not break out via 
necessity, but by voluntary human action and was carried out in common deliberation and on the 
strength of mutual pledges. It is also the case that while Rome was founded on a treaty between 
two different and naturally hostile people, not even Rome was an absolutely new beginning, 
since it was founded on alliances and was a restoration and re-establishment.
524
  
America’s foundation was a “novus ordo saeclorum,” an absolutely new beginning, since its 
foundation did not have links back to occidental politics, but emerged out of the act of 
foundation itself.  According to Arendt, the authority of the act of foundation, preserved in the 
US Constitution, assures the stability of the American republic. The American foundation “arose 
not from a common ideology but from mutual promises and as such became the basis for 
‘associations’- the gathering together of people for a specified political purpose.”525 Arendt 
explains that the remembrance of this foundational event endows the American Republic with 
authority.  “[O]ne is tempted to conclude,” says Arendt,  
that the remembrance of the event itself – a people deliberately founding a new body 
politic – has continued to shroud the actual outcome of this act, the document itself, in an 
atmosphere of reverent awe which has shielded both event and document against the 
onslaught of time and changed circumstances. And one may be tempted even to predict 
that the authority of the republic will be safe and intact as long as the act itself, the 
beginning as such, is remembered whenever constitutional questions in the narrower 
sense of the word come into play. 
 
The very fact that the men of the American Revolution thought of themselves as 
‘founders’ indicates the extent to which they must have known that it would be the act of 
foundation itself, rather than an Immortal Legislator or self-evident truth or any other 
transcendent, transmundane source, which eventually would become the fountain of 
authority in the new body politic.
526
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For Arendt, then, the act of foundation brings with it the legitimating authority of the body 
politic. However, it is the remembrance of this foundational act that bestows a “halo” on the 
constitution and this maintains the authority of the republic over time. We might thus conclude 
that Arendt would argue that the efficacy of the Nazi Regime was due, in part to its capacity to 
have the people “forget” the Weimar Republic and “remember” their Aryan roots. Arendt might 
also argue that propaganda played a key role in the dissemination of this ideology. This aspect of 
Arendt’s thinking on the political body stands in sharp relief to Schmitt’s sovereign dictator, 
who, possess the absolute power not only suspend the current constitution, but to create a new 
order altogether, apart from any mutual promises to others.     
 Arendt was also careful to distinguish the source of positive law from the sources of the 
body politic. Here again, she looked to America, where Lockean natural law philosophy stands 
as the authority for law. Locke’s thinking is reflected in the Declaration of Independence, which 
acknowledges the self-evident truths that all persons are created equal and that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights. Arendt considers the source of American law in 
her On Revolution:  
for the Constitution itself, in its preamble as well as in its amendments which form the 
Bill of Rights, is singularly silent on this question of ultimate authority. The authority of 
self-evident truth may be less powerful than the authority of an ‘avenging God’, but it 
certainly still bears clear signs of divine origin; such truths are, as Jefferson wrote in his 
original draft of the Declaration of independence, ‘sacred and undeniable’. It was not just 
reason which Jefferson promoted to the rank of the higher law which would bestow 
validity on both the new law of the land and the old laws of morality; it was a divinely 
informed reason, the ‘light of reason’ as the age liked to call it, and its truths also 
enlightened the conscience of men so that they would be receptive to an inner voice 
which still was the voice of God, and would reply, I will, whenever the voice of 
conscience told them, Thou shalt, and more important, Thou shalt not.
527
    
While Arendt looked to Greco-Roman culture, then to constitute the political body, her search 
for an appropriate answer to the question of sovereignty led her to America. The United States 
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avoided the critical error of the French Revolution, namely, a single source of authority for both 
law and the body politic. For its political authority, it looked to the founders’ act of mutual 
promise while its legal sanction stems from the self-evident truths established by the Lockean 
view of nature and nature’s God.     
If Arendt was concerned to designate the appropriate democratic intellectual and political 
structures, she also recognized the need for sustained political action, or what she called 
“authentic politics.” According to political philosopher George Kateb, Arendt’s notion of 
authentic politics conceives of politics as fundamentally “theatrical”, i.e. about deliberation, 
dispute, speech, and action specifically directed at the preservation of the political body.
528
 
Arendt restricted the scope of authentic political speech and action to that concerned specifically 
with “the form of government that institutionalizes the spontaneous deliberation and discussion, 
i.e. constitutional questions, questions concerning the spirit of the laws or the interpretation of 
the laws or changes in the political ground rules.”529 Kateb notes that authentic politics thus 
excludes deliberation about social and economic issues. Authentic politics restores dignity and 
value not only to politics but also to life, since politics for its own sake resists the powerful force 
of instrumental rationality predicated on self-interest, redirecting focus to the common concern 
for the preservation of the political body. It also engenders from its very nature a moral view and 
thus curbs the will to power. Authentic politics requires commitment and discipline. It requires 
the virtues of courage (readiness to risk one’s life) and forgiveness as well as keeping 
promises.
530
 Finally, leaders of such politics must be inwardly transformed, deprivatized and 
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deindividualized.
531
 For Arendt, the shared space of public disclosure that is authentic politics 
creates the conditions of possibility for freedom.  If totalitarianism is a picture of the world 
without politics and meaning, authentic politics pictures a world in which the political is 
addressed in spaces of public speech, reflection and action rather than violence. While politics is 
all the more authentic when eruptive were the French and American revolutions, the polis 
regularizes political action.
532
   
 Arendt looked to several historical cases to theorize authentic politics, with townships or 
“little republics” standing as the singular institution to preserve the revolutionary spirit. Kateb 
notes that Arendt was inspired not only by the French and American revolutions, but also the 
European working class rebellions of 1848, and the American movements of civil disobedience 
in the 1960s.
533
 In all of these cases, the revolutionary “pathos of an entirely new beginning” 
mobilized people for liberty.
534
 Arendt points out that while revolutions may produce much-
needed constitutional rights or guarantees, these political rights should not be mistaken for the 
political freedom exercised before such revolutions. While a two party system may guarantee 
constitutional rights, it does not make the citizen a political participant, i.e. does not mean that 
one will necessarily exercise their political freedom. Here, Arendt criticizes the American 
republic, where authority was established appropriately where no space was established for 
exercising the very political freedom that brought the Republic into being. According to Arendt, 
the founders failed to account for the preservation of this revolutionary spirit after this spirit 
established the body politic: 
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Since, moreover, the people remained in undisturbed possession of those institutions 
which have been the breeding grounds of revolution, they could hardly become aware of 
the fateful failure of the Constitution to incorporate and duly constitute, found anew, the 
original sources of their power and public happiness. It was precisely because of the 
enormous weight of the constitution and of the experiences of founding a new body 
politic that the failure to incorporate the townships and town hall meetings, the original 
springs of all political activity in the country, amounted to a death sentence for them.
535
  
For Arendt, democratic republics only live if the revolutionary spirit is sustained after the 
political body and law is established. In turn, the preservation of the revolutionary spirit requires 
consistent political activity, and for Arendt party politics is not democratic political activity.
536
 
Citizens should consistently participate in local townships and town hall meetings. These serve 
as power generators for the democratically oriented political body. “The public realm has 
vanished;” she says, “there is no space either for seeing and being seen in action…or for 
discussion and decision…[today] political matters are those dictated by necessity to be decided 
by experts, but not open to opinions and genuine choice.”537 For her, participation in townships 
and town hall meetings give birth to democratic energy because they employ the council system, 
where local leaders come together to consult, deliberate or make decisions on public matters.
538
 
According to political theorist Albrecht Wellmer, Arendt’s veneration of the council system was 
based on the fact that it was discovered spontaneously by the people rising up in the French and 
American revolutions.
539
 These, rather than liberal (parliamentary) or Marxist (complete change 
from a liberal constitution to a socialist one) politics, would maintain a truly participatory 
democratic body. They would make the political body such that it was neither “neutralized” as 
Schmitt argued nor so revolutionary that they would move past the age of discussion, debate and 
toward a society grounded completely in the human capacity for work.    
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Arendt’s thinking on sovereignty, like her thinking on the political body, is ambiguous from 
the perspective of an African American political theology. On the one hand, Arendt’s conception 
of political authority circumscribes sovereignty and rejects conceptions of supreme political 
power as arbitrary will, violence, or sheer force. Likewise, her theory of law emerges from a 
combination of tradition and transcendent moral standards rather than pure power. Also 
venerable is Arendt’s conception of participatory democratic politics, which allows citizens to 
acknowledge the authority of the political in a way that it lays claim to them “on behalf of the 
whole” rather than laying “claim to him wholly.”540 On the other hand, to the extent that Arendt 
assumes that law is grounded in Lockean natural law thinking, her approach remains problematic 
for reasons articulated in chapter 2. Also, it seems that Arendt betrays an ideological 
commitment of her own when she argues that historical revolutionary movements excluded 
speech and action on social and economic issues. Thus Arendt’s concern to rescue the political 
and to preserve the dignity of politics sometimes blinds her to the ways in which revolutionary 
spirits and movements were also connected to other aspects of human life together. Furthermore, 
Arendt fails to note the ways in which American religious culture played an integral part in the 
cultivation and preservation of the revolutionary spirit during the course of the eighteenth 
century. An African American political theology will give more attention to the relationship 
between the revolutionary spirit and religious commitment.     
In the end, perhaps Arendt scholar Jerome Kohn’s phrase is most accurate when he says that 
Arendt turned to history “to awaken the dead…by revealing action” that would generate a new 
body politic.
541
 For Arendt, politics as action and speech in public about public affairs is a 
collective, nonviolent activity. She hoped that in revealing historical action, she would motivate 
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people to craft novel public spaces in contemporary times, spaces which allow for the possibility 
of free action and the self-disclosure.
542
 Arendt’s historical work also sought to disclose the 
reality of the surrounding world; a world of common being held together by common sense. 
“Human reality” says Kohn,  
is appearance, then, in the twofold, complementary sense of the appearances that form the 
common world of (free) action and of the presence to each other of the persons to whom that 
world is visible and audible, and who can judge it. Actions are the appearances that are most 
shining forth, and they are the original source of that reality.
543
  
 
The Greek polis, the Roman republic and the French and American revolutions all preserved the 
memory of political action. Arendt hoped that just as such action imbued politics and life with 
meaning then, it would also provide the conditions of the possibility for new beginnings in 
contemporary times. While Arendt did not believe that all people were born free, she did hold 
that all were born for freedom, and that such freedom could only be realized in through political 
action in the polis. Political philosopher Maurizio Passerin D’Entreves explains that 
totalitarianism had destroyed this space; “destroyed our accepted standards of judgment and our 
conventional categories of interpretation and assessment, be they moral or political. And in this 
situation the only recourse is to appeal to the imagination, which allows us to view things in 
proper perspective and to judge them without benefit of a pre-given rule or universal.”544 
Arendt’s conceptions of the political body and political action seek to restore the dignity of 
politics, preserve the revolutionary spirit, and renew the possibility of freedom for humanity.  
Conclusion 
As with Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt also wrote in the context of the collapse of the 
European comity of nations, where there was first a loss and then (a la Schmitt) a recovery and 
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an intensification of a totalizing conception of “the political.” Like Schmitt, Arendt was also 
concerned with the restoration of the political body, but was much more concerned to protect the 
cultural variation present in the German regime. Arendt felt that reconceiving the political was 
one key aspect of her goal. Again, political thinker Heinrich Meier argues that there are two 
ways to conceptualize the political. It “can be conceived as what is authoritative…as it is able to 
lay claim to the individual on behalf of the whole or because…it is able to lay claim to him 
wholly.”545 The political community claims it members either because it makes possible “the 
entire reality of their actions,” or because it “grasps the whole man because this state faces him 
with the most important decision, confronts him with the greatest evil, and compels him to make 
the most extreme identification.”546 While Schmitt chose the second, more destructive path, 
Arendt chose the first. For her, a pluralistic political body preserved thorough authentic politics 
has the capacity to mitigate the destructive aspects of the political, thus preventing its ascent to 
absolute sovereignty. In Arendt’s theory, authentic politics occurs when the people discuss, 
debate, and give opinions on matters concerning the constitution and other dimensions of 
political freedom, ideally on a consistent basis in town hall meetings. For Schmitt, the political 
cannot be mitigated but must become the definitive mark of the political body; thus he saw the 
friend/enemy distinction along racial lines as the most important aspect of his relationships with 
other people. Another effect of the failure of political will is that a dictator must step in, with full 
direct bureaucratic powers. The dictator symbolizes the suspension of the rule of law and the 
beginning of sovereignty, whose key power is deciding on and in legally exceptional cases. No 
doubt, these decisions are made according to the friend/enemy distinction.    
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Neither Arendt nor Schmitt’s conceptions of the political body can be separated from 
their interpretations of Hobbes’s doctrine of the state of nature. For Schmitt, Hobbes was correct 
to acknowledge the state of nature as a state of war, but failed to internalize this logic into the 
state as essential to the art of government. Schmitt argues that the state of war, i.e. for him the 
political, is the fundamental collective relation that organizes all other forms of interaction, e.g. 
economic, social, moral, etc. For Arendt, Hobbes’s state of nature myth reflects the dominance 
of a particular cultural ethos, namely one dominated by power and self-interest. Successful 
refutation of the myth-become-reality requires a different myth, a theater in which political 
action takes place, i.e. a new political body, and pluralistic democratic politics.   
With respect to theology, Schmitt easily offers the more exhaustive account of 
relationship of theology to politics. For him, theology may play a distinctive role in determining 
the nature and content of the political as well as the formations of state. Arendt, on the other 
hand, understands modern society as thoroughly secularized and gives little attention to theology. 
Yet she offers several key points to which an African American theology must attend. These 
include a theory of freedom as situated within a discourse of revolution as opposed to war, an 
“allied”, multicultural rather than monolithic and uniform vision of the political body, a nuanced 
theory of law, a conception of participatory politics, and an account of the revolutionary spirit. 
Each of these features of Arendt’s theory is critical when practicing democratic politics. As we 
turn to the concluding chapter, we find that Schmitt and Arendt’s political concerns have not left 
us, but are very much alive in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, today we are confronted 
with political dynamics similar to those in the early twentieth century German context. Italian 
political theorist Giorgio Agamben (1942) refers to these dynamics and this particular formation 
of state as the “state of exception.”  
 188 
Chapter 7 
Giorgio Agamben: The State of Exception, the Paradigm of Sovereignty, and the Search 
for a New Paradigm 
 
This chapter takes up discourse on sovereignty in the thought of late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century Italian political theorist Giorgio Agamben (1942-). After an account of his 
context, I take up the three themes that are by now familiar: the state of nature and the body, the 
political body and sovereignty. Unlike previous thinkers in this dissertation, Agamben does not 
inquire into sovereignty as a form of government, but as what he calls the “paradigm of 
sovereignty”, i.e. as a technique of governance. Thus, he observes how a particular constellation 
within the themes of the state of nature and the body operates to the effect that law and violence 
are blurred to the point of indistinction in political practice. Paradigms play a constitutive role 
with respect to populations even before the constitution of the political body. For Agamben, 
then, the problem of sovereignty is displaced, or made secondary, to the problem of paradigms, 
and more specifically, the paradigm of sovereignty. These paradigms are instrumental in the 
tendency of the liberal state to take exception to its established laws. In the “state of exception,” 
the state exercises the sovereign power of life and death on (bare) lives that have been abandoned 
by the law and which can now be killed with impunity. The “state of exception”, frequently 
called the ‘state of emergency,’ is Agamben’s way of highlighting that a state suspends its 
constitution and takes exceptions to its laws to ban and detain certain groups when it is faced 
with an “emergency.” Agamben stands in the laudable tradition of sovereignty’s critics, 
including Locke, Kant and Arendt. Yet his notion of ‘paradigms of sovereignty’ turns a critical 
eye even on sovereignty’s critics. It shows how liberal states, even democratic ones, continue to 
exercise sovereign power on populations in the era of “universal” human rights. Agamben 
further explains that when the state of exception has become the norm, “the camp” emerges in its 
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various iterations (e.g. concentration camps, labor camps). Near the end of the chapter I take up 
the U.S. War on Drugs, neoliberal ideology and mass incarceration as a case study.      
Again, Agamben’s criticism is directed not so much at sovereignty (e.g. monarch, nation, 
or dictator) as what he calls “paradigms of sovereignty”. His use of the term ‘paradigm’ implies 
a certain way of understanding state of nature doctrines. In his view, most (Western) 
philosophers have incorrectly read state of nature doctrines as ontological schemes whose basic 
task is to logically reconcile the oppositional structures of “the universal and particular” or 
“identity and difference.” Agamben uses the terms “common and proper” to mark all such 
ontological games, and his strategy is to become indifferent the common/proper dialectic 
altogether. Instead, he reads the doctrines of nature as paradigms, that is, as guides on matters of 
controlling, organizing, and exercising power. Paradigms of sovereignty, readily represented in 
Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature doctrine, but long before him, in the writings of the Greek 
Sophists, have two marks: a) an opposition between law and nature and b) the anteriority of 
nature with respect to law.
547
 In political practice, paradigms of sovereignty unite law with 
violence to such an extent that the distinction between the two becomes blurred. In our post-
WWII context, such paradigms have attained hegemonic status, and this is important because 
they orient state actions in the state of exception. They are state’s frame of reference and its final 
measure of right action. Effective criticism of the state and its legalized means of violence may 
come through dismantling the paradigm of sovereignty. Such a criticism requires a new 
paradigm, one that understands state of nature doctrines as communicating the universal 
originarity of the human soul, one not completely determined by nature, as well as the ‘natural’ 
(i.e. pre-civil), nonviolent character of law. We begin with Agamben’s context.    
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Context 
Giorgio Agamben writes out of the context of late twentieth and early twenty-first 
century Italy. After the fall of Italian fascism (1944) and a brief period of government by multi-
party coalitions, a republican constitution was established at the end of 1947.
548
 Historian Nick 
Carter notes that this epochal shift was due in part to the role played by the PCI – the Italian 
communist party active until 1989 – in both resisting Mussolini and establishing the republic. 
Since its inception in 1948, the politics of the First Republic has been defined largely by the 
contest between the PCI – the second largest party, and the DC – the Christian Democrats – who 
have always been in government. “Every prime minister until 1981 was a Christian 
Democrat.”549 In 1989, the post-war political system collapsed, as the end of the Cold War 
diminished Italian communist resistance, and this in turn left a vacuum in Italian politics. In the 
early 1990s the flailing republic experienced financial crisis which resulted in “[r]ecession, rising 
unemployment, and Italy’s forced withdrawl from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM, September 1992)…membership of which was itself a condition of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU)…”550 Historian Francesco Bonini documents how Italy was 
simultaneously rocked by the  Tangentopoli affair, a nationwide system of corruption that 
involved roughly half of the Italian parliament and two-thirds of the public debt.
551
 In such a 
context, a cultural wave of neofascism is reconstructing the historical account of the republic.
552
 
“In place of the anti-Fascist Resistance myth,” says Carter, “a neopatriotic vulgata appears to be 
under construction, where the Resistance is the original sin rather than the original virtue of the 
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Republic and PCI [Italian communist party] its black heart, behind virtually all of Italy’s post-
war ills.”553 In the early twenty first century, Italian fascism is threatening rebirth.  
In terms of the current U.S. context, few scholars’ comments have been as memorable as 
those voiced by professor Cornel West. Renowned scholar in African American studies and 
American politics at Princeton University, West claims that “the ugly terrorist attacks on 
innocent civilians on 9/11 plunged the whole country into the blues. Never before have 
Americans of all classes, colors, regions, religions, genders, and sexual orientations felt unsafe, 
unprotected, subject to random violence, and hated.”554 West dubs this phenomenon 
“niggerization” to highlight the parallels between the current state of America at large and the 
historical state of African Americans under a violent white supremacist regime. African 
Americans’ first encounter with the New World was marked by fear; now all Americans are 
fearful in the new post-9/11 world of terror. Many African Americans are angry about the 
absurdity of their historical cultural experience. Today, it has spread to a diversity of Americans, 
angry about the unfair and arbitrary terrorist attacks. American lives have been tainted by fear 
and anger.  
At the political level, nihilism takes the form of power politics which assume that the best 
remedies for social problems are necessarily punitive and violent. As a result, government has 
been reduced to little more than a mechanism that perpetually accumulates power to extend its 
regime. Human rights, civil liberties, and concern for the wholistic well-being of citizens are 
now back seat concerns to self-interest. West argues that American politics is currently 
dominated by three “antidemocratic dogmas.”555 The first - free-market fundamentalism – posits 
the accumulation of individual wealth as fundamentally more important than public interest, 
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democratic principles, or religious convictions. The second dogma – aggressive militarism – 
posits that ‘might makes right’ and that military capacity, rather than giving any consideration to 
questions of the right to war (jus ad bellum) or the laws of war (jus in bello). The final dogma – 
escalating authoritarianism – displays America’s resonance with the Hobbesian solution to 
difference and conflict. American policy now overemphasizes security while ignoring concerns 
about liberty. These three inter-related dogmas circulate throughout the American body politic in 
such a way that intimidates and alienates an already nihilistic American citizenship. 
The State of Nature and the Body 
Agamben’s view on the state of nature is taken up under the philosophy of signatures. 
Drawing from Renaissance astrologers Paracelsus (1493-1541) and Jakob Bohme (1575-1624), 
Agamben explains that the philosophy of signatures implies a basic epistemic claim, namely that 
“all things bear a sign that manifests and reveals their invisible qualities. ‘Nothing is without a 
sign,” he says, quoting Paracelsus, “…since nature does not release anything in which it has not 
marked what is to be found within that thing.”556 Signatures mark things; they operate as “natural 
hieroglyphics” which make a sign intelligible or radically modify how one looks at a thing in 
question.
557
 Signatures situate a thing in a “complex network of relations of ‘authority,’” thus 
giving it a ‘place’ among other things in time and space.558 They disclose the character of things. 
For example, in astrology, signatures express “a relation of efficacious likeness between the 
constellation and those who are born under its sign, or more generally, between the macrocosm 
and the microcosm.”559 They mark and characterize signs so that a sign’s interpretation is 
predetermined. Another example emerges from certain European spaces, namely “the ‘small 
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yellow patch’ that the Jews wear on their jackets or coats: ‘What is this but a sign by which 
anybody who meets him may understand that he is a Jew?’ A similar sign,” he continues 
“…makes a private soldier or a bailiff (Scherg oder Buttel) recognizable. Just as couriers wear 
insignia on their garments that identify them as messengers – and also where they come from, 
who sent them, and how they should be treated – so does the soldier on the battlefield wear 
colored signs or bands making him recognizable by friends and enemies…”560 These and other 
signatures express “how one must comport oneself before Jews bailiffs, or couriers (as well as 
the behavior that is expected from them).”561   
Philosopher William Watkin explains that Agamben’s wants to avoid the key pitfall of 
the great majority of Western philosophers, which is to take up the philosophy of signatures 
within the ontological scheme of “the common” and “the proper”.562 “The common” and “the 
proper” refer to the logical set foundational to Western ontological thinking. The first term, “the 
common,” signifies a range of concepts including ‘identity,’ ‘the one,’ or ‘the universal.’ The 
second term, “the proper,” is constituted by its own range of concepts including ‘difference,’ ‘the 
many,’ and ‘the particular’. In Western ontology, the game has been to attempt to reconcile these 
logically opposed elements. Plato’s “doctrine of the Form/Idea” may serve as an example. 
Plato’s “common” aspect consists of the Forms such as “The One” and “The Good,” i.e. those 
objective, universal realities beyond the world of sense perception. Plato’s “proper” aspect is 
constituted by the many particular things of the sensory world, itself constituted by a multiplicity 
of (misleading) appearances.
563
 Another example is Aristotle’s ontological scheme of 
“substance” (the common) and “particulars” (the proper): philosopher Jonathan Barnes explains 
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that for Aristotle, ‘substance’ is “what is, [or] the cause of being…whatever is an ultimate 
subject, which is no longer said of anything else”, while particulars refers to the particular things 
of the world, whose most significant operation is to disclose the substances.
564
 Again, Aristotle 
theorizes the scheme of ‘genus’ (the common) and ‘species’ (the proper). These various modes 
of the common and the proper situate things according to identity and differentiating 
structures.
565
 According to Watkin, the consistent movement between common and proper is the 
“economy (oikonomia) of every conceptual-discursive formation in the West.”566 
Signatures have thus played a key role in common/proper dialectic, marking, ordering 
and making things intelligible. Agamben calls them “identity-difference-signatures”. He notes 
some signatures that have played a decisive role in the history of Western thought: “language, 
power, poetry, the sacred, the secular, glory and life.”567 When these are deployed in statements 
with respect to the ontological status of things, they participate in “signatory art” which endows 
things with “true names,” thus “speech acts of facticity” become such that “each name gives the 
true nature of being of [a thing].”568 Watkin points to Agamben’s book Homo Sacer (1998) as 
example. The text explores two signatures noted in the subtitle: power as sovereign power (the 
common) and life as bare life (the proper). (We will see the implications of this below) These 
and other signatures situate things according to identity and differentiating structures within the 
general logic of the common and the proper, thus ordering them in relationship to one another 
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within a general metaphysical picture. In this way, the “pure” existence of a thing is identified 
such that a thing becomes predisposed the interpretation of specific knowledges.
 569
   
 Watkin explains that for Agamben, the key problem of Western signatory thought, 
discourse and speech has been its entrapment within the common/proper dialectic and its 
unsolvable logical game. With respect to this dissertation’s question on the state of nature and 
the body, Agamben would criticize these themes as taken up under any of the various forms of 
the common/proper dialectic. To the extent that (Western) discourse on the state of nature and 
the body reflects this dialectic, it remains trapped within the back and forth endgame of 
identity/difference, general/particular, one/many and is thus doomed to situating things within 
inherently irreconcilable structures. Agamben overcomes the common/proper dialectic through 
indifference, which suspends (or becomes indifferent to) the dialectic and instead promotes 
singularity, or a thing’s relational state of belonging.570 In fine, Watkin argues that Agamben 
wants to emphasize a particular kind of singularity, namely inessential commonality over 
haecceity-singularity. While haecceity-singularity “names the particularity of the thing or what it 
shares with nothing else,” inessential commonality stresses what qualities a thing shares with 
other things.
571
 With respect to the philosophy of signatures, this means that things would be 
situated within structures that emphasize a thing’s singularity, or relational state of belonging 
instead of a thing’s identity or difference, generality or particularity, genus or species, unity or 
divergence, potentiality or act. Thus, as we will see, Agamben’s Homo Sacer will trace the 
relation between sovereign power and bare life.  
Agamben argues that the paradigm overcomes the pitfalls of the common/proper 
dialectic, which allows for the possibility of signatures which emphasize a thing’s singularity. 
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Drawing from philosophers Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), 
Agamben defines the paradigm as “…an example, a single case that by it repeatability acquires 
the capacity to model tacitly the behavior and research practices of scientists.”572 A paradigm is a 
term taken as “a singular case that in being isolated from its context [and] taken as 
exemplary…constitutes this isolation making intelligible a new set that it constitutes by revealing 
its own singularity.”573 In highlighting singularity, a paradigm thus “implies the total 
abandonment of the particular-general couple as the model of logical inference. The rule” 
Watkin explains, “is not a generality pre-existing singular cases and applicable to them, nor is it 
something resulting from the exhaustive enumeration of specific cases. Instead, it is the 
exhibition alone of the paradigmatic cases that constitute a rule.”574  
Watkin echoes Agamben when he says that analogical paradigms are processes “by 
which the standing for all cases (identity) and being one case amongst many (difference) is 
suspended in a state of indistinction, indiscernibility or indifference. “575 The paradigm thus 
rejects the Aristotelian genus/species division, and all other common/proper binaries for 
reticulation, a concept that Agamben borrows from philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy (1940-) to 
depict a situation “where a point stands in relation to all other points in every direction,” or 
where things stand in analogical relation to one another.
576
 The paradigm, then, allows for a re-
reading of signatures within an ontological scheme that is analogical rather than logical and 
which stresses singularity and resemblances rather than identities or differences. Finally, 
paradigms, or examples, are important because of their capacity to track power. They trace how 
power “organizes and controls, to the point that we can say that power is nothing other than this 
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mode of organizing control, or rather, that sovereign power is determined by, in a complex way, 
the modalities of government that it is presumed to found.”577  
With this understanding of paradigms, Agamben turns to writings on the state of nature to 
describe the features of certain paradigms, most notably the paradigm of sovereignty. (At the end 
of the chapter I give attention to an alternative paradigm). Agamben argues that “the hidden 
paradigm guiding every…definition of sovereignty…[is] the point of indistinction between 
violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into 
violence.”578 Sovereignty is “the principle that, joining law and violence, threatens them with 
indistinction.”579 The paradigm of sovereignty is represented by the ancient Greek philosophers 
known as the Sophists, including the Greek poets Hesiod (c. 750-650 BC) and Pindar (c. 522 – c. 
443 BC) and the Greek statesman Solon (c. 638-c. 558).
580
 The Sophists operate with two 
principles in their state of nature doctrines, both of which are key for the legitimation of 
paradigms of sovereignty. The first is an opposition between nature (physis) and order (nomos). 
The natural world and the (civil) order are set in oppositional terms, and thus the fact that society 
is ordered implies that nature is inherently chaotic and disordered. The second principle is the 
“anteriority of nature with respect to law.”581 This second principle is an outgrowth of the first. 
For Agamben, the opposition between nature and order, as well as the anteriority of nature to 
law, justifies the “coincidence of violence and law as constitutive of sovereignty.”582 Indeed, 
sovereignty is essentially the confusion of violence (Bia) and justice (Dike), the tying together of 
the two into a knot, so as to resolve the contradictions inherent in Sophist understandings of 
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nature and order.  “[T]his,” says Agamben, is the knot that [Pindar] bequeaths to Western 
political thought and that makes him, in a certain sense, the first great thinker of sovereignty.”583 
According to Agamben, the paradigm of sovereignty, seen in the example of the 
Sophists’ reading of the state of nature, has become hegemonic in the modern world. This has 
become so especially because of figures like Thomas Hobbes. “The Sophistic polemic,” he says, 
“against nomos in favor of nature…can be considered the necessary premise of the opposition 
between the state of nature and the ‘commonwealth’, which Hobbes posits as the ground of his 
conception of sovereignty.”584 This paradigm is also in Carl Schmitt’s thought, thus “it will not 
seem surprising that Schmitt grounds his theory of the originary character of the ‘nomos of the 
earth’ precisely on Pindar’s fragment…”585 As with previous theorists of sovereignty, moderns 
such as Hobbes and Schmitt understand the state of nature, the space prior to and thus 
authoritative over the state, the law, and (civic) justice, as fundamentally characterized by 
violence and disorder. For them, the nomos basileus is the “zone that is excluded from law and 
that takes the shape of a ‘free and juridically empty space,” circumscribing territorial orders 
within the framework of natural violence.
586
  
The State of Exception and the Biopolitical Body 
More specifically, the paradigm of sovereignty has become hegemonic in the operations 
of state and is the internal principle of modern statecraft in our own post-WWII context. As such, 
it is central to the formation of the biopolitical body through the management of populations. 
Paradigms represent, among other things, the exteriority of a state, and Agamben explains that 
“exteriority…is truly the innermost center of the political system, and the political system lives 
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off of it in the same way that the rule, according to Schmitt, lives off the exception.”587 In 
modern politics, conceptions of (geopolitical) exteriorities have become dominated by paradigms 
of sovereignty. As with previous thinkers of sovereignty, Agamben does not conceive of the state 
of nature as a primordial reality. It is an imaginary symbol, which represents the world beyond 
the borders of a particular political community. This representation serves a unique function with 
respect to state politics. The state of nature, and thus the paradigm, is the state’s fundamental 
internal principle, the one that predominates when the city’s preservation is at stake or its birth is 
at hand. Agamben explains:  
Hobbes, after all was perfectly aware, as Strauss has underscored, that the state of nature 
did not necessarily have to be conceived as a real epoch, but rather could be understood 
as  principle internal to the State revealed in the moment in which the State is considered 
‘as if it were dissolved’ (ut tanquam dissolute consideretur).588  
 
For Agamben, the doctrine of the state of nature is a political community’s representation of its 
self-understanding as well as its exterior surroundings. He sees it as fundamental to the 
constitution of the state and critical to its preservation. This doctrine indicates the true character 
of the state’s governmental logic and displaces the primacy of the social contract. As such, the 
state of nature is the “being-in-potentiality [l’essere-in-potenza] of the law” and the state. It is the 
law’s self-presupposition as “natural law” or natural condition.589 In modern politics, paradigms 
of sovereignty have overtaken discourse on the state of nature and the state’s exteriority, such 
that “the law of nature and the principle of the preservation of one’s of life – is truly the 
innermost center of the political system.”590 For Agamben, the Hobbesian principle has a 
powerful impact on the operations of state. “Far from being a prejuridical condition that is 
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indifferent to the law of the city,” he says, “the Hobbesian state of nature is the exception and the 
threshold that constitutes and dwells within it.”591 
On Agamben’s account, the doctrine of the state of nature provides theoretical support for 
the sovereign’s decision or declaration on the “state of exception,” a political arrangement which 
is technically only the precondition for the formation of a cohesive (bio)political body. The task 
of statecraft begins neither with rational agents in the natural condition, nor does it culminate in 
the formation of a constitutional regime. Just the opposite, statecraft begins with the institution of 
a juridical structure called the “state of exception” predicated on the Hobbesean myth of the state 
of nature. A “state of exception” (Ausnahmezustand) signifies a paradigm of government whose 
distinctive mark is the suspension of the law and the production of a “sovereign sphere” where 
state power is exercised beyond the bounds of both human and religious laws as if in a state of 
nature.
592
 Agamben explains, “The state of nature and the state of exception are nothing but two 
sides of a single topological process in which what was presupposed as external (the state of 
nature) now reappears…in the inside (as state of exception).”593 In the state of exception, nature 
and law, inside and outside, pass through one another. Philosopher Richard Ek notes the 
distinctiveness of Agamben’s thinking on the exception in relation to Carl Schmitt: “Schmitt’s 
understanding of the exception is related to a state of emergency in society that endangers the 
state…However, in Agamben’s exegesis, the notion of the exception moves away to a more 
original function…”594  
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For Agamben, the essential feature of the state of exception is the nullification of justice and 
various forms of a higher moral code. Thus in the state of exception, theories of justice take a 
second tier status as the state seeks to re-establish the conditions for the possibility of justice, i.e. 
as it fights for its preservation. Agamben uses the ancient Roman legal concept of iustitium, or 
“standstill” to get at this essential feature:   
Upon learning of a situation that endangered the Republic, the Senate would issue a 
senatus consultum ultimum [final decree of the senate] by which it called upon the 
conuls…and in some cases the praetor and the tribunes of the people, and even, in 
extreme cases, all citizens, to take whatever measures they considered necessary for the 
salvation of the state…At the base of this senatus consultum was a decree declaring a 
tumultus (that is, an emergency situation in Rome resulting from a foreign war, 
insurrection, or civil war), which usually led to the proclamation of iustitium.
595
   
 
In the state of exception, the state understands the current state of affairs such that its own 
preservation is at stake. It thus transitions from operating within constitutional and/or legal 
frameworks, i.e. according to the rule of law, to operating as if in a state of nature. The state of 
exception “is not a dictatorship…but a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal 
determinations- and thus above all the very distinction between public and private-are 
deactivated.”596 In the state of exception, the administering of justice is placed on standstill while 
the state takes actions, which it deems necessary to save and reconstitute itself. State powers take 
exception to established laws and produce a “juridical void.” “[E]ven though [the state of 
exception] is not a state of nature,” Agamben says,“[it] presents itself as the anomie that results 
from the suspension of law.”597 No longer restricted by law, the sovereign powers of the state 
pour out onto sovereign spheres in an effort to (re)establish the political community.  
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The state of exception, then, is a dispensation in which the constitution is suspended, “an 
emptiness and standstill of law,” and yet one where the force of law remains intact.598 While 
exceptions occur during the normal rule of law, the state of exception is distinguished in that 
there is a movement from “a particular case…released from obligation to serve the law”599 to the 
exception constituting “the ultimate ground and very source of law.”600 Thus the normal becomes 
indistinguishable from the exception, and the entire political situation becomes a “zone of 
indistinction” between nature and law, and given the paradigm of sovereignty, between violence 
and justice. For example, even as the law is suspended, the military’s wartime powers extend 
into the civil sphere, calling “into question the very consistency of the public space; yet, 
conversely, the consistency of the private space is also immediately neutralized to the same 
degree.”601 Also caught within this zone are human actions themselves. Within this dispensation, 
human action escapes legal comprehension. This is why events such as the shoah, although 
condemned, were legally unclassifiable and unpunishable. Those who act in this space neither 
execute, transgress, or create law, since the law itself has been neutralized. Through the state of 
exception, the sovereign “creates and guarantees the situation that the law needs for its own 
validity.”602 The state of exception enables Agamben to reconceive totalitarianism, diverging 
from Arendt’s understanding of totalitarianism as a state in the image of an ideology to define it 
as “the establishment, by means of a state of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the 
physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for 
some reason cannot be integrated into the political system.”603 
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Having established the state of exception, sovereignty now comes forth in the form of the 
ban, which institutes a zone of indistinction between citizens of the political community and 
foreigners, between the people of the city and wolf-men that lurk at its borders. The ban is 
carried out through various forms of biopolitics, a term Agamben derives from French 
philosopher Michel Foucault (below). Indeed, Agamben argues that “the production of a 
biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as 
old as the sovereign exception.”604 As conceived by Agamben, “[t]he ban is essentially the power 
of delivering something over to itself, which is to say, the power of maintaining itself in relation 
to something presupposed as nonrelational. What has been banned has been delivered over to its 
own separateness and, at the same time consigned to the mercy of the one [i.e. the state] who 
abandons it…”605 In other words, the ban nullifies a thing’s singularity and places it within 
identity and differentiating structures, which provide the conditions for the possibility of 
conceiving of a thing in a nonrelational sense.  
Agamben highlights the significance of the ban and its nonrelational ontology with respect to 
the law: “The relation of the exception is a relation of ban. He who has been banned is not, in 
fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, 
exposed and threatened on the threshold…”606 The ban, coincident with the state of exception, is 
made possible by letting the law withdraw from the exception and abandon it. Thus with the ban, 
which corresponds to the structure of the exception and reflects the logic of sovereignty, it 
becomes difficult if not impossible to “say whether the one who has been banned is outside or 
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inside the juridical order.”607 In this way, the ban also allows for the possibility to write the state 
of nature onto geographical and institutional spaces. Sovereignty, or the sovereign ban, “thus 
presents itself as an incorporation of the state of nature in society, or, if one prefers, as a state of 
indistinction between nature and culture, between violence and law, and this very indistinction 
constitutes specifically sovereign violence.”608  
Sovereign Power as Biopolitics, Ideology and the Camp 
 
Once a state of exception has been instituted and the ban has been established, various 
forms of the sovereign decision (re)constitute the political community. The state of exception is 
thus not born of necessity but produced. The sovereign decides what forms of life are worthy of 
living as well as those that do not deserve to live. Thus, the sovereign decision on life produces 
what Agamben interchangeably calls “bare life”, “naked life”, or “sacred life” (homo sacer). 
These phrases indicate speech about life which carries signatures that mark it as “life unworthy 
of being lived” or life that “may be killed and yet not sacrificed.”609 Life that is caught in the 
paradigm of sovereignty and banned in a state of exception is life that falls outside of the 
protection of the politico-theological establishment of a society. “Sovereign violence,” says 
Agamben, “is in truth founded not on a pact but on the exclusive inclusion of bare life in the 
state.”610 Although this decision, although operative in modern politics, is as old as Western 
politics, reaching back to Aristotle (384-322 BC). It is reflected in dichotomies such as the divide 
between life (zen) and good life (eu zen), between the simple fact of living (zoe) and the form or 
way of living proper to an individual or group (bios), or between voice and language. 
“…[W]estern politics,” says Agamben, “first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is 
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simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life…life presents itself as what is included by means of an 
exclusion[.]”611 These decisive acts of inclusive exclusion function as constitutive acts of the 
state, where the sovereign seeks to (re)establish the body politic.  
Agamben’s account of the operations of sovereign power in accord with the ban is informed 
by French philosopher Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) notion of ‘biopolitics.’ Biopolitics is the 
organization and discipline of individual identities and populations at large according to medical, 
psychological, economic, or other human scientific norms in an effort to rank, purify, strengthen, 
and maximize social forces. In The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), Foucault illustrates how, since the 
French Revolution (1789), there has been a shift not only in the locus of sovereignty from the 
monarch to the people, but also a shift in the nature of sovereign power, from ‘the power to take 
life’ to biopolitics. Foucault thus defines biopolitics as “the attempt, starting from the eighteenth 
century, to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic 
of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, 
race…”612 Foucault offers a description of this process in The History of Sexuality (1990). Here, 
Foucault argues that power, since the eighteenth century, has become organized less around the 
law and more over the anatomical (the human body) and biological (the species or population) 
aspects of life.
613
  This new formation of power, which he calls ‘bio-power,’ is concerned to 
discipline and regulate human life as such, and does so by disciplining individuals and 
populations in line with human scientific norms such as criminality, (ab)normality, race, 
sexuality, sex, delinquency, and other pathologies. Foucault uses the norm of “sex” as an 
example to explain the significance of all human scientific norms. Sex is not an “autonomous 
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agency which secondarily produces manifold effects…over the entire length of its surface of 
contact with power. On the contrary, sex is the most speculative, most ideal, and most internal 
element in a deployment of sexuality organized by power in its grip on bodies and their 
materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and pleasures.”614 Such is the process of 
biopolitics. 
For Foucault, biopolitics is problematic in so far as it compromises individuality. Biopolitical 
norms are not merely interpretations of the body, but also descriptions and prescriptions for the 
soul. As such, these norms make persons intelligible to themselves and to others and give people 
a fundamental sense of identity as a particular sexuality, race, class, etc. For Foucault, such 
norms implant in individuals and populations the “mirage” of a true identity, the illusion of an 
essential self. They justify force-fitting human beings into human scientific artificial molds. 
Again, Foucault uses the example of sex to illustrate his point about the disciplinary erosion of 
individuality according to biopolitical norms. “The Faustian pact,” he says, “whose temptation 
has been instilled in us by the deployment of sexuality, is now as follows: to exchange life in in 
its entirety for sex itself, for the truth and the sovereignty of sex. Sex is worth dying for.”615 To 
the extent that we embrace and internalize biopolitical norms such as sexuality, we are “fastened 
to the deployment of sexuality that has lifted up from deep within us a sort of mirage in which 
we think we see ourselves reflected – the dark shimmer of sex.”616 In truth, these norms, which 
proclaim to reveal the underlying secret of all that we are, actually have no intrinsic laws or 
properties of their own. They are inventions of the human sciences, political technologies 
designed to subjugate and normalize individuals.  
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In addition to compromising individuality, biopolitics also has more direct political 
implications: it compromises the rule of law as well as the integrity of the modern “private” 
realm and also legitimates state-sponsored colonization. After biopolitical norms have been 
“scientifically” legitimated by experts, they are then distributed among populations via various 
social institutions such as families, schools, hospitals, religious institutions, the police or the 
army. Indeed, Foucault notes that “all the sciences, analyses, or practices employing the root 
‘psycho-’ have their origin in this historical reversal of the procedures of individualization.”617 
Biopolitical norms are “means of access both to the life of the body and the life of a species.”618 
They ascribe value and utility to individuals and populations and act as factors of segregation 
and social hierarchization.
619
 These norms compromise the rule of law, the integrity of the 
private realm, and support colonization to the extent that they are superimposed on the law. This 
superimposition provides justification for social authorities (doctors, for example) to quarantine, 
control, survey, and even experiment on people, distorting their constitutional and human rights 
in the process.
620
   
Biopolitical norms create the social conditions for various campaigns to manage life toward 
securing the health of society. These include campaigns for social/public health, for “progeny, 
race, the future of the species and the vitality of the social body,” to protect society against 
“dangerous” elements.621 When applied, these norms distort the rule of law, transforming the law 
from an ‘unbiased’ authority to one which discriminates according to the criteria set forth by 
these norms, since law is organized and instituted within a biopolitical regime. These biopolitical 
techniques never ‘cure’ persons, but “merely refer individuals from one disciplinary authority 
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[prisons, hospitals, etc] to another…”622 Foucault argues that the true purpose of such norms 
have a economic in nature. “The adjustment of the accumulation of men [sic] to that of capital,” 
says Foucault, “the joining of the growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces 
and the differential allocation of profit, were made possible in part by the exercise of bio-power 
in its many forms and modes of application. The investment of the body, its valorization, and the 
distributive management of its forces were at the time indispensable.”623 Foucault, then, offers an 
account of a new social phenomenon called biopolitics, or the organization and discipline of 
populations according to norms generated in the human sciences. The underside of these norms 
is that they allow social authorities to act in ways that compromise individuality and violate the 
rule of law and the right to privacy. 
 While Agamben does not disagree with Foucault’s conception of biopolitics, his own 
study indicates the need to revive and reconstitute the problem of sovereignty in ways that 
Foucault did not. Agamben’s research focuses on what Foucault’s did not, namely “the 
exemplary places of modern biopolitics: the concentration camp and the structure of the great 
totalitarian states of the twentieth century.”624 One of the many effects of this is that Agamben 
sees the need to take seriously the idea of sovereignty, a concept Foucault, along with much of 
late twentieth century (economic) discourse, was at ease to set aside. As we have seen, Agamben 
links sovereignty to biopolitics. When biopolitics operate according to identity and 
differentiating structures, they are oriented toward the logic of sovereignty; a logic that begins to 
play out when the identity and differentiating structures enter into zones of indistinction. From 
the point of view of the sovereign, bare life is all that exists initially. Bodies (human?) have no 
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rights, free will, or social contract. Through biopoilitcs, which Agamben defines as “the work of 
the science of the police,” the political body is formed.625 He elaborates on this definition in 
Homo Sacer, where he links biopolitics to national socialist ideology. “National Socialist 
biopolitics,” he says, “and along with it, a good part of modern politics even outside the Third 
Reich – cannot be grasped if it is not understood as necessarily implying the disappearance of the 
difference between the two terms: the police now becomes politics, and the care of life coincides 
with the fight against the enemy…It thus aims to fortify the health of the people as a whole and 
to eliminate influences that harm the biological growth of the nation.”626 Indeed, biopolitics is 
“the link that secretly governs the modern ideologies seemingly most distant from one 
another.”627  
The sovereign ban is executed by way of a wide range of biopolitical strategies that all 
reduce populations to biopolitical classifications. In concrete cases, biopolitics takes root in 
legislation and policy in the form of “general and indeterminate clauses,”628 which seem to be 
either moralistic or fear-based: “good morals…proper initiative, important motive, public 
security, state of danger, case of necessity.” Agamben notes the significance of these clauses: 
they do not refer to a rule (i.e. the rule of law), but to a situation, which “rendered obsolete the 
illusion of a law which would a priori be able to regulate all cases and all situations…The judge, 
the civil servant, or whoever else has to reckon with such a notion no longer orients himself 
according to a rule of situation of fact.”629 Agamben notes that there is a shift in the meanings 
and uses of law: the law is no longer applied (e.g. decrease in trail by jury), but the biopolitical 
law of nature is now fully realized. Upon the execution of a biopolitical strategy within a state of 
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exception, social authorities ignore the rule of law and bind themselves “solely with [their] own 
community of race…”630 In Schmittian fashion, sovereignty emerges in the state of exception as 
the decision on the exception, that is, on when the law does and does not apply. Yet, different 
from Schmitt, the sovereign decision in our contemporary context rests not with the dictator, but 
with a wide range of actors across a number of institutions including police, education, medicine 
and religion. These actors, in accord with human scientific ideology, make decisions as to 
whether a life is worthy of living. For Agamben, the state of exception minimizes questions 
about the social contract and constitutional rights. Before the political body is formed, the state 
of exception shapes what he calls the “biopolitical body,” that is, it confines bare life away from 
‘good’ life.  
The overall effect of these biopolitically based decisions is that a “twofold” biopolitical body 
is produced (German/Jewish, White/Black). Individuals and entire populations run the risk of 
having their entire legal status erased, as in the case of those who, without rights, are now simply 
called “detainees.” As for citizenship, it “now does not simply identify a generic subjugation to 
royal authority or a determinate system of laws, nor does it simply embody…the new egalitarian 
principle; citizenship names the new status of life as origin and ground of sovereignty and, 
therefore, literally identifies…’the members of the sovereign.’”631 Those who are not citizens are 
subjected to a wide range of marginalizing geopolitical strategies, including gentrification, 
ghettoization, confinement, imprisonment, and finally, and most importantly for Agamben, the 
camp. While Foucault accented the prison and panopticon, Agamben argues sees “the camp” as 
the dominant paradigm for biopolitical governance in the modern world. The camp, rather than 
the city, is the new biopolitical paradigm of ‘the Modern.’ The camp is “the hidden matrix and 
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nomos of the political space in which we are still living.”632 It is “the space that is opened when 
the state of exception begins to become the rule.”633 Before Agamben, Foucault gave some 
attention to the camp, especially noting its supervisory and experimental advantages.
634
 His 
insights are of note in thinking about the camp: 
The camp is the diagram of power that acts by means of general visibility. For a 
long time this model of the camp or at least its underlying principle was found in 
urban development, in the construction of working-class housing estates, 
hospitals, asylums, prisons, schools: the spatial ‘nesting’ of hierarchized 
sureveillance. The principle was one of ‘embedding’ (‘encastrement). The camp 
was to the rather shameful art of surveillance what the dark room was to the great 
science of optics.
635
  
Ek notes that “the camp has a colonial origin (created by the Spanish in Cuba and the English in 
South Africa at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century 
respectively…colonial war extended the State of Emergency to an entire civil population…”636 
Ek highlights the significance of the camp as the culmination of the life-denying forces 
unleashed during the state of exception, noting the “connection between racism, colonialism, 
biopolitics and the camp. Modernity is a colonial modernity, and its histories and geographies 
have been made in the shadow of colonialism.”637 Among other things, this implies colonial 
models of governance, or those where “the camp was entrusted [to authorities] outside the rules 
of penal and prison law”638  
Philosopher Anthony Downey also gives attention to the camp. Downey is particularly 
concerned about processes that the oppressed undergo “often in advance of their internment, 
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forms of legal and political delegitimization and the suspension (if not denial) of their right to 
representation, be it legal, political, or otherwise.”639  Downey concludes that the camp in all its 
incarnations is the most insidious symbol of modernity, concomitant with the incremental repeal 
of an individual’s rights. “Placed beyond political and legal representation, [Agamben] argues 
that the subject of modernity increasingly inhabits a zone of indistinction within which their 
claims to justice and equality can be effectively suspended. And these spaces of modernity are 
identified in the proliferation of camps – in all their transient forms of permanence – across the 
modern world.”640 In the camps, one is “consigned to condition inhumana while awaiting the 
only possible outcome under such conditions: death.”641 The camp, for Downey, is the most 
distinctive feature of modernity, and it is the “law of a new sovereign power – an unaccountable 
form of rule – re-emerging in modernity and made manifest in the architecture of genocide.”642  
 In sum, Agamben’s theory of the state of exception is one in which the doctrine of the 
state of nature, the state’s internal principle, comes to predominance as law recedes into the 
background. The constitution is suspended, the normal order placed on standstill, and a 
dispensation is commenced wherein it becomes difficult if not impossible to distinguish between 
the norm and the exception. On the one hand, the state of exception signals the ban, where 
certain individuals of populations are abandoned by the law to occupy the thresholds of the 
social order, spaces of indeterminacy and zones of indistinction. On the other, biopolitical 
process is initiated whereby individuals are disciplined, punished, confined, and may even be 
killed, according to any of a variety of human scientific norms. The purpose of biopolitics is to 
rank, purify, strengthen, and maximize social forces. The Third Reich is Agamben’s central case. 
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He argues that the state of exception, i.e. the “voluntary creation of a permanent state of 
emergency (though perhaps not declared in the technical sense) has become one of the essential 
practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones.”643 As I will argued in the 
conclusion of this dissertation, it appears that the state of exception is dominant paradigm of 
government in contemporary politics, moving from a provisional measure to a more regular 
technique of government. In the U.S., this means the decline of the legal authority and role of 
judicial discretion and the rise of rigid, all-encompassing policies and practices. 
Case Study: The U.S. State of Exception, the War on Drugs and Neoliberal Ideology 
 
Agamben’s analysis is important for an African American political theology because it 
illuminates how the juridical system continues to partition off, manage, subjugate, constrain, 
regulate, frustrate and also produce the black body and black agency. These forces, which 
Agamben highlights, are the correlative social disciplines to West’s three anti-democratic 
dogmas - escalating authoritarianism, aggressive militarism, and free-market fundamentalism. 
Moreover, to the extent that these forms of sovereign power circulate in a global context, 
Agamben’s theory of the state of exception is also helpful for cases like Abu Ghraib, 
Guantanamo Bay, and Haiti, all of which I initially planned to include in my dissertation 
research.  
  A prime example of a contemporary state of exception is America’s ‘War on Drugs’. 
The four-decades long (1970s-present) biopolitical campaign against criminality has produced 
disastrous results for democracy and the rule of law. Policies such as “truth-in-sentencing” as 
well as prosecutorial pressure for guilty pleas place the established institutions of justice on 
standstill, and the military’s wartime powers have been extended predominantly into the poor 
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black and Latino civic life. On the ground, this means the creation of agencies like the U.S. 
Border Patrol, the El Paso Intelligence Center, or from another angle, the issuing of house 
arrest ankle monitors for “delinquents.” Today, sovereignty resides with the police, who carry 
out the biopoliitcal vocation with religious-like devotion. In the wake of police tactics, we have 
witnessed many deaths: Eric Garner, Sandra Bland, Tamir Rice, Freddie Gray and other of a 
variety of colors and character types. In 2014, the Obama administration unveiled a new, 
apparently more humane drug policy, one whose task was is not to punish criminals, but to 
“break the cycle of addiction, arrest and incarceration.”644 However, a biopolitical analysis of 
this new approach finds that bare life has simply been taken up anew under a campaign of social 
medicine and thus exhibits features similar to the War on Drugs: the rule of law is compromised 
by the intervention of psychiatric and medical professionals “at every level of the justice system” 
as they attempt to “link the criminal justice system with the substance abuse system.”645 The new 
policy claims to be staunchly against incarceration, but it remains the case that the biopolitical 
production, management and control of bare life still occurs.   
The war on Drugs, along with various techniques of authoritarian governance over black 
bodies, is legitimated by the current mode of liberal economic discourse. Known by a variety of 
names (neoliberalism, libertarianism, New Wilsonianism, liberal internationalism and neo-
classical economics), neoliberal ideology dominates the North American cultural landscape. The 
structure of this ideology has been shaped significantly by thinkers such as Milton Friedman 
(1912-2006), Paul A. Samuelson (1915-2009) and AW Phillips (1914-1975). However, 
philosopher Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992) has made perhaps the most distinctive 
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impact in terms of signatures on human beings, when he argues that entrepreneurial 
individualism is an evolved way of life of any form of collective or “social” morality. We find 
this in his The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (1988). Here, he explains that the current 
spontaneous market-generated order of things reflects a (Western) culture at the forefront of 
(cultural, not biological) evolution. In this context, the mark of an evolved human being is 
ownership of private property, the capacity to trade freely, and the possession of morals that 
reflect such an evolved state, i.e. entrepreneurial individualism. For Hayek, private property and 
entrepreneurial individualism function as a signature, placing human beings in ‘identity and 
differentiating’ structures of classification:  
…[O]nly abstract rules of property – i.e. rules of law – guarantee freedom. When Adam 
Ferguson summed up such teaching by defining the savage as man who did not yet know 
property, and when Adam Smith remarked that ‘nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures 
or natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that is yours’, they expressed what, in spite of 
recurrent revolts by rapacious or hungry bands, had for practically two millennia been the 
view of the educated. As Ferguson put it, ‘It must appear very evident, that property is a 
matter of progress.’646 
In Hayek’s narrative, cultural evolution moves away from collective and cooperative ways of life 
to an order marked by differentiation, individualization, increased wealth and great expansion. 
Again, this culturally evolved context requires human conduct to evolve into what has come to 
be called “entrepreneurial individualism”647: the evolved exhibit “disciplined work, 
responsibility, risk-taking, saving, honesty, the honouring of promises, as well as the difficulties 
of curbing by general rules one’s natural reactions of hostility to strangers and solidarity with 
those who are like oneself…”648 Unfortunately, there are those who are less evolved, primitive 
even, and thus cannot transcend their animal status. They remain bound to autocratic and slavish 
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collectivities, groups of thieving bands and nostalgic cooperatives. However, this “socialist” 
morality “serves to steer the cooperation of the members of the troop, a cooperation that was, 
necessarily, a narrowly circumscribed interaction of fellows known to and trusted by one 
another.”649 Hayek admonishes socialist moralists otherwise: “continued obedience to the 
command to treat all men as neighbors would have prevented the growth to an extended order. 
For those now living within the extended order gain not from treating one another as neighbors, 
and by applying, in their interactions, rules of the extended order – such as those of several 
property and contract – instead of the rules of solidarity and altruism.”650  
 Neoliberal anthropology sits within a larger metaphysical scheme, namely the all-
encompassing market, whose sovereign laws of supply and demand determine the stage and 
character of things, including (among other things) firms, products, wage rates and inflation 
rates.  Neoclassical thinkers interpret economics as an objective science framed within positivist 
rules of discursive formation. Milton Freidman provides this positivist metaphysical support for 
neoliberal economics, most decidedly his 1966 article: “The Methodology of Positive 
Economics”, where he argues that:  
Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical position or 
normative judgments. As Keynes says, it deals with "what is," not with "what ought to 
be." Its task is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make correct 
predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances. Its performance is to 
be judged by the precision, scope, and conformity with experience of the predictions it 
yields. In short, positive economics is, or can be, an “objective” science, in precisely the 
same sense as any of the physical sciences.
651
   
 
For Freidman, the objectivity of positivist economic science finds support in an analysis of 
supply and demand as the two most significant elements affecting the relative price of products 
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and/or factors of production. He uses business firms as an example, explaining that if one 
analyzes the movements of supply and demand, and the conditions which underlie them, one 
may attain a high level of predictive success concerning the health and/or growth potential of a 
firm. Just as Hayek theorized two types of morals framed within identity and differentiating 
structures, so Friedman argues that the market’s objective laws of supply and demand give rise to 
two “ideal types” of firms. They are “atomisticially competitive firms, grouped into industries, 
and monopolistic firms.”652 As Friedman explains each type, we see that these ideal types 
function as what Agamben called “identity-difference signatures:”  
A firm is competitive if the demand curve for its output is infinitely elastic with respect to its 
own price for some price and all outputs, given the prices charged by all other firms; it 
belongs to an “industry” defined as a group of firms producing a single “product.” A 
"product" is defined as a collection of units that are perfect substitutes to purchasers. So the 
elasticity of demand for the output of one firm with respect to the price of another firm in the 
same industry is infinite for some price and some outputs. A firm is monopolistic if the 
demand curve for its output is not infinitely elastic at some price for all outputs. If it is a 
monopolist, the firm is the industry.
653
 
Here, Freidman provides the criteria by which business firms might be ordered according to a 
“natural” hierarchy. Those firms that compete with other firms to produce the same product are 
competitive, but only imperfectly so, while firms that have overtaken and become the industry 
are monopolistic, i.e. perfectly competitive. Such a model cannot but encourage the proliferation 
of monopolistically-oriented firms, managers and workers.  The thinking of Hayek and Freidman 
are examples of the ways in which positive economists conceive of the natural order of things 
within the common/proper dialectic, that is, in way that place them within identity and 
differentiating structures.  
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In the context of the contemporary North American state of exception, i.e. the War on Drugs, 
neoliberal ideology operates to justify the operation of biopolitics and thanatopolitics on black 
flesh. Although black and brown bodies are pushed into ghettos and poor schools, policed, 
unlawfully arrested and indefinitely detained, North American culture ignores or accepts it 
because blacks fall within the signature of Hayek’s mythical primitives. According to Hayek’s 
analysis, black cries of protest amount to primitive tribal cries whose meaning is fragmented in 
the market, calls to unifying love reflect the hollow hopes of a bygone era, and social organizing 
and social movements pose a direct threat to individual freedom. Agamben (following Arendt 
and Schmitt) argues that Hobbes’s state of nature doctrine has become determinate in the 
contemporary state of exception. However, it is possible that Hayek’s doctrine of nature 
circulates alongside Hobbes’s without much friction because they both operate with paradigms 
of sovereignty. Like Hobbes, Hayek theorizes an opposition between law and nature and also 
holds the thesis of the anteriority of nature with respect to law. In Hayek’s account, the 
spontaneous market order existed before the law, and too much law can only impede the 
market’s evolutionary patterns. Hayek is a critic of sovereignty. Yet the paradigm of sovereignty 
still circulates within his theory such that in exceptional cases it legitimates the exercise of 
sovereign power against “socialists” and other less evolved groups in an effort to preserve the 
order of things. As Hayek says, “[g]overnments strong enough to protect individuals against the 
violence of their fellows make possible the evolution of an increasingly complex order of 
spontaneous and voluntary cooperation.”654 In the state of exception, sovereign power comes 
forth in all its vengeance. 
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A New Paradigm 
 
We have seen how the paradigm of sovereignty - physis opposed to nomos and the anteriority 
of nature with respect to law – links justice with violence and blurs them to the point of 
indistinction. Agamben constitutes a new paradigm as an alternative to the paradigms of 
sovereignty by turning to Plato’s Gorgias (~380) and The Laws. These demonstrate how Plato 
“dismantle[s] the Sophistic construction of this opposition [between nature and order] as well as 
the thesis of the anteriority of nature with respect to law.” For Agamben, Plato offers an 
alternative paradigm to Pindar and the Sophists’ paradigm of sovereignty, first, by affirming the 
idea of a human soul in the state of nature. In his words, Plato dismantles the paradigm of 
sovereignty “both by affirming the originarity of the soul and of ‘all that belongs to what is a 
soul’ (intellect, techne, and nomos) with respect to bodies and the elements ‘that we erroneously 
say are in accordance with nature.’”655 For Plato, the originarity of the soul implies that even in 
the state of nature, before the rise of civilization, the possibility exists of a ‘law’ in harmony with 
nature rather than opposed to it, a ‘natural law’ of sorts. Plato’s paradigm also neutralizes the 
paradigm of sovereignty with the notion of the nonviolent character of law, a feature derived 
from the first. Agamben explains that Plato’s paradigm emphasizes “not law’s sovereignty over 
nature but, on the contrary, its ‘natural,’ which is to say nonviolent, character…in Plato, the ‘law 
of nature’ is thus born to undermine the Sophistic opposition of physis and nomos and to exclude 
the sovereign confusion of violence and law…”656 These two features – an original human soul 
not completely determined by nature and the nonviolent character of the ‘natural law’ – 
constitute paradigms that effectively dismantle the paradigm of sovereignty.  
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With respect to the Western canonical discourse on sovereignty, Agamben’s criticism of the 
paradigm of sovereignty means that although certain theorists may have been critics of 
sovereignty, they may still be implicated as subscribing to a paradigm of sovereignty. More 
clearly, figures such as Hobbes and Rousseau stand in this tradition. For all of the differences in 
their doctrines of nature, both imagine the “natural”, pre-political human as without a soul and 
without a link to any kind of transcendent moral order. Thus each of these thinkers eventually 
blurs justice with violence to the point of indistinction. Thinkers such John Locke and Immanuel 
Kant present the analyst with a more significant challenge because it is possible that they might 
be critics of sovereignty, yet still perpetuate the paradigm. This is certainly the case with John 
Locke, a thinker who, though kind enough to grant souls and thus political freedom to the 
industrious, denied such capacities to slaves. In this light, Locke constructs a paradigm of 
sovereignty that reflects a categorical distinction between slaves and citizens of the political 
community. Our vision of Locke the revolutionary, then, is turned on its head, for in exceptional 
cases, perhaps against unruly salves, Locke would permit the state to mix justice with violence, 
even to the point of that their distinction is blurred. Similarly, Kant is a strong critic of 
sovereignty, but his discourse fails to call into question the paradigm of sovereignty. Kant barely 
acknowledges the existence of the state of nature because it is a space devoid of reason. Only 
reason can deliver humans from their confused moral sentiment, and Kant justifies more coercive 
measures for peace if reason cannot accomplish this task. His recommendation of a standing 
army conceals his doctrine of the exception to far less a degree than Locke. While these latter 
theorists acknowledge an original human soul not completely determined by nature and the 
nonviolent character of the ‘natural law’, they don’t attribute such feature to all human beings. 
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This means that paradigms which seek to criticize sovereignty must wrestle with the question of 
universalism and/or universal egalitarianism.   
Philosopher Richard Ek discusses the relationship of Agamben’s theory of paradigms to 
(post-colonial) geopolitics.
657
 Ek follows critical geopolitical theorists O’ Tuathail (1962-) and 
John A. Agnew (1949) in his understanding of geopolitics as “a discursive practice by which 
intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent it as 
‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas.”658 Like Agamben’s 
study of notions such as exteriority and the state of nature, Ek understands critical geopolitics as 
the study “of the spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states.” It 
engages the historical and contemporary politics of writing global space. For Ek, then, critical 
geopolitics is concerned with the discursive formations which conceptualize spaces (such as the 
state of nature). “T]he discursive writing of global political space,” says Ek, “the production of 
geopolitical imaginations, the interpretation of geopolitical events and the implemented 
geopolitics based on these writings/imaginations/interpretations …are finally conducted and 
initiated by political agents, as ‘practical statecraft.’”659 Ek concludes that such practices are thus 
open to critical interrogation and transformation. Critical paradigms, then, not only have 
philosophical and theoretical implications, but also implications for both geopolitical discursive 
formations and for concrete geopolitics. An African American political theology must take 
seriously the geopolitical implications of paradigmatic discourse, for such discourse frames the 
conditions for state action in both international relations and the state of exception.   
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Conclusion 
For Agamben, the problem of sovereignty has been displaced in our post-WWII context. 
In its place, the state of exception, and more specifically the paradigm of sovereignty, has 
become the central problem for the state. Unbeknownst to its own theorizations, the liberal state 
frequently takes exception to its established laws to exercise the sovereign power of life and 
death over those it deems bare life, i.e. life not worthy to live. In this chapter, we observed how 
Agamben’s concept of the state of exception explained much about the U.S. War on Drugs and 
the problem of mass incarceration. We saw how the paradigms of sovereignty, at work in both 
Thomas Hobbes’s and Freidrich Hayek’s doctrines of nature and the body, operated to justify the 
exercise of sovereign power underneath our contemporary neo-liberal culture. Indeed, the 
paradigm of sovereignty operates in a number of liberal thinkers, even critics of sovereignty such 
as John Locke and Immanuel Kant. Agamben’s strategy is to constitute new paradigms, ones that 
dismantle the paradigm of sovereignty. They do so by acknowledging an original human soul not 
completely determined by nature as well as harmony between law and nature such that the 
nonviolent character of law is communicated. We also saw how even Agamben’s prime example 
of an alternative paradigm – from the writings of Plato – was also insufficient for an African 
American political theology to the extent that Plato did not attribute souls in egalitarian fashion.   
We also saw how Agamben’s theory of paradigms has implications for geopolitics, or the 
conceptualization of spaces. It means, at the very least, that we must reconsider our geopolitical 
discursive formations as well as our concrete geopolitics in light of our paradigmatic analysis.  
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Conclusion 
This dissertation is a critical discourse analysis of sovereignty (i.e. supremacy) in 
canonical Western political theory. It became my topic of study after its theorization in the work 
of Giorgio Agamben. His analyses of the logic of sovereignty at work in Western biopolitics, 
most recently as the state of exception, made sovereignty a priority for me because it showed that 
sovereignty was a controlling concept in state acts that had disastrous implications for the 
world’s poor.660 This dissertation is a clarifying dissertation. I bracketed my own claims to get 
clear on the contours of the discourse. While theories and practices of sovereignty in its various 
iterations are likely as old as human interaction, sovereignty rose to prominence as a political 
symbol in the West in early modern figures like Jean Bodin. He looked on the history of the 
world’s cultures and derived five features of sovereignty - creating the most important 
magistrates and defining the office of each one, proclaiming and annulling laws, declaring war 
and peace, receiving final appeal from all magistrates, and the power of life and death when the 
law itself leaves no room for extenuation or grace.
661
 Bodin placed sovereignty in the monarch, 
but sovereignty has since traveled to other political actors. After a moment with Hobbes’s 
monarch, it traveled to Rousseau’s nation and then to Hegel’s rational spirit. In Schmitt, 
sovereignty was wrested back into the possession the dictator, i.e. of a single physical body 
reminiscent of the absolute monarch. Today, sovereignty has freed itself yet again and takes 
ideological form. Yet sovereignty’s reign of terror has not been without resistance. In Locke’s 
people, Kant’s reason, Arendt’s authentic politics, and Agamben’s paradigms, sovereignty finds 
its limits, and even a counterbalancing force of freedom.       
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The discourse on sovereignty not only exhibits variation with respect to the locus of 
sovereignty, but also with respect to its legitimacy. Not all of theorists of sovereignty are friends 
of sovereignty. A distinction can be made in the discourse between its champions and critics. In 
the wake of the failings of the liberal state, sovereignty’s champions argue for the supremacy of 
a unitary political actor in relation to individual and associational rights. The authority and 
interests of the sovereign trump all other claims. Thus Jean Bodin theorized an absolute monarch 
against a defiant Huguenot faction, Thomas Hobbes a sovereign against those (Anglicans) 
wanting too much authority and those (Puritans) wanting too little. Other champions of 
sovereignty include Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose general will trumps individual right, G.W.F. 
Hegel, whose subject may never attain a right that transcends the state’s right, and Carl Schmitt, 
whose sovereign dictator decides when the law does and does not apply, and whose sovereign 
ideology determines when one is a friend and when one is an enemy of the state. If there are 
sovereignty’s champions, there are its critics. Sovereignty’s critics write in support of a 
decentralized or “separated” political actor and the rule of law. Sovereignty’s critics include John 
Locke, Hannah Arendt, and Giorgio Agamben, all of whom locate the heart of politics in popular 
politics, and Immanuel Kant, who, because his distrusted all humans, split sovereignty between 
the people, the monarch and reason’s rule over history. Beyond this general distinction, others 
may be made. For example, Bodin and Hobbes are both absolute monarchialists, but diverge on 
the terms of its legitimacy. Again, much of Agamben’s thinking derives in part from Hannah 
Arendt, yet he displays significantly less faith in human rights and the rule of law than she. 
These and other distinctions are helpful, and do not contradict the general distinction between 
champions and critics, but only give it further support.   
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Although sovereignty is most readily taken up as a political scientific term in our current 
context, this study finds that the doctrine of sovereignty cannot be confined to discourse about 
the state’s most appropriate form of government. The roots of sovereignty reach beyond 
government to include discourse on the political body and its exemplar, the state of nature and 
the body. These three doctrines give support to and justify sovereignty. The state of nature is a 
figure of speech, a primordial myth that has been taken literally, and the political body is nature’s 
mimetically derived political symbol. Thinking on the state of nature thus conditions thinking on 
the political body, which makes the state of nature the central theme among the three for how we 
think about sovereignty. John Locke imagined the state of nature not as a Hobbesian war of all 
against all, but an established society simply seeking more security. Thus the authority of the 
political body faded under the strength of inalienable rights. Although Rousseau’s narrative gives 
a twist to this relation, the general pattern remains the same.  
In his account, the state of nature devolves into corruption-prone civil society. He thus 
endows the political body with sovereignty to free civil society from its own evils. Kant also 
appears an enigma to the pattern, for his pessimistic view of nature doesn’t produce a strong 
political body. However, the enigma is solved when we understand than Kant’s pessimistic view 
of nature is offset by his optimism that reason itself would push history beyond its human limits. 
Hegel also dreads nature, but it is also always already caught up in the dialectical unfolding of 
the spirit. Thus Hegel imagines a sovereign nation guided by a monarchial head, one able to 
oversee the consistent cultivation of a people and to direct their energies towards war efforts. For 
Schmitt, the bloody, decisive battle that is history requires a sovereign dictator.     
Discourse analysis on sovereignty reveals a story. It is the story of sovereignty and the 
loss of “the political”, or civil society, in modern political thought, culminating in the perpetual 
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state of exception. Although Carl Schmitt made the most definitive contribution to the concept of 
the political in this dissertation, I find theologian Mark Lewis Taylor’s conception helpful. 
Taylor explains that the political is “a certain mode of organizing the human practices that 
structure social interaction and…collective action in history.”662  It refers not to government 
practices or solely to politics, but “a mode of being affected by our socially and historically 
mediated ontological constitution.” Its primary mark is agonistic tension. The political, then, 
refers to any social or cultural practices that give rise to such tension. It “is inherent to every 
human society and…determines our very ontological condition.”663  
This dissertation described the dynamics inherent in modernist theories of sovereignty, 
which over time and through a series of rational moves, have progressively eroded the centrality 
of the political. In early modern theories of sovereignty (Bodin, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau), the 
political was embedded logically in the body politic. With Kant’s rational empiricism (itself 
informed by Hume’s radical empiricism) and the abandonment of traditional metaphysics for 
transcendental thinking, theories of sovereignty traveled from their metaphysical basis in early 
modern thinkers to the reason of state. Thus, in comparison with early modern thinkers, Kant and 
Hegel give little attention to a philosophy of nature and do not envision a political body based on 
an imaginary social contract. With Hegel, the reason of state becomes totalized. With this 
epistemological shift, the political force of early modern theory, along with its notion of the 
political body, recedes into background as bureaucracy, management, and statecraft become the 
primary locus of the political.  
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In the wake of early 20
th
 century crises across the span of Western culture, the reason of 
state abandoned itself to the state of exception, marked by the voluntary creation of a permanent 
state of emergency and the suspension of habeas corpus for certain populations. This transition, 
from constitutional regimes to the state of exception, can be partly traced to the thinking of 
German jurist Carl Schmitt. Although Schmitt correctly attempted to recover the concept the 
political, his strategy proved to be an overcorrection as his particular conception was totalizing, 
laying claim to each individual wholly. As a result, the political was not only recovered, but also 
(re)construed such that all mediatory strategies were rendered ineffective. Now the decisive force 
of a dictatorial will and more centrally, the state of exception, become “necessary” strategies. 
 On the heels of Schmitt, but far more concerned to protect certain features of liberalism, 
Hannah Arendt also attempted to recover the political. In contrast to Schmitt, her conception was 
authoritative, but not totalizing. It thus lays claim to individuals on behalf of the whole. For 
Arendt, the political marks a moment not of extreme cosmological conflict, but of a situation 
where the context which makes possible the entire reality of the individual’s actions becomes 
defined more by agonism than accord. Arendt was careful to emphasize that the political was not 
absolutely determinate, and that our (impartial) collective narratives enable us to transcend the 
boundaries of our various sects, associations and tribes. She also argued that the human condition 
itself required authentic participatory democratic politics. Looking forward, an African American 
political theology must come to terms with the concept of the political. Arendt is clue here, as 
her conception – authoritative yet not totalizing, and oriented toward democratic politics rather 
than absolutism – seeks to balance the reality of political conflict with the conviction that such 
conflict does not capture the entirety of human existence or potential.        
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This dissertation used the method of critical discourse analysis. This allowed me to 
observe not only how sovereignty itself has been theorized, but also how the discourse on 
sovereignty operates as a socio-cultural practice and constitutive feature of a now-globalized 
Western culture. Discourse on sovereignty is a way of speaking that doesn’t simply reflect or 
represent things ‘out there’, but assists in their construction. Discourse is cognitively processed 
by people. Its thematic structures communicate a distinctive message. It participates in relations 
of domination and oppression or in surrounding dynamics of power, knowledge and ideology. In 
other words, the discourse on sovereignty is not simply abstract academic theory. It also shapes 
the institutions and practices of the state, as well as certain cultural spaces and attitudes. The 
discourse on sovereignty thus matters for our life together. This dissertation finds that Hobbes’s 
state of nature doctrine has become hegemonic in the discourse on sovereignty and that his 
doctrines of the state of nature and the body politic have problematic enduring cultural-historical 
effects, especially for African Americans and the world’s poor. While to Hobbes’s credit he 
theorized the natural condition as an egalitarian condition, he still argued that human interaction 
would decline into a condition of war without the strong hand of an absolutist ruler. For Arendt, 
Hobbes’s state of nature doctrine is the source of power politics, i.e. of the endless accumulation 
of capital and power. In turn, power politics becomes the root of racism, nationalism and a whole 
host of venomous ideologies. By contrast, Hobbes was a resource for Schmitt, who admired his 
vision of a natural war of all against all so much that, beyond Hobbes, Schmitt makes war 
internal to the body politic.     
Critical discourse analysis does not just show that Hobbes’s state of nature doctrine has 
become hegemonic in the discourse on sovereignty, but also that it stands as a key paradigm of 
sovereignty. According to Agamben, the institution of the state of exception in a number of 
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Western states in the early twentieth century including Britain, France, Italy, and the U.S. has 
displaced the question of sovereignty as the central question of statecraft. In its place, the 
question of the paradigm of government has taken center stage, and in the late twentieth and 
early twentieth century, the paradigm of sovereignty has become dominant. When Agamben says 
that Hobbes’s state of nature doctrine is a paradigm, this means that he rejects all discourse on 
nature and the body trapped within the “common/proper dialectic.” Philosopher Benson Saler 
notes that the problem with this kind of discourse is that its tools for generalizing, comparing and 
ordering things – for example, “identity and difference,” “universal and particular,” “organic and 
inorganic,” “genus and species” – is so determined to find the universal in particular things that it 
translates similarities between things into identities and so eclipses differences.
664
  
Thus paradigmatic readings of nature and the body are indifferent to the common/proper 
dialectic and instead ask how these doctrines function as guides on matters of controlling, 
organizing, and exercising power. Paradigms of sovereignty, readily represented in Hobbes’s 
state of nature doctrine, but which frame every definition of sovereignty, have two marks: a) an 
opposition between law and nature and b) the anteriority of nature with respect to law.
665
 
Paradigms of sovereignty unite law with violence to such an extent that the distinction between 
the two becomes blurred. Today, such paradigms are hegemonic and this is important because 
they orient (state) actions in the state of exception and its final measure of right action.  
To conclude, we sit, then, in dark times. Liberalism - the ethos of discussion, debate, 
compromise and exchange – wanes even as the political rises. In the U.S., enemies of various 
sets face off, sometimes in the most extreme forms of conflict. “Black lives matters” stands off 
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against “Blue lives matters.” Sexually normalized people balk at those who resist the norm. Open 
carry advocates unsettle the deep sensibilities of pacifists and nonviolent activists. An insecure 
patriarchal culture wages war on women. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the political will be 
simply authoritative or totalizing. Again, an African American political theology takes the 
former position as clue. Even as the political re-emerges, the state of exception has become the 
rule. The constitution has been suspended for groups such as African Americans, Hispanics, 
Sikhs and Muslims. These groups are treated so poorly by the state that it is hard to determine 
whether they sit within or outside the political community. Meanwhile, “the camp” has emerged 
in various forms: mass incarceration, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay to name a few. All of 
this is justified by a neoliberal ideology, which construes freedom not as a natural attribute of all 
human beings, but as the result of a selective process of cultural evolution. This same ideology 
erroneously opposes “freedom and property” to neighborly love and collective cooperation. 
Finally, even as the political threatens to become totalizing and the camp emerges, the paradigm 
of sovereignty has become hegemonic. Now, in the state of exception, justice and law have 
become fused with violence to the point of indistinction. Thus black and brown bodies are 
pushed into ghettos and broken schools, policed, unlawfully arrested and indefinitely detained, 
all in the name of the preservation of justice.  
In such times, it is helpful to remember that political theologians bear a great 
responsibility for the history of effects and consequences of sovereignty as the ideology of 
totality and power in the twenty-first century. Sovereignty endures even today in the state of 
exception, which frames our current global political context. If political theologians provide 
theological interpretations of the source, meaning and purposes of political society, then the 
challenge this dissertation presents for future constructive work is to construe the political when 
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the state of exception seems perpetual in the 21
st
 century. In this sense, the dissertation is a 
prolegomena to an African American political theology in the state of exception, where the 
henotheism of market forces reigns supreme: free-market fundamentalism, escalating 
authoritarianism, and aggressive militarism. How might one think about African American 
Political Theology where we seem caught between the rock of Carl Schmitt’s henotheistic faith 
in the national community as sovereign and the hard place of Hannah Arendt’s polytheistic faith 
in plurality and difference? This means that we need a new paradigm. An African American 
political theology seeks doctrines of nature and the body that are indifferent to the 
common/proper dialectic. These doctrines must also promote the originarity of the human soul, 
one not completely determined by nature, as well as the nonviolent character of the ‘natural’, that 
is, pre-civil, law. These features displace the paradigm of sovereignty. Moreover, we also need 
the appropriate form of faith-filled democratic politics. These politics would be popular, 
participatory, oriented toward consistent discussion with those who have views unlike our own, 
and prone to social movements and other forms of collective democratic action, even with and on 
behalf of those with pervasive dissimilarities. 
Finally, an African American political theology must revisit perhaps the most pressing, 
haunting and vexing question of all, that of the sovereignty of God. In light of the history of 
effects of the concept of sovereignty, this question has become more central for one rooted in the 
black church and mainline Christian traditions. This dissertation finds claims regarding the 
sovereignty of God to be questionable in light of the fact that the history of sovereignty’s effects 
on the world’s poor appears to be categorically at odds with biblically based Christian claims 
about God’s “preferential option for the poor.” Indeed, the same sovereignty under which Christ 
was crucified was posited by Bodin as the supreme power of the modern world, and just as the 
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sovereignty of old unleashed unflinching brutality on the forsaken Christ, so the modern 
sovereigns pour out violence on the flesh of the disinherited and “wretched of the earth.” Indeed, 
in the concept of sovereignty, the cross and the lynching tree converge. This raises the question 
as to whether the phrase “sovereignty of God” commits a categorical error. That is, it raises the 
question as to whether the terms fit together or are inherently opposed, that is, sovereignty and 
God. This means that an African American political theology must give attention to questions 
about God’s transcendence, immanence, about divine providence and divine impassibility, about 
immutability and a host of other concerns surrounding the nature and attributes of God. At the 
very least, this dissertation finds that sovereignty is at root a grotesque symbol, one filled with 
tension and ambiguity. It can mean power or the lack thereof, freedom or enslavement, life or 
death. For now, it is sufficient to say that sovereignty’s career as a political symbol is evidence 
enough of it unsuitability for politics even as those theologians who first brought me to this 
project insisted, theologians such as John Milbank and Jean Bethke Elstain and the religious 
critic, Cornel West whom together held the political career of sovereignty violently suspect in 
the production and reproduction of its power of life and death over the wretched of the earth. 
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